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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with understanding the relationship between trade liberalization 
and the environment in the context of China. Four empirical essays are conducted to 
investigate different aspects of the nexus. We first look at the changing patterns of 
revealed comparative advantage in manufacturing industries for China and other 
countries to examine whether dirty industries have `migrated' from developed countries 
to China as a result of an environmental regulatory gap. The attention is then turned to 
the determinants of trade specialization and the role played by environmental stringency 
using cross-industry regressions within a Heckseher-Ohlin framework. The 
environmental consequences of trade liberalization are evaluated at both the industrial 
and provincial level. Next, Environmental Input-Output Analysis (EIOA) is used to 
measure the `potential' and `actual' pollution content (for three air pollutants, C02, SO2, 
NO, 1) in imports and exports by industry and overall. In the last essay, we evaluate 
different and countervailing effects (scale, income and trade-induced composition 
effects) of trade's impact on the environment using Chinese provincial data. 
Some generalizations can be made from the studies. Firstly, little evidence is found to 
support the feared `Dirty Industry Migration' phenomenon from North (developed 
countries) to South (e. g. China) at ISIC 3 digit level for the past three decades. 
Secondly, environmental stringency seems to be a negative effect on trade performance 
at cross-industry level in China. Thirdly, China `saves' in environmental terms through 
trade and its exports structure is cleaner than that of imports; however, these two 
conclusions are completely overturned when technology heterogeneity across countries 
is allowed for. Finally, the channels through which trade liberalization can affect the 
environment are conflicting and there is no clear cut answer to the question 'is freer 
trade good or bad to the environment'. 
V 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
The worldwide concern over the interaction between trade liberalization and the 
environment started as early as the beginning of 1970s. For example, the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 was the first 
global conference on environmental issues. In 1980s, the Montreal Protocol on the 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layers set a good example for the subsequent 
international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. Along with the creation of free 
trade promoting agreements and organizations such as North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s, fears of 
competitiveness loss' for the developed world and fears of environmental disaster for 
the less developed countries made the links between trade liberalization and the 
environment hotly debated. 
With three decades of economic reforms and opening-up, China now has a very large 
economy, indeed larger than most developed countries in terms of GDP2; however, it 
'It is argued that stricter environmental regulations will lower the international competitiveness of the 
firms in the developed countries. 
2 China is estimated to be the third largest economy in terms of nominal GDP in 2008 with 3.86 trillion 
dollars and China's ranking as the second largest economy in terms of GDP adjusted by purchasing 
power parity (PPP) remains (World Bank, 2009). 
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also has a grave risk of being nominated as one of the most polluted countries in the 
world3. 
Rapid trade growth, especially export growth encouraged by the export-oriented 
policies, and capital inflows have been accredited for their contribution to China's 
rapid economic growth. In the beginning of the Economic Reform in late 1970s, China 
only enjoyed about 1% of total world trade (sum of exports and imports) but recent 
data (WTO, 2008) show that Chinese export share of the world's total exports is 
approaching 9% and the import share is close to 7% in 2007. Attracted by low labour 
cost and preferential policies for foreign enterprises along coastal regions, foreign 
investment flows have also increased dramatically in China. Between 1979 and 2007, 
the actually utilised value of foreign investment is about 955 billion US dollars and 
that of foreign direct investment (FDI) is about 760 billion US dollars, respectively 
3.12% and 2.88% of total GDP in China during this period. In 2007, the actually 
utilised value of foreign investment and that of FDI are respectively 23.87% and 22.78% 
of GDP in 2007 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2008). 
Environmental degradation in China is certainly not a recent phenomenon that only 
stems from its opening-up process 4 However, it is evident that the environment in 
China has been deteriorating at an unprecedented speed during the period of the trade 
liberalization process. In the early stage of the Economic Reform and opening up, 
environment protection in China was blatantly ignored and sacrificed for economic 
growth. By the early 1990s, the environmental situation was so notoriously worsened 
3 China has 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities according to World Bank data. State Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA, China) reported in 2006 that China is the world's No. 1 emitter of SO2 
emissions. The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency was the first to report that China 
overtook the US and became No. I in CO2 emissions in 2007. 
4 As a matter of fact, it is seen as a century long, even millennium-old course by many researchers (Smil, 
1984; Elvin, 1993,2004; Edmonds, 1994; Shapiro, 2001; Economy, 2004). 
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that China's Environmental Action Plan for 1991-20005 highlighted seven priority 
problems to tackle: water pollution, especially contamination by organic waste; urban 
air pollution, as measured by particulates and sulphur dioxide; hazardous and toxic 
solid waste in urban areas; water shortages, particularly in northern China; soil erosion; 
loss of forests and grasslands. Accumulated pollution, however, has been causing 
great damage in various ways: acid rain falls on one third of the land; one-third to one 
fourth of Chinese people lack access to clean drinking water; hundreds of thousands 
Chinese people die of respiratory diseases caused by poor air quality. Some 
international observers have been very pessimistic about China's huge environmental 
problem. Smil (1993: 192) claims that `there are no solutions within China's economic, 
technical, and manpower reach that could halt and reverse these degradative trends- 
not only during the 1990s but also during the first decade of the new century'. 
China's environment protection network has been developing quickly and has been 
accredited for its sophistication. Although the enforcement of environmental 
protection laws has been questioned, the laws and standards are showing effectiveness 
which is evidenced by the statistics of pollution indicators. As industrial pollution is a 
primary contributor to China's environmental degradation, we provide in table 1.1 the 
trends of GDP and different indicators of industrial pollution between 1985 and 2007. 
While GDP has increased to eight fold in 2007 compared to 1985, the industrial 
pollution has not risen in such a dramatic manner. Solid waste disposal seems to have 
the largest decrease scaled by initial level. Industrial waste water, industrial dust and 
industrial soot have remained relatively steady with variations across the years. 
Industrial waste air has increased to five fold while SO2 has almost increased to the 
double of 1985. 
S It was prepared jointly by the then National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and the State 
Planning Commission (SPC) in 1994. 
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Table 1.1 Trends of GDP and Industrial Pollution 1985-2007 
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Note: values are adjusted to 1985=100 (for solid waste, 1986=100); GDP is gross domestic product 
measured in constant price and adjusted to 1985=100; Data from China Statistical Yearbook (various 
years). 
As trade liberalization is an indispensable part of China's growth miracle while the 
issue of pollution is a bottleneck for China's future economic growth, the linkage 
between trade liberalization and the environment in China is receiving growing 
attention. This project is hence motivated by the need to understand and quantify the 
various aspects in the relationship between trade liberalization and the environment in 
China. 
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1.2 RESEARCH AIMS 
There has been a growing body of literature' both theoretically and empirically 
concerned with the trade liberalization-environment nexus. Like many other 
interlinked economic phenomena, this nexus is multidimensional. Following Taylor 
(2005)'s schematic figuration of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH, explained in 
details below) and Antweiler et al. (2001)'s theory on two motives of trade 
(differences in factor endowments and in environmental policy leading to different 
specialization patterns in different countries), the research questions in this thesis are 
organized in figure 1.1. 
Figurel. 1 The relationship between trade liberalization and the environment 
--i 
Country Characteristics 
I I- i 
Factor Endowments Environmental Regulations 
I 
---I 
I 
Production Costs 
Trade flows/FDI flows 
Pollution, prices, incomes 
Trade 
Liberalization 
The line from country characteristics to environmental regulations, then to production 
costs, to trade/FDI flows, and finally to pollution emissions, is embedded in the 
6 For extensive surveys of this literature, see Dean, 1992; Ferrantino, 1997; Beghin et al., 1999; Levinson, 
1996; Savas, 1999; Tisdell, 2000. 
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pollution haven argument. The PHH stresses the importance of environmental 
stringency as a source of production cost and hence comparative price advantage 
which affects trade patterns. The theoretical side of the PHH hypothesis is broadly 
explored and it is predicted that North (the group of developed countries) specializes 
in clean good while South (the group of less developed countries) specializes in dirty 
good; however, the empirical methodology and evidence are mixed. Detailed literature 
review is provided in chapter two. Similarly, the line from country characteristics and 
factor endowments to trade flows and pollution emissions follows the traditional 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) framework and the factor endowments hypothesis (FEH) 
predicts that North specializes in dirty good (also capital intensive) while South 
specializes in clean good due to their differences in capital-labour ratio. The 
theoretical predictions of the PHH and the FEH seem to be in strong contrast to each 
other but the effects of the two may coexist as they work through different 
mechanisms. Examining the time-series data of trade flows of different industries may 
reflect some of the truth. If the environmental regulatory gap between North and 
South is sufficiently large to cause deviations in H-O predictions, we shall see 
increasing comparative advantage in dirtier industries in developing countries like 
China and the opposite shall be true for developed countries especially those with 
higher environmental standards than other countries. Our first objective is then to 
examine the PHH argument by looking at the changing patterns of comparative 
advantage in China and its major trading partners at industrial level. 
Due to the coexistence of other factors (capital, labour, etc), the role of environmental 
stringency is likely to be masked if we look at the ex post trade flows only. The impact 
of environmental stringency on export performance shall not be ignored even if we do 
not find any evidence to support the PHH from investigation of trade pattern changes. 
Empirical studies have also attempted to quantify the weight of environmental 
6 
stringency on the international competitiveness of the domestic firms as well as on 
firm/FDI location choice. Due to data limitation, most studies are confined to examine 
the impact of increasing environmental standards on US imports at industrial level. 
After decades of development in environment protection laws and rules, China has 
applied a `polluter pays' principle? in environmental regulations: charges must be 
levied for excessive pollution emissions of enterprises and the levy income must be 
used in environmental protection related activities. Since pollution abatement costs 
and trade statistics are available at industrial level, our second question is thus "does 
environmental stringency matter to trade specialization (export performance) at 
industrial level in the context of China? " 
Another line of research focuses on the impact of trade liberalization on the 
environment. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory, trade can be conceived 
as the exchange of the services of production factors. Given that the environment is 
often seen as a production factor in related theoretical models, the service of the 
environment in producing exportable and importable can also be measured. The 
environmental consequences of international trade can be evaluated by calculating the 
embodiment of environmental services in net trade. We are interested in two related 
questions: first, whether China is indeed a net exporter of environmental services (in 
terms of volume) due to its huge trade surplus; second, which is dirtier (in terms of 
intensity), China's exports structure or imports structure? 
7A 
'polluter pays' principle has various definitions which have a common element that the party 
responsible for producing pollution is held responsible by environmental laws for reducing the pollution. 
In China, enterprises are only levied for excessive pollution emissions. 
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The impact of trade liberalization on the environment has distinctive and sometimes 
countervailing effects. With greater market access and technology spillovers, trade 
liberalization serves as a source of economic and income growth which in turn 
encourages better environmental protection. In the mean time, it can hasten natural 
resource depletion and cause specialization in dirty goods which are harmful to the 
environment. In the case of China, trade growth has boosted economic growth and 
technological advance. However this impact is not balanced across China's vast 
geography: coastal provinces have benefited more than inland provinces in GDP 
growth and technological advance. Given the great variations in pollution emissions in 
Chinese provinces, it is our interest to evaluate the different channels of trade's impact 
on the environment and to draw some policy implications. The last question is then 
"what are the mechanisms of trade liberalization's impact on the environment, using 
provincial level analysis? " 
1.3 ROAD MAP 
In order to refine the understanding of the relationship between trade liberalization and 
the environment in China, we look at different aspects of this broad topic. The thesis 
firstly examines the export performance/trade specialization consequences of 
environmental policy heterogeneity across countries, and then investigates the role of 
environmental stringency on trade performance/specialization within a cross-industry 
H-O framework for China. The second half of the thesis focuses on the environmental 
consequences of trade liberalization by investigating the pollution content in trade 
within an Input-Output framework and by decomposing trade's impact into different 
mechanisms using Antweiler et al. (2001)'s theoretical models. 
Chapter two is the scene-setting part of the thesis. Using trade information of 
manufacturing industries between 1976 and 2004 in 100 countries, we attempt to 
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examine the changes in trade patterns which may provide information for the PHH. 
We critically review alternative revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices before 
adopting two specific indices to investigate the changing trade pattern of industries 
according to their `dirtiness'. The findings suggest that China has revealed increasing 
comparative advantage in cleaner industries and increasing comparative disadvantage 
in dirtier industries, which argue against the pollution haven hypothesis on the 
developing country side. In addition, little evidence is found for the PHH on the 
developed country side. 
Chapter three then investigates the determinants of trade specialization in a cross- 
industry regression analysis for China. The role of environmental policy is especially 
looked at. We find some sensitivity in the empirical results according to how trade 
specialization is measured. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in industries and 
time specific effects, we do find evidence for the hypothesis that stringent 
environmental policy has negative impact on export performance. Moreover, the 
export performance of dirtier industries seems to be more adversely affected by 
increasing environmental stringency. 
Chapter four addresses the issue of environmental consequence of trade openness by 
looking at the overall pollution content (i. e. environmental services) embodied in 
exports and imports using Environmental Input-Output analysis. To address the 
weaknesses in the existing literature, we distinguish the `actual' and `potential' 
pollution content of trade by using alternative assumptions of production technologies 
for the imported goods. It turns out that China `saves' in environmental terms by 
producing and exporting cleaner goods than the importable; however, China is 
exporting more pollution content than actually embodied in the imported goods due to 
China's less energy efficient production technologies compared to the advanced 
industrialized economies. 
9 
Chapter five decomposes the impact of trade liberalization on the environment into 
distinctive channels: the scale effect, the income effect and the trade-induced 
composition effect. Using Chinese provincial data between 1985 and 2007, we carry 
out the econometric analysis for the determination of provincial pollution levels. The 
results provide evidence that an increase in economic activities brings increase in 
pollution emissions while an increase in income level tends to reduce pollution. We 
find that factor endowments and environmental stringency tend to offset each other 
and result in a small trade-induced composition effect which has mixed sign under 
different modelling and estimation. We also find that capital intensity is associated 
with dirtier production and more emissions. 
Chapter six summarizes the main empirical findings of the thesis upon which policy 
implications are also considered. Moreover, it highlights the limitations of the 
empirical techniques used, the contributions of the thesis made to the literature. 
Finally, it points to possible research areas for further work. 
10 
CHAPTER TWO 
POLLUTION HAVENS AND REVEALED 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy as a whole and its trade regime 
specifically has undergone significant reforms. The characteristics of Chinese trade 
flows--their remarkable growth, the structure of sectoral trade, the geographical 
distribution, together with their underlying causes--have been explored. One aspect of 
trade specialization research links to the weaker environmental regulations in China. It 
is feared that dirty industries facing higher environmental controls in the industrialized 
countries may have found 'pollution havens' in developing countries like China where 
environmental protection is taken less seriously. Research has been undertaken to 
address whether such fear is supported empirically by examining changes in trade 
patterns. 
The main research question investigated in this chapter is whether China has 
specialized in line with a comparative advantage in pollution intensive industries. As 
mentioned in the introduction chapter, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis suggests that a 
developing country with relatively lax environmental regulations will be made dirtier 
as a result of trade liberalization and become pollution havens for the world's 
pollution intensive industries. Given less stringent environmental regulations than its 
major trading partners, China is predicted to have a comparative price advantage in 
producing dirty goods. The traditional H-O framework, however, predicts that China 
11 
become more specialized, as it opens up, in relatively clean (usually labour intensive) 
goods given its large endowment of labour and its relative scarcity in physical capital 
and human capital, and as a result can become less specialized in the production of 
pollution intensive goods. In practice, of course, the two effects may be 
simultaneously influencing different sectors in China and the net impact on 
specialization depends on the relative importance of the two effects. As suggested by 
Balassa (1965: 103), "for purposes of indicating the possible consequences of trade 
liberalization, it appears sufficient to provide information on revealed comparative 
advantage. " In this chapter, we explore what the actual trade flows reveal about the 
relative strengths of the two forces (or possibly of other forces). 
By investigating the sectoral trade flows of manufacturing industries for China as well 
as its major trading partners during the period 1976-2004, we aim to find out the 
dynamics of Chinese revealed comparative advantages in different industries which 
are categorized according to their `dirtiness'. The main findings suggest that although 
China has undergone significant structural change in sectoral trade, China has shown 
little or no revealed comparative advantage in pollution intensive industries. Rather, 
China has increased revealed comparative disadvantage in the most polluting 
industries, while most of the cleanest industries in China have increased revealed 
comparative advantage over time. There is also little evidence that the pollution 
intensive industries have decreased comparative advantage in the selected high income 
countries. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 describes the 
theoretical framework of the pollution haven hypothesis, while section 2.3 provides a 
summary of empirical evidence in this branch of research. A definition of `dirtiness' 
will be provided in section 2.4. Section 2.5 compares China's trade structure and 
performance with selected developed countries. Section 2.6 discusses the concept of 
12 
revealed comparative advantage and its concomitant indices. Section 2.7 summarises 
the revealed comparative advantage patterns against sectoral pollution intensities for 
China as well as for five selected high income economies. Finally, section 2.8 
provides some concluding remarks. 
2.2 THE POLLUTION HAVEN HYPOTHESIS 
Traditional comparative advantage theories state that changes in trade performance 
should reflect changes in factor endowments such as capital, labour and land; but 
increasingly, new theories claim that environmental regulations are potentially playing 
an important role in influencing domestic firms' international competitiveness and 
shaping up a country's comparative advantage. 
There are two main schools of thought on the impact of environmental regulation 
differentials on competitiveness. One school votes for the negative effect of 
environmental regulations on competitiveness and comparative advantage. The 
theoretical works can be found in Siebert (1974,1977), Pethig (1976), McGuire 
(1981), Baumol and Oates (1988: 257-283), Krutilla (1991), Carrao and Siniscalco 
(1992), Chichilnisky (1994), Copeland and Taylor (1994,2003), Palmer, Oates and 
Portney (1995), Simpson and Bradford (1996), Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor 
(2001). The main argument is that: by pricing environmental factors, environmental 
regulations can form part of production costs. As a result of heterogeneous 
environmental pricing, other things equal, countries with lax environmental standards 
can become relatively competitive in producing and exporting pollution intensive 
goods while countries with stringent environmental standards lose comparative 
advantage in dirty industries. If capital is freely mobile, pollution intensive industries 
will be driven out of an area with stringent environmental regulations and relocating to 
an area with laxer environmental regulations. Pethig (1976) extends several 
13 
propositions of the neoclassical trade theories to pollution generating industries and 
derives different versions of the theorem of comparative advantage with respect to 
environmental scarcity. McGuire (1981) shows that, environmental regulations can be, 
under specific conditions, equivalent to negative neutral technical progress. McGuire 
also investigates FDI (foreign direct investment) flows and dirty industries relocation 
due to stricter environmental standards in the regulated area. Baumol and Oates (1988: 
257-283) demonstrate in a two-country (rich and poor) two-good (dirty and clean) 
setting that the rich country which adopts an environmental control programme will 
specialize in the clean good while the poor country will specialize in the dirty good. 
This school of thought can be summarized by the Pollution Haven Hypothesis: 
countries with laxer environmental regulations (developing countries) will be made 
dirtier as a result of trade liberalization and become pollution havens for the world's 
pollution intensive industries. 
We adopt Copeland and Taylor (2003)'s pollution haven model to illustrate the PHH. 
The basics of the model: two goods, X is dirty with price p and Y is the clean 
numeraire good; two factors, K refers to capital and L is labour. e is the emission 
intensity which is the result of environmental taxes and the equilibrium output of X. 
Let an asterisk denote Southern variables. North and South have the same capital to 
labour ratio, although North has absolute larger stocks of factors and hence richer than 
South. To investigate the pollution haven mechanism, the authors adopt the 
comparative advantage approach which is common in the traditional international 
trade literature. Basically, this approach employs a relative demand and supply 
analysis for the two goods, as shown in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 the Pollution Haven Hypothesis 
RS 
PA 
PT 
PA* 
XTA T XA/ TX A/y*A XtNT 
RD 
X/Y 
Note: diagram adopted from Copeland and Taylor (2003). A and A* denote autarkic equilibriums while T 
and T' denote production points in trading equilibriums. C denotes consumption in trading equilibrium. 
Because preferences are assumed identical and homothetic and demand decreases as 
price goes up, there is only one common downward-sloping demand curve in the 
figure (denoted as RD). Relative supply curve is denoted as RS, which is upward 
sloping, i. e. RS'(p)>O. 
Since an increase in the emissions intensity (e) would stimulate the X industry and 
contract the Y industry, ORS/Oe>O. The relative supply curve for South lies to the right 
of that for North since emission intensity is higher in South than in North$. The world 
supply curve RSw is a weighted average of the RS and RSA curves and lies in between 
of the two. If trade opens, North's equilibrium would move from A to T and that of 
South would move from A* to T". Thus, the autarky relative price of X is higher in 
a It could be the result of either a rigid emission scheme (exogenous) in North or an income gap driven 
regulatory gap between North and South. Copeland and Taylor (2003) explore income difference as the 
root of regulatory differences in which case the pollution supply and demand curves are shifted upwards 
because of higher income in North and hence pollution taxes are higher in North. Consequently, emission 
intensities are lower in North than in South. 
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North than in South, which implies that the South has a comparative price advantage 
in producing X (the dirty good). On this basis, international trade leads to South 
specializing in dirty good production and North specializing in clean good production. 
To make up the gap between consumption and production, southern production of the 
dirty good rises while that of clean good falls (from XA/Y*A to X'T/Y*T) and the 
contrary applies to North (from X4/Y' to XT/Y"). A pollution haven pattern of 
production and trade thus happens in South. 
The other school of thought on the impact of environmental regulations argues that 
stricter environmental regulation can have little or even positive impact on 
international competitiveness (brought to attention by Porter, 1991). On the one hand, 
to counteract the negative effect of rising environmental standards, developed 
countries may either erect high trade barriers (especially non-tariff barriers) on dirty 
goods imports from the countries that have laxer environmental standards, or subsidize 
the threatened domestic producers. On the other hand, technology innovation triggered 
by stringent environmental standards and government intervention could, to some 
extent, offsets or even overcomes the negative effect of stringent environmental 
regulations. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argue that a country with relatively 
stringent environmental regulations can benefit from the improvement in 
environmental quality and is likely to develop new comparative advantages in the 
environmentally more sensitive industries. These advantages, in the long run, might 
more than offset the short-term losses. This proposition is often referred to as the 
`Porter Hypothesis'. However, Palmer et al. (1995) argue that the Porter hypothesis is 
too optimistic in the sense that it sees tightening environmental standards as a cost- 
free paradigm. 
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2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the literature of environmental regulation and competitiveness, several approaches 
have been used to empirically examine the role of environmental regulations in 
shaping a country's trade pattern and/or firms' competitiveness. They include the 
analyses on trade pattern changes, on the role of environmental stringency on the 
determination of specialization using the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and Gravity- 
type models, and on the role of environmental regulations on FDI location. We group 
and discuss the empirical literature according to their methodological framework. 
2.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
In this section we review the empirical studies that attempt to examine the role of 
environmental regulations using descriptive statistics on production and trade. 
Comparison is generally made between trade performance in developed countries 
(North) and in less developed countries (South), with the definition of `dirty' 
industries and `clean' industries invariably based on US data, either on pollution 
abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) or on emissions of pollutants (from 
Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS), see Hettige et al., 1995). 
The previous studies fall into two groups, those analysing trade and production shares 
of dirty industries and those using revealed comparative advantage indices. In the first 
group, research work has focused mainly on the time-series production share, growth 
rate and net exports of dirty goods compared to other goods or total (manufacturing) 
output. Low (1992) finds out that the growth rate of `dirty' industry exports in Mexico 
exceeded that of total exports between 1981 and 1989. It is questionable, however, if 
this finding applies to other developing countries. Jänike et al. (1997) find the general 
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tendency of net exports between 1960 and 1991 has not involved the general 
relocation of `dirty' basic industries from developed to developing countries. In fact, 
the high-income market economies have remained net exporters of major dirty 
industries, with the net export share in some of the dirty industries becoming even 
higher at the end of the period. Decreases in net exports of the high income group 
could only be found in a few dirty industries such as copper, nickel and tin. 
To the contrary, Mani and Wheeler (1999) find supportive evidence for pollution 
havens in poor countries by exploring the trends of pollution intensive industries in 
different economic groups between 1960 and 1995. Their results show that pollution- 
intensive output (grouping of five dirty industries) as a percentage of total 
manufacturing has fallen consistently in the OECD countries and risen steadily in the 
developing world. Moreover, the periods of rapid increase in net exports of pollution- 
intensive products from developing countries coincided with periods of rapid increase 
in the cost of pollution abatement in the OECD countries. But the authors also argue 
that the tendency towards formation of a pollution haven seems to have been self- 
limiting and transient because economic growth brings countervailing effects through 
regulation and technical expertise, which is evidenced by the `cascading' pattern of 
production and importlexport ratio of dirty industries in the Newly Industrialized 
Countries, Developing East Asia and South Asia. 
Other studies investigate the issue of pollution havens using a revealed comparative 
advantage framework. Using measures of trade flows and revealed comparative 
advantage as indicators of shifts of patterns of international industrial location, Low 
and Yeats (1992) find that between 1965 and 1988 more developing countries gained 
comparative advantage in dirty industries. However, the significance of this discovery 
is muted by the finding that industrialized countries were still the major exporters of 
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"dirty" good: 17 OECD countries accounting for 72.5% of world exports of such 
goods. 
These findings receive supportive evidence from other studies, such as Sorsa (1994) 
who examines the trade patterns of environmentally sensitive goods (ESGs) 9 in 
industrial economies as well as developing countries as a whole. It is found that `the 
bulk of world exports of environmentally sensitive goods continue to originate in 
industrial countries 
-over 70%'. Nevertheless, there are differences between countries. 
While the U. S, Japan, Norway, and Sweden lost market share in environmentally 
sensitive goods, Austria, Finland and Germany gained market share in these goods. In 
addition, industrialized countries as a whole have also been found to have maintained 
their comparative advantage (based on Balassa's revealed comparative advantage 
index) in these goods at the aggregate level over developing countries, although 
product level analysis gives some indication of a shift in comparative advantage 
towards developing countries. 
Following Mani and Wheeler (1997)'s definition of five dirtiest industries, Grether 
and de Melo (2003) examine the patterns of production and trade for 52 countries 
during the period 1981-1998. Their results show that the second richest and the richest 
quintile have experienced decreasing trends in output and export share of some of the 
dirty industries. The RCA-based evidence on delocalization of dirty industries towards 
the South is rather mixed. As a group, developing countries exhibit increasing 
revealed comparative disadvantage in pollution intensive products. Within the dirty 
industries and within countries, there is, however, some evidence for pollution havens 
in poor countries: developing countries have experienced an increase in RCA in 
pollution intensive products. 
9 Environmental sensitive goods (ESG) are defined in Sorsa (1994) as those that incurred the highest 
pollution control expenditure in the US in 1988. 
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To sum up, existing studies provide mixed results for the PHH despite of the 
simplicity of the methods used. While production share of dirty industries in 
developing countries seems to have grown faster to be larger than earlier decades, this 
piece of evidence, however, is not rigorously convincing since we do not know the 
changes in trade patterns and whether such a change is indeed caused by North-South 
regulatory differences. In addition, it is shown that industrialized countries were still 
the major exporters of dirty goods in the 1990s, accounting for more than 70% of 
world's total. At disaggregated level, RCA-based findings show dirty industries in 
developed countries seem to have a decreasing revealed comparative advantage in 
dirty goods while developing countries seem to export more dirty goods. When the 
countries are lumped together as North or South, the reverse seems to be true: as a 
group, developing countries exhibit increasing revealed comparative disadvantage in 
polluting products while developed countries maintain their comparative advantage. 
The divergence in findings may result from both methodology and data differences. 
Regulatory differential is only one possible determinant of specialization along with 
trade liberalization. Traditional production factors also could play important roles in 
affecting specialization. By lumping together countries into North or South, factor 
endowment differentials and regulatory gaps are masked. A developing country with 
presumably lower environmental stringency could be relatively labour abundant as 
China, or relatively natural resource abundant such as Arabian countries. These two 
types of developing countries are likely to respond quite differently in specialization 
terms to trade liberalization. Similarly, by lumping together pollution intensive goods, 
we may lose sight of the unobserved heterogeneity in industries. Some polluting 
industries (higher transportation cost or heavily protected) may be less footloose than 
others. Consequently, the footloose industries have a greater capacity to seek locations 
in South while the less footloose ones may have to expand in North. Thirdly, there is 
no consensus on the choice of trade performance index. While comparative price 
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advantage of lax environmental regulations is theoretically pinned down, it is often 
difficult to use a price formulation of the principle of comparative advantage. Not all 
trade performance indices used may be correctly representing the changing pattern of 
comparative advantage. 
2.3.2 Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
A conventionally used framework in this subject is Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) modelling, 
where comparative advantage is determined by the environmental regulatory gap as 
well as factor endowment differentials. In this methodology, trade performance 
indices are often expressed as a function of factor endowments and environmental 
stringency. However, data on environmental stringency are either unavailable across 
time or incompatible among countries. Hence, early studies have either adopted a 
qualitative measure of environmental stringency or employed pollution abatement 
costs based on the US data. 
An early attempt at investigating the impact of environmental stringency on trade 
patterns is made by Tobey (1990), who uses trade flows data on five pollution- 
intensive industries in 23 countries in 1975. Based on two alternative approaches, i. e. 
including a qualitative variable for regulatory stringency10, and performing an omitted 
variable (regulatory stringency) test, Tobey tests the hypothesis that "stringent 
environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by 
the world's `dirty' industries". No empirical evidence is found from either approach 
that the introduction of environmental control measures has caused trade patterns to 
deviate from the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) predictions. 
10 It is adopted from Walter and Ugelow (1979). 
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By extending Tobey's estimations, a number of studies have examined the link 
between environmental stringency and competitiveness by incorporating heterogeneity 
across regions and industries as well as endogeneity of environmental regulations. The 
results are at best mixed. 
Cole and Elliott (2003) provide an HOV type test of the link between environmental 
stringency and net exports for 4 pollution intensive industries in 60 countries in 1995. 
According to their results, environmental stringency is not a statistically significant 
determinant of net exports, regardless of, which alternative measures of environmental 
stringency used, whether environmental regulations treated as exogenous or 
endogenous, or whether the industries are pooled together or regressed individually. 
On the contrary, Wilson et al. (2002) regress net exports in five pollution-intensive 
industries (individually) on factor endowments and environmental stringency. They 
use pooled cross-section data (time dummies included) for 24 countries between 1994 
and 1998. It is found that environmental stringency is negatively related to net exports 
of most pollution intensive industries, once country heterogeneity such as enforcement 
of environmental regulations is controlled for. To control for unobserved differences 
in the effectiveness of environmental legislation, they use a slope dummy for 
developed (or developing) countries. Their results show that environmental legislation 
has a more dramatic effect on net exports in OECD countries than in non-OECD 
countries. 
Quite a few studies of environmental stringency and trade specialization are 
performed using Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) 11 framework, with factor 
11 There is difference between Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson modelling and Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek 
modelling as the latter is the ` factor content' version of the HOS model. Although the cross-section IIOV 
22 
intensities and a measure of environmental stringency collectively explaining trade 
patterns. A number of studies focus on industries in the US or in other OECD 
countries, since developed countries generally have better data records on 
environmental regulations and pollution abatement costs than developing countries. 
Kalt (1988) is probably the earliest H-O study on the relationship between the US 
environmental stringency and industrial competitiveness. He regresses changes in net 
exports between 1967 and 1977 across 78 industries on changes in environmental 
compliance costs and other control variables. Although the effect of environmental 
stringency on trade patterns is insignificant when 78 industries are pooled together, he 
does find significant and negative effect from environmental stringency for 
manufacturing industries, and especially so when chemical industries are excluded 12. 
Grossman and Krueger (1992) use the ratio of US pollution abatement costs to 
industry value added as a measure of environmental stringency. They investigate 
whether the pattern of US imports from Mexico and the pattern of US foreign 
investment in Mexico in 1987 have been affected by the higher costs of pollution 
abatement in the US. Their findings suggest no significant effect on import penetration 
from Mexico due to higher US environmental standards. 
The usage of cross-section data often makes it difficult to control for unobserved 
characteristics of countries or industries that may be correlated with the key 
explanatory variables. As Levinson and Taylor (2004: 24) put it "the first, and 
simplest, implication of our discussion so far is that cross-section regressions of net 
imports on pollution abatement costs may be biased by unobserved heterogeneity. " 
allows to consider multiple factor multi-commodity case, Bowen et al. (1987) show that it is only a weak 
version of H-0 hypothesis. 
12 Jaffe et al. (1995) point out that this result is puzzling given the fact that chemical industries are subject 
to relatively high environmental compliance costs. 
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Another impossible mission for cross-section analysis is to tackle endogeneity. A few 
recent studies have employed panel data to address both the endogeneity of 
environmental regulation and unobserved heterogeneity of the industries. A significant 
negative effect of environmental regulation on competitiveness has been found in 
these studies. 
Ederington and Minier (2001) argue that the reason why previous research has only 
found a negligible impact of environmental regulations on trade flows is because these 
studies treat the level of environmental regulation as exogenously determined 
(implicitly assuming away the possibility that trade considerations may play a role in 
the setting of environmental policy). To address this weakness, they estimate a system 
of simultaneous equations: an equation modelling the determination of environmental 
protection, and an equation modelling the determination of imports. Following 
Grossman and Krueger (1992), they regress import penetration on the level of 
environmental stringency and trade barriers for US manufacturing industries between 
1978 and 1992. Their fixed effects estimates find a small predicted effect of 
environmental regulations on import penetration. After taking endogeneity into 
account, they use three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation and find a much larger 
effect of environmental regulation on trade flows. Although the sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of instruments is a concern, their results suggest that countries 
tend to endogenously under-tax import competing industries and over-tax export 
industries. 
Levinson and Taylor (2004) develop an econometric model to demonstrate how 
unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and aggregation issues bias measurement of 
the relationship between regulatory costs and trade. Using data from the US, Canada, 
and Mexico for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986, they conduct both 
fixed effects estimation and two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Fixed-effects 
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estimates provide evidence that import penetration from Canada and Mexico into the 
US is positively correlated with pollution abatement costs. Their 2SLS estimates are 
consistently and robustly larger than the FE estimates. 
A recent study by Cole et al. (2005) investigates the competing effects of factor 
intensities and environmental regulations to explain why US specialization in dirty 
industries does not seem to decrease. Using US two and three-digit SIC levels of 
industry aggregation between 1978 and 1994, they find that environmental stringency 
does have a negative effect on U. S specialization indices but this effect has been 
overcome, in terms of elasticity magnitude, by significantly positive effects of human 
capital intensity and physical capital intensity. By using an instrumental variable 
approach, they also find pollution abatement cost actually has a larger effect (in terms 
of elasticity) on trade specialization once endogeneity is addressed. 
Ederington et at. (2005) propose and test several common explanations for why the 
effect of environmental regulations on trade may be difficult to detect. They propose 
that: 1) environmental regulations have stronger effects on trade between 
industrialized and developing countries (while most trade occurs among industrialized 
economies); 2) footlooseness 13 also affects the sensitivity of industries towards 
regulatory differences; 3) for most industries pollution abatement costs are a small 
component of total costs, and the effects of the differences in these small costs are 
overwhelmed by other more important factors. They show that industries with the 
largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least geographically mobile, or 
"footloose". After accounting for these distinctions, they find a significant effect of 
pollution costs on US imports (between 1978 and 2002 at 4-digit industry level) from 
developing countries, and in pollution-intensive, footloose industries. 
13 Footlooseness refers to geographical mobility of an industry and is usually measured as transport cost, 
fixed plant cost as well as the extent of agglomeration economy. 
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Mulatu et al. (2004) examine the impact of environmental regulation on net exports of 
2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries during the period 1977-1992 in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the US. They also distinguish pollution-intensive from non pollution- 
intensive industries, resource-based from non resource-based industries, to test 
unobserved heterogeneity in industries. Their empirical results show that the estimated 
effects of stringency of environmental regulation on export competitiveness differ 
across the three countries: a negative impact in the US, a negative impact in Germany 
only when pollution intensive industries are distinguished from other industries; for 
the Netherlands, the country with laxest environmental regulations among the three 
according to PACE data, the negative link is not existent and sometimes a positive 
significant effect is obtained. 
2.3.3 Gravity models: bilateral trade flows 
The gravity model of trade resembles Issac Newton's law of gravity and predicts 
bilateral trade flows based on the sizes of and distance between trading partners. The 
model has also been used to test hypotheses rooted in theories of trade such as H-O 
theory. This type of modelling has become popular in empirical studies of 
environmental regulation and bilateral trade flows in recent years. 
As van Beers and van den Bergh (1997: 30) argue "a disadvantage of this approach 
[the H-O-V approach], which is based on multilateral trade flows, is that the effects of 
differences in strict environmental regulations on trade flows between countries may 
cancel out as multilateral trade is an aggregate of bilateral trade flows. " 
By repeating the empirical test of Tobey (1990) with a gravity model using two 
output-oriented environmental policy strictness indicators (namely a broad and a 
narrow energy-based one), van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) find a significant 
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negative effect of stricter domestic environmental regulations on exports in 1992. 
However, the effect is insignificant for dirty trade flows, which may be due to the 
possibility that most dirty industries are resource based and thus less mobile. Contrary 
to the prediction, they find a significant negative effect of trading partner's 
environmental regulation on domestic exports, pointing to the existence of import 
barriers that go together with relatively strict environmental regulations. 
To examine the reliability of the results, van Beers and van den Berg (2000) re-test the 
analysis in Tobey (1990), replacing the focus on multilateral trade flows by one on 
bilateral trade flows. This is actually an update of van Beers and van den Berg (1997) 
in terms of country sample and sectors coverage. The results provide partial support 
for Tobey, namely no significant effects for dirty goods trade flows. Moreover, results 
for total exports show a positive (albeit counterintuitive) effect of relatively strict 
environmental policy on exports which is consistent with an omitted variable test in 
Tobey. Analysis of sector specific trade data provided no significant export effects of 
a relatively stringent environmental policy for chemicals and steel, which is in line 
with Tobey. The export effects are significantly negative for mining and non-ferrous 
metals but significantly positive for paper. They conclude that the results for 1992 
show more significant effects than those for 1975, which may be due to the longer 
gestation period of environmental policy implementation and impacts. 
Motivated by the gravity models in van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), Harris et al. 
(2002) examine the relationship between environmental regulation and foreign trade in 
a three-dimensional panel data framework for a panel of 24 OECD countries over a 
sample period of 1990-1996. They find that environmental costs do not have a real 
impact on foreign trade, once country specific effects as well as time effects are taken 
into consideration. They conclude that a simple cross-sectional or naive panel-data 
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model is mis-specified when the stringency measures, and probably also the other 
quantitative explanatory variables, absorb the influence of the missing specific effects. 
Grether and de Melo (2003) also search for evidence of changes of imports in 
response to regulatory gap. Using a gravity model, they examine the determinants of 
import flows in five heavily polluting industries for 52 countries between 1981 and 
1998. Estimations for total imports versus dirty imports, as well as footloose (non- 
resource-based) imports versus non-footloose imports, are performed. They find 
support for the pollution haven hypothesis in the case of footloose imports. However, 
when endogeneity is controlled, this relationship is not robust. It is noteworthy that 
they measure the regulatory gap between countries by difference in GDP per capita 
(which may be only partially related to the stringency of environmental regulations). 
Jug and Mirza (2005) investigate the role of environmental regulations in structural 
gravity equations based on monopolistic competition. Using a panel of 9 ISIC 
industries in European countries between 1996 and 1999, they find that environmental 
expenditure data (cost-based) is negatively influencing trade flows, even when 
unobserved heterogeneity in countries and industries as well as endogeneity of 
environmental regulation is taken into account. A robustness check shows that this 
finding is not due to adoption of the environmental stringency proxy. 
2.3.4 Summary of previous studies 
We have seen so far a wide diversity of approaches and data adopted by the studies on 
the relationship between environmental stringency and trade performance 
(competitiveness), for example, a Heckscher-Ohlin model vs. Gravity framework, 
cross-section vs. panel data, as well as different measurement of environmental 
standards. Quite a few empirical studies have also examined the influence of 
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environmental regulations on FDI location choice. The methodologies and empirical 
results are mixed. Detailed summaries can be found in Eskeland and Harrison (2003), 
Dean et al. (2005) and Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005). The examination of 
intra-country FDI location choice in China can be found in empirical papers such as 
Dean et al. (2005), Amiti and Javorcik (2008), Zhang and Fu (2008). 
Early studies usually find an insignificant effect of regulatory stringency on industrial 
competitiveness. On this account, `small environmental cost' is often being used as an 
explanation. For example, Pearson (1987) claims that the effect on trade will be 
correspondingly low since environmental control costs are a small fraction of 
production costs in virtually every industry. Tobey (1990: 206) also makes similar 
comments: "as already noted, a reasonable explanation for these empirical results may 
simply be that the magnitude of environmental expenditures in countries with 
stringent environmental policies are not sufficiently large to cause a noticeable effect. " 
Lucas et al. (1992) also point out that "these studies conclude that direct investment 
does not appear to be stimulated by such regulations, partly because the cost of 
emission controls is generally a tiny fraction of operating costs. " 
However, as Levinson and Taylor (2004: 1) argue `while it is possible that more 
stringent environmental regulations have a small effect on firms' costs and 
international competitiveness, it seems unlikely that more stringent regulations would 
have no effect whatsoever'. 
Recent studies have made improvements in methodology to isolate the effect of 
environmental stringency. Quite a few weaknesses in early studies are identified and 
addressed. For example, endogeneity of environmental stringency, certain industrial 
characteristics (such as pollution intensity and footlooseness) and unobserved 
heterogeneity are addressed in panel data. 
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With regard to measuring environmental stringency, it is still difficult to have 
internationally comparable indicators. Hence most studies are confined to single 
country (normally a developed country such as the US) data or OECD data. 
Finally and importantly, we have to bear in mind that the complicated adjustment 
mechanisms (real wages, real exchange rates) that operate when regulations are 
imposed are not accounted for in existing studies (Jaffe et al., 1995). 
The following sections focus on examining the changes in trade patterns over past 
decades before we turn into econometric analysis on the effect of environmental 
stringency on the competitiveness in chapter three. 
2.4 DEFINING `DIRTINESS' OF INDUSTRIES 
The existing commodity categorization standards such as International Standard 
Industrial Categorization of All Economic Activities (ISIC) and Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) mainly focus on production processes. Studies in the 
literature have adopted different categorization principles (according to product 
attributes) in order to suit their research, for example in the context of revealed 
comparative advantage, Hufbauer (1970), Lim (1997), Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 
(2004). To examine the changing patterns of trade flows in dirty industries as well as 
in relatively clean ones, we need to define the `dirtiness' of an industry. Various 
definitions exist such as: (1) intensity of energy use per unit of output; (2) intensity of 
emissions per unit of output (per employee or per unit of value added); (3) associated 
socioeconomic costs, e. g., illness (especially respiratory diseases); (4) pollution 
abatement operating costs or pollution control expenditures (Low and Yeats, 1992; 
Sorsa, 1994). A direct approach is to identify pollution intensive sectors as those with 
high emissions intensity per unit of output. Based on detailed firm level data, Hettige 
30 
et al. (1995) estimate the industrial emissions by merging U. S manufacturing data and 
emission data at the firm level (over 200,000 factories) for detailed product categories 
(1,500 categories) for the late 1980s. They also construct toxic pollution risk-intensity 
indices for more aggregate level. Important questions arise, however, about the use of 
such measures. Firstly, how applicable are these US-based estimates to other 
countries? Country specific factors such as resource abundance and technologies 
affect the production process of a product and may also incur different emission 
intensities. However, the ranking of an aggregate sector may be more similar across 
countries than the ranking of a specific product. 14 That is one reason why we focus on 
the industries at ISIC 3-digit level rather than on more disaggregated product 
categories. Secondly, even within this data source, correlations of different pollutant 
intensities are low cross classes of pollutants. This means that an industry defined as 
highly pollution intensive in terms of water pollutants may be relatively clean in terms 
of air pollutants. Hettige et al. (1995) find that a few industries are highly intensive in 
all pollutants. Thirdly, these estimates do not allow for variations of pollution intensity 
over the years. We have to question whether or not the relative `dirtiness' ranking 
remains constant across time, especially over decades. 
To provide some tentative answers to these questions, we compare Hettige et al. 
(1995) and Dean and Lovely (2008) for sectoral pollution intensity information. We 
adopt from Hettige et al. (1995) (also named as the Industrial Pollution Projection 
System, IPPS) the pollution per output estimates for 28 manufacturing sectors at ISIC 
3 digit level. The sectors are ranked according to their pollution intensities in 8 
different water/air pollutants (BOD, TSS, NO2, PMIO, SO2, CO, TP and VOC)15. An 
14 Hettige et al. (1995: 66) also point out that even if there is considerable international variation in the 
absolute level of sectoral pollutant intensities, the relative ranking of intensities across sectors may be 
expected to remain more constant. 
15 Since all risk-weighted indices are highly correlated with total toxic intensity, IPPS has standardized on 
the latter. We choose the eight individual pollution intensities to create rankings of 'dirtiness'. 
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average ranking is then calculated by taking the mean of the eight rankings. We also 
rank the sectors by the aggregation of the pollutants by pound. Table 2.1 provides 
information on the average ranking and total ranking. Detailed pollution intensity data 
can be found in appendix A2.1. Sectors have very different rankings depending on the 
pollutant and weighting employed. Appendix 2.2 provides Spearman correlation 
coefficients for all the rankings. The average ranking and total ranking have a high 
rank correlation of 0.93. According to the average ranking, the most pollution 
intensive group includes: 371 (Iron and Steel), 341 (Paper and Products), 372 (Non- 
ferrous Metals), 351 (Other non-metallic Mineral Products) and 354 (Misc. Petroleum 
and Coal Products). Using information of Heftige et al. (1995), Mani and Wheeler 
rank top ten 3-digit ISIC industries in terms of total pollution intensities (focusing on 
air, water and metal pollution intensities). They select 371 (Iron and Steel), 372 (Non- 
ferrous Metals), 341 (Paper and Products), 369 (Other non-metallic Mineral Products) 
and 351 (Industrial Chemicals) as the top five `dirty sectors' for their analysis. 
In the relatively clean sectors we find 322 (Wearing Apparel), 385 (Professional and 
Scientific Equipments), 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastic), 342 (Printing and 
Publishing) and 356 (Plastic Products). The top five cleanest industries identified by 
Mani and Wheeler, 321 (Textiles), 382 (Machinery, except Electrical), 383 
(Machinery, Electric), 384 (Transport Equipment) and 385 (Professional and 
Scientific Equipments) are also relatively clean in our ranking table. 
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Table 2.1 Ranking of Industrial Pollution Intensity 
ISIC code Description Average Total 
371 Iron and Steel 11 
341 Paper and Product 23 
372 Non-ferrous Metals 32 
351 Industrial Chemicals 46 
354 Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products 55 
353 Petroleum Refineries 67 
369 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 74 
352 Other Chemicals 88 
331 Wood Products, except Furniture 99 
313 Beverages 10 12 
311 Food Products 11 15 
362 Glass and Products 12 10 
321 Textiles 13 16 
355 Rubber Products 14 13 
323 Leather Products 15 17 
381 Fabricated Metal Products 16 18 
332 Furniture, except Metal 17 14 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 18 20 
383 Machinery Electric 19 21 
382 Machinery, Except electrical 20 23 
384 Transport Equipment 21 22 
314 Tobacco 22 19 
390 Other Manufactured Products 23 11 
356 Plastic Products 24 24 
342 Printing and Publishing 25 25 
324 Footwear, except Rubber or Plastic 26 26 
385 Professional and Scientific Equipment 27 27 
322 Wearing Apparel, except Footwear 28 28 
Source: Hettige et al. (1995) pollution intensity based on output level. Average denotes the arithmetic 
mean of the individual rankings of the eight pollutants. Overall denotes the sum of individual pollution 
emissions: BOD biochemical oxygen demand), TSS (total suspended solids), NO2 (nitrogen dioxide), 
PMIO (particles of 10 micrometers or less), SO2 (sulphur dioxide), CO (carbon monoxide), TP (total 
particulates), and VOC (volatile organic compound). 
Dean and Lovely (2008) estimate the pollution intensities of Chinese industrial output 
between 1995 and 2004 in terms of four pollutants: COD, SO2, Smoke and Dust. 
Since Chinese pollution information is given at the industrial level (GB/T4754-2002) 
which is similar to ISIC 3-digit classification, an attempt is made to concord the two 
classifications. A2.3 in the appendix presents the pollution intensities for Chinese 
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manufacturing sectors. Although information for relevant ISIC industries are missing 
(for example, 354,361 and 362), we still rank the other industries according to their 
actual pollution intensities (from highest to lowest using ranking in overall intensity in 
1995). Although the pollution intensities for each sector have reduced dramatically 
between 1995 and 2004, the relative rankings do not change significantly. There is 
also much similarity between the rankings of pollution intensity based on the two 
sources. For example, 341,369,371 and 372 are among the dirtiest industries, while 
322/324,384,383 and 385 have lowest pollution intensities in both rankings. Since 
industrial pollution intensity is heavily affected by its sectoral composition and the 
technologies which are employed as well as the regulations imposed, it is almost 
unavoidable to have a few exceptions. For example, 313 (Beverage Production) and 
311 (Food Production), which have been grouped into medium low and low pollution 
intensive industries according to Hettige et al. (1995), are ranked among the heavy 
polluters in China. 
Another source of industrial pollution intensity ranking is Lu and Huang (2008) which 
uses pollution abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) and pollution abatement 
operating costs (PAOC) in the US in 1999. It also provides similar rankings to table 
2.1 although the industrial classification in PACE and PAOC is North America 
Industrial Classification System (NAICS). 
Since there is no universal ranking of pollution intensities, we use the ranking in table 
2.1 to provide tentative answers and use them for the following analysis. 
2.5 CHINA'S TRADE STRUCTURE 
The trade data used in this chapter comes from the World Bank database Trade, 
Production and Protection 1976-2004 developed by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). The 
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industry classification system for the database is the 3-digit level ISIC revision 2 
which covers 28 manufacturing sectors across 100 countries. We only focus on 
manufactured goods for three reasons. The first is that primary goods are subject to 
subsidies, quotas and other arrangements which mask enduring sources of 
comparative advantage. Additionally, relative ranking of pollution intensity for 
primary goods are not readily available and comparable. Lastly, for China as well as 
the industrialized countries, the manufactured goods constitute a large proportion of 
all traded goods. 
Except the reported trade flow values (official data reported by each country), the 
database also contains the mirrored trade flow values which represent the 
imports/exports value of the reporting countries observed as exports/imports values 
from partner countries. The reported and mirrored data may differ significantly from 
each other due to transportation costs not to mention the different goods classification 
systems used by individual countries. Despite their high correlation coefficients'6, we 
would use mirrored data which provides a more complete dataset and may be more 
precise than the reported one because trade flows are usually better recorded in 
entrance (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). 
2.5.1 Aggregate trends 
Trends in trade data often provide a straightforward impression of a country's stance 
on trade openness. We take a first look at the time series data. Before the economic 
reform and opening up, Chinese exports and imports were roughly balanced with low 
levels of trade values. Foreign trade, as well as other economic activities, were strictly 
controlled by the central government. This situation did not change much throughout 
16 It turns out that reported data and mirrored data have a high positive correlation (the correlation 
coefficient for imports is 0.9903, while that of the exports is 0.9730). 
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the early and mid 1980s, although foreign trade reform actually started in July 1979". 
From the late 1980s on, both imports and exports volumes increased dramatically. In 
the meantime, the gap between exports and imports (trade surplus) has widened'$. In 
2004, the trade surplus in manufactured goods has risen to over 300 billion US 
dollars'9. (See figure 2.2) 
Although the worldwide trade flows of manufactured goods simultaneously increased, 
the share of Chinese exports and imports in world trade has grown phenomenally; the 
share of exports rising from below 2% to over 10% and the share of imports rising 
from below 1% to about 6% (figure 2.3). 
17 This is because during the first five years of opening-up, the right to conduct foreign trade was still 
centrally determined through state-owned corporations. Only a few provinces (Guangdong and Fujian 
among the first few) enjoyed flexible policies while others enjoyed little autonomy in conducting foreign 
trade. A report on full scale opening-up as well as other decentralization measures was submitted by the 
then newly established Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). It was approved 
by the State Council in September 1984 (Luo, 2000). Hence we consider this as an effective start of trade 
openness for individual provincestfirms when the right of conducting foreign trade was decentralized to 
local governments. 
16 Many quantitative restrictions such as export controls, import licensing and quotas were gradually 
abolished. Instead of strictly planning, guidance plans were used in conducting foreign trade. The local 
governments now had more incentive to promote foreign trade thanks to the foreign exchange retention 
scheme. Trade and payments were regulated at local level through the export-and-import-agency system 
which was an improvement from the conventional 'airlock' system. During this period, agricultural goods 
constituted a significant share of Chinese exports while capital goods were the main imports. It is also 
argued (Word Bank, 1994; Zhang et al., 1998; Dean, 2002) that the Chinese trade regime remained quite 
protectionist until 1991. 
19 This figure based on mirrored trade data is much larger than the figure calculated using reported trade 
data. 
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Figure 2.2 Chinese Trade Volumes in Manufactured Goods 
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Note: Inflation figures for US dollars are obtained from the inflation calculator at US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; data from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
Figure 2.3 Chinese Trade Share in Manufactured Goods 
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Data source: Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
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2.5.2 Sectoral distribution 
At sectoral level, China's export share in world for almost every industry, including 
the most pollution intensive industries, has increased. Such a trend has been even 
more dramatic since the early 1990s. The sectoral distribution of Chinese 
manufacturing trade has also undergone substantial changes. We present the sectoral 
structure (sectoral trade share in total manufacturing trade) for China and the world as 
a whole for the beginning, mid and last year of the data set, that is for the years 1976, 
1990 and 2004. On the horizontal axis, the sectors are arranged in the decreasing order 
of average ranking in pollution intensity in accordance with table 2.1. Figure 2.4 
focuses on comparing the export structure in China across time. There are notable 
changes within China. Firstly, the major sectors are not fixed. In the planned economy 
period (before 1979), 311 (Food Products) and 321 (Textiles) constituted over half of 
the manufacturing exports in China. All the other sectors had less than 10% share 
each. By 1990, the sectoral distribution had changed significantly, with the four 
largest sectors-321 (Textiles), 322 (Wearing Apparel except Footwear), 383 
(Machinery Electric) and 390 (Other Manufactured Goods)-collectively accounting for 
half of the total share, while 311 (Food Products) became a minor sector. By 2004 the 
structure had more polarized, with the largest two sectors-382 (Machinery non- 
Electric) and 383 (Machinery Electric) 
-enjoying approximately 46% of the total 
manufacturing exports values. Secondly, the most pollution intensive sectors now 
seem to be less important. Some sectors with medium-high pollution intensity (for 
example, 351 (Industrial Chemicals), 352 (Other Chemicals) and 353 (Petroleum 
Refineries) have even witnessed a steady decline in importance. Thirdly, quite a few 
sectors have remained insignificant such as 313 (Beverages), 314 (Tobacco) and 354 
(Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products). The small size of these sectors may be 
in part due to an aggregation effect, with other sectors comprising more sub-divisions. 
This is suggested also by the small sizes of these sectors in the world exports 
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distribution (figure 2.5). The world exports structure has remained relatively stable 
over the years. The largest three sectors, 382 (Machinery, except Electrical), 383 
(Machinery, Electric) and 384 (Transport Equipment) comprise of over 40% of the 
total world manufactures exports. 
Figure 2.4 Chinese Export Structure by Sector 
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Data source: Nicita and Olarreaga (2006); same for all the following figures except otherwise explained. 
Figure 2.5 World Export Structure by Sector 
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To give a more detailed picture of the sectoral specialization, we also present the 
imports structure for China (figure 2.6) and the world (figure 2.7). Before the 
economic reform, China's main imports sector is 371 (Iron and Steel) which alone 
constituted about 45% of total manufacturing imports. 351 (Industrial Chemicals) and 
382 (Machinery, non-Electric) each had approximately 15% each. By 1990, the 
significance of the Iron and Steel imports has declined dramatically, with a share of 
less than 5%. In the mean time, other sectors such as 382 (Machinery non-Electric) 
and 383 (Machinery Electric) have increased their share. More than a half of the 28 
manufacturing sectors have insignificant shares. By 2004, the major three imports 
sectors are 351 (Industrial chemicals), 382 (Machinery non-Electric), 383 (Machinery 
Electric), which collectively constitute over 60% of the total manufacturing imports. 
Figure 2.6 Chinese Import Structure by Sector 
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Similar to the world export structure, the world import structure has remained stable, 
with the largest three sectors 382 (Machinery, except Electrical), 383 (Machinery, 
Electric) and 384 (Transport Equipment)) constituting over 40% of the total exports. 
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Figure 2.7 World Import Structure by Sector 
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The above analysis identifies the major exports/imports sectors in China as well as 
globally. Although the pollution intensive industries are minor exports sectors in 
China, they are not the most important sectors globally too. 
2.6 MEASURING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
In the previous section, we have shown China's trade growth as well as sectoral 
distribution over the years. So far we still have little idea about whether China has 
comparative advantage in dirty industries. We discuss the attributes of revealed 
comparative advantage indices in this section and apply them in the next section. 
The intuition of the comparative advantage theory is straightforward. But difficulties 
arise when one comes to empirical application of the theory due to the real world 
complexities. One major problem lies in the fact that the autarky-price formulation of 
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the comparative advantage20 is confronted with unobservable pre-trade relative prices. 
A direct test of the comparative advantage theory is given by Bernhofen and Brown 
(2004). Using Japanese product-specific data on autarkic prices and related trade 
flows, their findings support the prediction of the theory that the autarky-price value of 
trade is negative for each year of the period 1868-1875. However, under most 
circumstances the unobservability of relative autarkic prices hampers the identification 
of comparative advantage. Thus it is customary practice in the empirical trade 
literature to obtain indirect measures of comparative advantage by exploiting post- 
trade data. These indirect measures are termed as revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) indices which were first introduced by Liesner (1958) and later coined and 
popularized by Balassa (1965,1977). The causal links between theory and real-world 
are illustrated in the flow chart below (Balance et al., 1987). Economic conditions 
(such as endowments and technologies) determine comparative advantage for the 
trading countries which in turn governs post-trade variables such as trade flows, 
consumption and production. Indices constructed using these post-trade variables are 
termed as revealed comparative advantage indices (RCAs). 
EC ý CA ý--`ý- 
EC-economic conditions, CA-comparative advantage, P-production, C-consumption, T-trade, RCA- 
revealed comparative advantage indices 
This extrapolation approach implies that there can be as many RCA indices as there 
are combinations and transformations of the post-trade variables. Each revealed 
20 The correlation version of the law of comparative advantage (Deardorff, 1980) asserts that an 
economy's net export vector evaluated at autarky prices is negative. Recent literature, for example, Galor 
(1992) on overlapping-generations and Cordella (1998) on oligopoly theory, questions the validity of 
using autarkic relative prices to predict true comparative advantage arguing that the autarkic equilibrium 
is not necessarily a good predictor of the long-run equilibrium. 
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comparative advantage index may reflect distinct information of international trade 
patterns. Balance et al. (1987) found considerable inconsistency among alternative 
RCA measures. In the following, we discuss the merits and limits of the commonly 
used RCA measures. 
The common approach of a RCA measure is to compare national sectoral shares with 
their international analogies21 and to infer the existence of comparative advantage 
through the examination of actual trade flows and/or output. Balance et al. (1987) 
divide these indices are into two groups: 1) trade-only indices which include the 
Balassa's index and alternative RCAs which seek to improve the statistical properties; 
2) trade-cum-production indices which employ production and consumption data as 
well as trade data. As production and consumption data are recorded in different 
classifications and less comparable across countries, we only focus on trade data in 
this chapter and hence a discussion on trade only measures is provided in the 
following. 
2.6.1 Trade only RCA measures 
While there is no consensus on the most appropriate index of RCA, the index based on 
relative export shares proposed by Balassa (1965) has been used extensively, the 
recent examples including Dalum et al. (1998), Hiley (1999), Thongdee et al. (2003) 
and Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2004). We denote it as Balassa's Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (BRCA) which is the ratio of a product (or product group) i's 
share in total exports in a country (denoted by the superscript c) to its share in total 
21 By this criterion, other trade intensity indices such as trade specialization index (TSI), the Michaely 
index as well as the ratio of net trade to total domestic production which uses trade data (or other related 
economic data such as output and value added) on only one country fall out of this framework. We do not 
discuss such indices in this chapter. 
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exports in a group of reference countries (denoted by the superscript ref, which also 
includes the case of all countries in the world). It takes the form of. 
X'c /I: Xic 
xc lX ref BRCA c= t=it j Xi ref lEVref EX, c/ EXt ref 
III (2.1) 
It is equivalent to scaling the share of country c's exports in world trade (represented 
by a group of reference countries) of good i by its share of total world trade. This ratio 
ranges from 0 to a positive number which varies across the selection of reference 
countries and across time22. Any value of BRCA that is greater (less) than unity is said 
to indicate the country has comparative advantage (disadvantage) in product (product 
group) i. 
BRCA is tractable and easily interpretable, but it suffers from a risk of non-normality, 
namely, it gives too much weight to the values above one. Taking the logarithm of 
BRCA index (similar operation seen in Vollrath (1991)) could make it more 
symmetrical but a commodity with zero export would be undefined under this 
modified index. 
ISCA; 
= 
log(BRCAfl (2.2) 
Laursen (1998) suggests a symmetrically transformed BRCA index. It is given as 
follows: 
SRCA`_BRCA; -1=1- 2 
' BRCA; +1 BRCA` +1 (2.3) 
For both LBCA and SRCA, a positive value indicates comparative advantage while a 
negative one indicates comparative disadvantage. 
22 In general, the BRCA ranges from 0 to +oo; but it has variable upper bound according to the selection of 
reference countries and time. 
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Proudman and Redding (1998) propose a weighed version of BRCA for an individual 
product with the arithmetic mean of the country's BRCA scores. We term it as 
WRCA: 
WRCA; 
= 
BRCA; 
ZBRCA; 
N, 
(2.4) 
where N is the total number of products (or product groups). The comparative 
advantage neutral point for WRCA is not fixed. For a product i, if its BRCA value is 
greater (less) than the average BRCA value across products in country c (at period t), 
we say that country c (at period t) has comparative advantage (disadvantage) in 
product i. 
Since their early appearance in empirical analysis, the above traditional RCA indices 
have received many criticisms (Hillman, 1980; Bowen, 1983,1985,1986; Balance et 
al., 1985,1986; Yeats, 1985; Deardorff, 1994; De Benedictis and Tamberi, 2001; 
Hoen and Oosterhaven, 2006). Apart from the asymmetry property, the BRCA index 
also has small country bias and small industry bias, which implies that a small country 
or a small industry is more likely to obtain extremely high values of BRCA. Although 
the transformed versions of BRCA have been proposed to improve the statistical 
properties, they are, notwithstanding, defective. In particular, De Benedictis and 
Tamberi (2001) point out three defects of the WRCA index which makes the 
economic interpretation difficult: 1) dismissing country effect; 2) giving too much 
emphasis to the first moment and 3) inconsistent with BRCA. If econometric analysis 
is not required, these transformations are not necessary since their defects may 
obscure the dynamics of the original index. 
According to Hoen and Oosterhaven (2006), the root cause of all these problems with 
the BRCA index (and hence its transformations) lies in the multiplicative character of 
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the index. They outline several peculiar statistical properties of the original BRCA 
(which they name as multiplicative RCA). Firstly, the distribution of BRCA is not 
centred on I since the mean of the sectoral MRCAs is above 123 (which means that the 
average sector has a net comparative advantage). Secondly, it is shown the distribution 
of the BRCAs around this mean is asymmetric and skewed. Thirdly, the number of 
countries (the reference group) also influences the distribution of BRCAs. Fourthly, 
the number of sectors influences the size and distribution of the BRCAs. Finally, at 
higher levels of sectoral details, the BRCAs can have more extreme values. To solve 
the problems, they propose an additive index which takes the form of the following: 
` X'K XIý ARCA, 
_ EX; EX; #- 
iI 
(2.5) 
ARCA is greater than zero if the country of interest has a revealed comparative 
advantage in sector i and it is smaller than zero if instead the country has a revealed 
comparative disadvantage. Compared to BRCA and its transformations, ARCA has a 
stable mean independent of the number and classification of the sectors or countries 
and a more symmetrical distribution as evidenced by their empirical findings. 
However, the ARCA index is biased when the country of interest is included in the 
group of reference countries (Hoen, 2002; Hoen and Oosterhaven, 2005). To obtain 
non-biasedness, the country of interest has to be excluded from the group of reference 
countries. 
The above RCA indices can be incorporated into the framework of comparing actual 
and expected trade flows (Kunimoto, 1977) or a `hypothetical comparative advantage 
neutral' world as in Bowen (1983). This framework is suggested by Vollrath (1991) as 
a guide to appraise trade intensity indices. Following the concept of an imaginary 
world without geographical specialization of international trade in Kumimoto (1977), 
23 It finds support from the empirical results from Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2001). 
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the BRCA can be expressed in terms of the ratio of actual-to-expected exports (see 
Bowen (1983). For example, 
BRCA` 
= 
Xr 
= 
X' 
ý E(X, c) EX, c (2.6) 
Xj r ZXr'f 
r 
where the expected export of i in country c equals to the product i's total exports 
(X(), multiplied by country c's relative size. This index actually measures the degree 
of deviation in sector i's (in country c) actual exports from its expected exports level 
(or comparative-advantage-neutral point 24 ). Deviations of the index from unity 
indicate the presence of factors which influence the distribution of a country's trade 
among countries without affecting the level of its trade. Similarly, ARCA can also be 
expressed in the terms of actual-minus-expected exports scaled by total exports of 
country c. 
1 X` X', EXº ARCA, ` 
c 
(X; 
- 
E(X; )) 
-"ý-'ý 
, ý. xi ýXj ýXj X, iiIi 
(2.7) 
Instead of scaling the difference between actual and expected trade flows by country 
c's total exports, we can simply use the difference of the actual and expected exports. 
However, to make it comparable across time, a scale has to be adopted 25. A scale that 
does not change the statistical properties should be a scale that is both country and 
commodity invariant. Scaling the difference by the sum of exports in all the countries 
24 Vollrath also points out that neutral comparative advantage does not necessarily exclude trade when we 
focus on a composite commodity (industry or sector) and on a country with diverse decision makers. 
23 Suppose if all exports of each i in each c increase by a factor of g in the next period, the value of 
F, X, 
X' 
- 
Xý `J , 
will also increase by a factor of g. In the mean time, the position of comparative 
i 
advantage for product i in country c in fact remain the same as the period before. 
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in the reference group and all products ( 1: X, ') satisfies this requirement. Such 
an index is found in Yu et al. (2009). Their normalized revealed comparative 
advantage index (NRCA) can be expressed as: 
F, X 
0 Yxref EX, refIX, ref ZýXe 
(XI 
-E(Xr )) 
III ci 
(2.8) 
The NRCA index measures the degree of deviation of a country's actual export from 
its comparative-advantage-neutral level in terms of its relative scale with respect to the 
world export market. A positive NRCA indicates that a country's actual export of 
sector i is higher than its comparative-advantage-neutral level. It has nice properties 
such as: 
ZNRCA; 
=0 
i 
NRCA, 
=0 
Where X; 
= 
X; " and country c should be included in the group of reference 
countries. 
2.6.2 What constitutes a good RCA index? 
From the above discussion, we have shown that all measures related to revealed 
comparative advantages/specialization have their pros and cons. The next question is 
which RCA index to choose. To evaluate a RCA index, fitting in the theoretical 
framework of comparing actual and expected trade flows seems to be a good general 
criterion. Focusing on the statistical properties, Hoen and Oosterhaven (2006) propose 
four guidelines for an ideal RCA index: 
1) It should have a stable mean or median. 
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2) It should have symmetry around the mean or median. 
3) Its distribution should be independent of the number and 
classification of the commodities or sectors used. 
4) Its distribution should be should be stable, such that the individual 
sectoral values may be compared across time and space. 
Empirically, a good RCA index should also embody threefold interpretation (Balance 
et al., 1987; Benedictis and Tamberi, 2001): 
1) Dichotomous: it provides a demarcation between countries that 
reveal a comparative advantage in a particular sector and those do 
not. 
2) Cardinal: it should quantify the commodity-specific degree of 
comparative advantage enjoyed by one country vis-ä-vis any other 
country. 
3) Ordinal: it should provide commodity specific ranking of countries 
of degree of comparative advantage. 
These criteria can be summarized in the figure below. Most RCA indices have a fixed 
demarcation point (or comparative neutral point). The quantification property belongs 
to the BRCA and its transformed versions although in the latter cases the economic 
interpretation is less clear. For the ranking feature, it is further divided into three 
comparability requirements: cross-country, cross commodity and cross time. 
Propertie 
Demarcatio 
49 
While the BRCA index has often been used to compare comparative advantage across 
commodities, countries and over time, such comparisons are not soundly founded. 
Hillman (1980) examines the correspondence between the Balassa index and autarkic 
relative prices in cross commodity and cross country comparisons. For cross 
commodity comparison, his diagrammatical illustration shows that the BRCA values 
are independent of whether one good is relatively less expensive than the other in the 
autarkic equilibrium. Hillman also derives a theoretically necessary and sufficient 
condition for cross-country comparison for a specific good under homothetic 
preferences in the reference countries. Specifically, the condition is that: 
1-ý 
c 
ý> 
r 
(2.9) 
i 
In general approximation the Hillman condition is not satisfied for a small country 
ref 
is small) when it specializes in the good i (i. e. is equal to unity) (i. e. ' F, XI EXIC 1I 
and/or when it has monopoly power in good i in the international market (i. e. 
Xref 
is 
equal to unity). This condition is less stringent for large countries with disaggregated 
26 trade data. 
Hillman's theoretical analysis was focused on the BRCA only while we want to 
evaluate the comparability of alternative indices. Since comparative advantage is a 
relative term, we can view the notion in two aspects: 1) any trading country has both 
goods with comparative advantage and goods with comparative disadvantage, but 
overall it is comparative advantage neutral, i. e. Z RCA; =p; 2) any good is a 
comparative advantage good in one country while comparative disadvantage in the 
26 Supportive empirical evidence can be found in Ilinloopen and van Marrewijk (2005). 
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others as a whole, but overall it is comparative advantage neutral, i. e. RCA, ` = 0. 
Of all the RCA indices we reviewed, only NRCA seems to meet the two requirements. 
In the following table 2.2, we summarize the trade-only RCAs. 
Table 2.2 Summary of Trade-only RCAs 
Index Source Range 
Comparative 
Advantage 
neutral point' 
Cross- Cross- Cross- 
country commodity time 
BRCA Balassa (1965) [0, +0o)27 1xxx 
LRCA Vollrath(1991) (-oo, +oo) 0xxx 
SRCA Laursen [-], +1] 0xxx 
(1998) 
Proudman and WRCA [0, ?)1xx 
Redding 
Hoen and 
ARCH [-1, +1] 0xx 
Oosterhaven 
NRCA Yu et al [-1/4,0 
(2009) +1/4128 
Note: a. Comparative Advantage neutral point refers to a state that is neither in comparative advantage 
nor in comparative disadvantage. 
2.7 REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
EVIDENCE 
For our research purpose, the BRCA and NRCA are both chosen to `reveal' 
comparative advantage: 
n The upper bound is not fixed. 
2$ See Yu et al. (2009) for the derivation of the boundaries [-1/4,1/4] 
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BRCA °=X; 
_ 
X; 
ý E(X, c) 2: X, ` 
X'ý ` 
ZX-f 
I 
NR('A° 
-1 ! Y° 
- 
F! Y°II 
- 
X` 
X; ýýX, ` 
OiA 
Zx, ref Ex, refIxref 
While the indices are expressed using data on the exports side, similar indices can be 
constructed using imports data 29 
. 
Then the comparative export advantage and 
comparative import advantage are compared to reveal the overall comparative 
advantage30. In this chapter, however, we only focus on the export side. 
We use trade flows from the database of Nicitita and Olarreaga (2006) which covers 
100 developing and developed countries over the period 1976-2004 for 28 (3-digit 
ISIC Rev. 2) manufacturing sectors. The list of 100 countries is displayed in A2.5. For 
the reasons explained earlier, we use mirrored trade data. Both BRCA and NRCA are 
calculated for each industry in every country over time. Emphasis will be laid on 
evidence revealed by NRCA since we believe NRCA is better than BRCA in terms of 
comparability over time. To examine whether `dirty' industries have gained 
comparative advantage in China, we examine evolution of the BRCA and NRCA 
values for each industry according to their ranking in `dirtiness'. To compare the 
changing trade patterns in the North, we also present revealed comparative advantage 
evidence for five developed countries (the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and France) 
which are also China's major export markets. 
29 At the time when BRCA was proposed in the 1960s, Balassa justified taking only exports data on the 
grounds that policy-induced distortions are more severe on the imports side. See also Vollrath (1991), 
Lafay (1992) points out the necessity of using imports data since import protection has been reduced by 
multilateral negotiations while policy intervention has been increased on the export side. 
30 This has been done by several researches such as Vollrath (1991), Murrell (1990), Lafay (1992) and 
Lim (1997). 
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2.7.1 Overall patterns of BRCA and NRCA 
The table below (table 2.3) presents the statistical attributes of BRCA and NRCA 
based on exports for China and the five selected developed countries between 1976 
and 2004. While the mean of NRCA is consistently zero across country and time, we 
find that the mean of BRCA indices is indeed not fixed. Among the six countries, 
China has the highest mean BRCA value and Japan has the lowest mean BRCA value. 
Standard deviation of the indices provides information on the variation of comparative 
advantage. However, as we have explained earlier these BRCA statistics (mean and 
variation) do not have much economic meaning. 
Table 2.3 Statistical Properties of BRCA and NRCA for Selected Economies 
Variable BRCA 
Country China Germany France UK Japan USA 
Obs 812 812 812 812 812 812 
Mean 1.41 0.92 1.05 1.08 0.63 0.86 
Std. Dev. 1.66 0.41 0.79 0.61 0.57 0.55 
Min 0 0.11 0.22 0.09 0 0.04 
Max 8.57 3.55 5.28 3.45 2.34 3.07 
NRCA 
Country China Germany France UK Japan USA 
Obs 812 812 812 812 812 812 
Mean 000000 
Std. Dev. 1.90E-03 2.40E-03 1.30E-03 8.80E-04 3.90E-03 2.50E-03 
Min 
-0.01 -0.01 00 -0.01 -0.01 
Max 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.02 0.02 
Source: Nicitita and Olarreaga (2006). 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present five economies with the largest BRCA/NRCA values based 
on exports for both dirtiest industries and cleanest industries in 1976,1990 and 2004 
(to conserve space, we only present the top five economies in the three years). We find 
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evidence of small country bias in terms of BRCA values as pointed out by the 
criticisms of BRCA index, i. e. small countries tend to have larger values31. China is 
not listed among the top 5 in terms of dirty industries. Except for industries 341 and 
354, most developed countries do not seem to have highest BRCA values compared to 
other small developing countries. In terms of clean industries, China has increased 
BRCA values in industry 356 and listed among top 5 in 1990 and 2004. 
Based on the NRCA values, we pick out the five economies with highest NRCA 
values for each industry. The rankings of the economies that have the largest revealed 
comparative advantage in dirty industries have changed dramatically and China is 
again not on the list. The most developed countries such as USA, Japan, Germany, UK 
and France are found to have the largest comparative advantage in a few dirty 
industries. However, the top 5 list is changing. Except for industry 354, these most 
developed countries have gradually lost their position to other developed countries and 
developing countries. Notably, Russia, Brazil and South Africa seem to have 
specialized in dirty industries in recent years. The clean industries were dominated by 
developed countries in the 1970s. China began to gain comparative advantage in these 
industries during 1980s. By 2004, China is listed as the top economies in 3 out of 5 
clean industries; they are 356 (Plastic Products), 324 (Footwear, except Rubber or 
Plastic) and 322 (Wearing Apparel, except Footwear). The developed economies seem 
to maintain their revealed comparative advantage in certain clean industries. For 
example, the US, UK and Germany still hold a strong position in 342 (Printing and 
Publishing); while UK, Germany and Japan hold a strong position in 385 (Professional 
and Scientific Equipment). Italy seems to maintain its strong position in 324 
(Footwear, except Rubber or Plastic). 
31 The highest BRCA value based on exports is for industry 354 in Gabon in 1981. 
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2.7.2 Dynamics of China's revealed comparative advantage 
Between 1976 and 2004, China enjoyed a revealed comparative advantage in the 
world export market in 10-13 out of 28 manufacturing sectors, which account for 
65%-84% of Chinese manufacturing exports in monetary value. The BRCA index 
gives more weight to small sectors while the NRCA index emphasizes the importance 
of large sectors. The two measures have been reasonably consistent in values. This is 
illustrated by the positive and significant Spearman rank correlation coefficients (see 
table A2.6 in the appendix). In terms of relative ranking, however, the two differ 
considerably. Only about 26% of the 812 observations have the same rank order in 
terms of BRCA and NRCA32. For example, 383 (Machinery, Electric) is identified by 
NRCA as the highest revealed comparative advantage sector in 2004, while BRCA 
only places it tenth in ranking (see table A2.4 in the appendix). 
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 present the sectoral distribution of the indices for the years 1976, 
1990 and 2004. Sectoral pollution intensity is in descending order on the horizontal 
axis. China barely has any revealed comparative advantage (i. e. BRCA>1 or 
NRCA>0) in the top ten pollution intensive industries. One exception is 369 (Non- 
Metallic Mineral Products) which a comparative advantage is revealed in some of the 
years. For chemical and petroleum refinery industries (351,352,353), revealed 
comparative disadvantage has deepened. These two figures also show that the 
industries that China has comparative advantage are concentrated on the relatively 
clean end (to the right). Figure 2.9 (with NRCA values) shows that the line of 1976 
has fewer fluctuations than those of 1990 and 2004. It gives the impression that before 
the opening-up, China has a similar distribution of industries to the world (which is 
32 Yu et al. (2009) also found 25% of the two have the same ranking, although they focus on agricultural 
products in the US Mainland market. 
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denoted by the reference line NRCA=O). As the process of economic reform and 
opening-up has deepened, some clean industries have gained comparative advantage 
while several of the dirtiest industries have increased comparative disadvantage. 
Figure 2.8 BRCA Values for Selected Years in China 
(Based on exports) 
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Figure 2.9 NRCA Values for Selected Years in China 
(Based on exports) 
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To detect evidence of structural changes in comparative advantage, we present 
Spearman test results for China as well as the five developed countries as follows 
(table 2.6). Among the six economies, China has undergone the most dramatic 
changes in revealed comparative advantage between 1976 and 2004, which is 
evidenced by the lowest significant correlation coefficient for BRCA and the lowest 
and insignificant correlation coefficient for NRCA. The USA seems to have fewer 
changes in terms of export comparative advantage than the other economies. In 
addition, with few exceptions, the first 15 years (1976 to 1990) are more volatile than 
the second 15 years (1990-2004) for these economies. 
Table 2.6 Spearman Tests for RCA Indices 
(Based on exports) 
1976-2004 1976-1990 1990-2004 
BRCA NRCA BRCA NRCA BRCA NRCA 
China 0.49"' 0.26 0.66"' 0.57"' 0.79"' 0.78 
USA 0.84"' 0.70"' 0.90"' 0.84"' 0.92"' 0.85 
Japan 0.75"' 0.67"' 0.82"' 0.59"' 0.96"' 0.90"' 
Germany 0.54"' 0.61"' 0.78"' 0.750.80"' 0.88"' 
France 0.58"' 0.54"' 0.69"' 0.640.92"' 0.93"' 
UK 0.58"' 0.38" 0.65"' 0.630.93"' 0.59"' 
Note: * denotes 90% significance level, " denotes 95% significance level and "' denotes 99% 
significance level. 
To examine the evolution of the pollution intensive industries and clean industries, we 
plot both BRCA and NRCA values based on exports. These figures can be found in 
appendix A2.7 (figures A2.7.1-A2.7.10). BRCA values exhibit more complex trends 
than NRCA values. Based on NRCA values, the dirty industries 371 (Iron and Steel), 
341 (Paper and Products), 372 (Non-ferrous Metals), 351 (Industrial Chemicals) and 
354 (Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products) have a downward trend which implies that 
their comparative disadvantage has been deepening over the years. 
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As for the five cleanest industries, China only have revealed comparative advantage in 
322 (Wearing Apparel except Footwear), 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastic) and 
356 (Plastic Products), which exhibit a similar trend: at first revealed comparative 
advantage in terms of NRCA increases (in the case of 324, this increasing trend shows 
only since late 1980s); starting from approximately 1994, the trend flattens and it also 
seems to go downwards since 2000. For 385 (Professional and Scientific Equipment), 
China does not have revealed comparative advantage for most of the years with 
exceptions between 1997 and 1999. The trend shows that the revealed comparative 
disadvantage has even increased in industry 385 in recent years. For 342 (Printing and 
Publishing), China has first revealed comparative disadvantage increased and then it 
recovered to the initial level in 2004, although still at a revealed comparative 
disadvantage position. 
Since NRCA values are additive, we also plot an aggregate of top five dirty industries 
and an aggregate of top five clean industries in figure A2.7.11 in appendix A2.7. In 
the first few years, the two aggregates were around zero which is the revealed 
comparative neutral point. Starting with a narrow gap, the two aggregates seem to part 
from each other from the beginning of the economic reform. The aggregate of top five 
dirty industries continue to have greater revealed comparative disadvantage over time. 
The opposite seems true for the top five clean industries which experienced steep 
growth in revealed comparative advantage until 1993. The trend has been stagnant 
since early 1990s and even seems to decrease since 2000. 
These RCA figures are only based on exports and the indices themselves have various 
issues. To complement the analysis based on RCA indices, we also present trade 
specialization figures by industries in China. 
TSI = 
X, 
-M 
X + M 
(2.10) 
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This index is constructed as percentage share of net trade in total trade volume. Its 
value ranges from 
-1 when there are no exports to +1 when there are no imports. The 
larger TSI is, the more specialized the sector will be. This index could tell the relative 
importance of net exports in total trade of a particular industry. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 
present the evolution of TSI for top five dirty industries and top five lean industries 
respectively. Although the trends seem to be volatile, the negative trade specialization 
values imply that China has not been specialized in these dirty over the years. To the 
contrary, China has been very much specialized in 322 (Wearing Apparel except 
Footwear) and 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastic) with TSI value close to 1. In 
addition, 356 (Plastic Products) has increased specialization from 0.4 to 0.8. The other 
two industries 385 (Professional and Scientific Equipment) and 342 (Printing and 
Publishing) have also increased their TSI values indicating growing specialization. 
Figure 2.10 Trade Specialization Index of Top Five Dirty Industries in China 
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Figure 2.11 Trade Specialization Index of Top Five Clean Industries in China 
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2.7.3 Dynamics of revealed comparative advantage in DCs 
We also look at the trade patterns of the dirty industries in five developed countries 
(DCs): the US (USA), Japan (JPN), Germany (DEU), the UK (GBR) and France 
(FRA)--see Appendix 2.8 (figures A2.8.1-A2.8.10). These countries have been 
identified as among the top ten largest export markets in 1997 for China (Hinloopen 
and Marrewijk, 2004). In addition, these countries have remained as the top five 
largest economies (in terms of nominal GDP) in the world for the period from 1976 to 
2004. Finally, environmental standards are more stringent in these high income 
countries. We examine whether the patterns of revealed comparative advantage in 
these developed countries have shown any supportive evidence for the Pollution 
Haven Hypothesis. 
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The US does not seem to have significant revealed comparative advantage in the four 
of the five dirtiest industries (371,341,372 and 354) according to the negative NRCA 
values in figure A2.8.1. It had revealed comparative advantage in 341 (Paper and 
Products) only in 1976 and 1977. The industry 354 (Misc. Petroleum and Coal 
Products) has remained roughly revealed comparative advantage neutral. The two 
industries 371 (Iron and Steel) and 372 (Non-ferrous Metals) have an upward trend 
over the years although they remain revealed comparative disadvantaged. This finding 
is consistent with Cole et al. (2005)33 that the US does not seem to have strong 
revealed comparative advantage in dirty industries and there is no systematic tendency 
for US specialization to decline in pollution intensive industries (between 1978 and 
1994). Changing patterns of five cleanest industries are plotted in figure A2.8.6. The 
US has strong revealed comparative advantage in 385 (Professional and Scientific 
Equipment) which has further strengthened itself over the years. The industries 342 
(Printing and Publishing) and 356 (Plastic Products) have a weak revealed 
comparative advantage. The other two clean industries 322 (Wearing Apparel except 
Footwear) and 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastic) have remained revealed 
comparative disadvantaged and their initial positions are restored at the end of 2004. 
Figure A2.8.2 shows structural changes of five dirties industries for Japan. Japan 
initially had significant revealed comparative advantage of 371 (Iron and Steel) but it 
decreased over the years and levelled off since late 1980s around revealed 
comparative neutral state. Little fluctuation is detected for 354 (Misc. Petroleum and 
Coal Products) which stays roughly revealed comparative advantage neutral. Japan 
has revealed comparative disadvantage in 372 (Non-ferrous Metals), 351 (Industrial 
Chemicals) and 341 (Paper and Products) which have experienced a decrease in the 
first 10-15 years and an increase afterwards. Figure A2.8.7 shows structural change of 
33 They use BRCA for a slightly different set of dirty industries classified by SIC. 
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five cleanest industries, in which Japan only has revealed comparative advantage in 
385 (Professional and Scientific Equipment). The strongest disadvantaged is 322 
(Wearing Apparel, except Footwear). Other three cleanest industries are revealed 
comparative disadvantaged and are relatively stable over time. 
In Germany, there is little evidence of revealed comparative advantage in top five 
dirty industries apart from 351 (Industrial Chemicals) which has a downward trend. 
The industries 371 (Iron and Steel) and 354 (Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products) had 
revealed comparative advantage in early years while the industry 372 (Non-ferrous 
Metals) remains revealed comparative disadvantaged despite of a constant increase 
over time. Overall, we see a convergence tendency to revealed comparative advantage 
neutral state for the five dirtiest industries (figure A2.8.3). Structural change of 
cleanest five industries in Germany is presented in figure A2.8.8. Industries 322 
(Wearing Apparel, except Footwear) and 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastic) are 
significantly revealed comparative disadvantaged while the other three seem to be 
revealed comparative advantage neutral. 
Figure A2.8.4 presents changing patterns of dirty industries in France. A convergence 
pattern similar to that of the USA and Japan seems to have happened in France. The 
dirtiest industry 371 (Iron and Steel) has been decreasing in revealed comparative 
advantage while other dirty industries have either remained neutral (see 354 (Misc. 
Petroleum and Coal Products)) or have decreased revealed comparative disadvantage 
(341 (Paper and Products) and 372 (Non-ferrous Metals)). Much fluctuation is seen in 
351 (Industrial Chemicals) but it stays around the revealed comparative advantage 
neutral state at the end of the examination period. For the clean industries (figure 
A2.8.9), they have remained relatively stable. France only has revealed comparative 
advantage in 342 (Printing and Publishing) among the five cleanest industries. 
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Structural change in dirty industries in the UK (figure A2.8.5) also exhibits a 
convergence tendency towards comparative advantage neutral state. Industry 351 
(Industrial Chemicals) shows significant revealed comparative advantage over the 
years. Industry 372 (Non-ferrous Metal) shows significant revealed comparative 
advantage in the early years but it decreases gradually. Other dirtiest industries have 
been either approximately neutral or negative in revealed comparative advantage. As 
for the five cleanest industries, figure A2.8.10 shows that 342 (Printing and 
Publishing) is the only one that maintains its comparative advantage state over the 
years. However, UK has experienced considerable changes with 322 (Wearing 
Apparel) which has changed from an industry with revealed comparative advantage to 
disadvantaged while 385 (Professional and Scientific Equipment) improves its 
situation in revealed comparative advantage. 
In general, we do not find strong evidence of dirty industries having declined revealed 
comparative advantage between 1976 and 2004 in these developed countries. One 
exception is 371 (Iron and Steel) which has been decreasing revealed comparative 
advantage for Japan, Germany and France. In addition, 351 (Industrial Chemicals) has 
seen decreasing revealed comparative advantage for Germany. On the other hand, 
there are some dirty industries in developed countries which seem to improve their 
situation by reducing their revealed comparative disadvantage. While these developed 
countries enjoy revealed comparative advantage in one or two clean industries, fewer 
variations are found in the clean industries. 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter uses cross-section and time-series trade flows information of 
manufacturing industries to examine whether the fear of dirty industries migrating 
from developed countries to developing countries is evident in the case of China as 
well as five other selected developed economies between 1976 and 2004. Support for 
the PHH or FEH is sought. Having compared the information on industrial pollution 
from Hettige et al. (1995) and Dean and Lovely (2004), we first rank the 28 
manufacturing industries according to their emission intensities. Different indices of 
trade performance are then considered for identifying revealed comparative advantage. 
We employ both BRCA and NRCA indices to measure revealed comparative 
advantage in industries. An emphasis is played on the changing trade patterns revealed 
by the NRCA since the BRCA index is less comparable across industries, across 
countries and across time than the NRCA index. 
Overall, China does not seem to have revealed comparative advantage in most of the 
dirtiest industries, while it has revealed comparative advantage in 3 out of the top 5 
cleanest industries. To compare revealed comparative advantage across industries and 
over time, we also examine the dynamic feature of the trade patterns using NRCA. 
The aggregate of five cleanest industries in China displayed an upward trend in 
revealed comparative advantage, while that of five dirtiest industries showed an 
increase in revealed comparative disadvantage between the years 1976 and 2004. 
Investigation of individual industries shows China has an increased revealed 
comparative disadvantage in top five dirty industries. Most of the cleanest industries 
in China have undergone phenomenal increase in revealed comparative advantage, 
although this trend has slowed down or even reversed since 2000. Two industries 385 
(Professional and Scientific Equipment) and 342 (Printing and Publishing) have 
experienced marked variations in revealed trade performance during the period of 
analysis although they remain revealed comparative disadvantaged industries. In short, 
there is no support for a pollution haven story in China on the basis of revealed 
comparative advantage analysis. 
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The five high income countries also do not have significant revealed comparative 
advantage in the dirtiest industries. One exception is 371 (Iron and Steel) in which 
Japan, Germany and France have revealed comparative advantage, albeit with a 
downward trend. In addition, while 354 (Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products) in the 
high income countries seem to maintain their position with revealed comparative 
advantage around a neutral point, other dirty industries seem to converge towards the 
neutral point. As for the five cleanest industries, the patterns of revealed comparative 
advantage are less volatile in the high income countries. To sum up, except for 
371(Iron and Steel) and 351 (Industrial Chemicals), we do not see much evidence of 
dirty industries having reduced revealed comparative advantage from these high 
income countries. Additionally, some dirty industries have decreased revealed 
comparative disadvantage. Hence the evidence does not seem to strongly support the 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis on the developed countries side. 
The above results with regard to China are not surprising. In the first place, differences 
in labour, capital and natural resources are more likely to have contributed to the 
international division of labour. Given China's huge labour supply, the FEH effect 
might dominate the PHH effect. Secondly, dirty industries may not be footloose 
enough to immigrate into China. Most of the dirty industries such as iron and steel, 
petroleum refineries are still largely controlled and protected in China as well as in the 
developed world. Lastly, the pollution haven effect is self-limiting since environment 
protection is a normal good. With increases in GDP and income growth, 
environmental regulatory framework in China has strengthened over time since mid- 
1980s. 
For the developed countries we selected, they do not have significant revealed 
comparative advantages in dirty industries in the first place. Instead of finding dirty 
industries having increased revealed comparative advantages, we find that most dirty 
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industries have actually decreased revealed comparative disadvantages and there is a 
convergence tendency to comparative neutral point for these dirty industries in these 
high income countries. 
In closing this chapter, we draw attention to a few limitations that we have to bear in 
mind together with findings. One limitation in this chapter is concerned with the 
methodology. Revealed comparative advantage indices capture the effects of changes 
in relative factor endowments as well as in environmental policies. However, they 
cannot distinguish and attribute the changes in trade patterns to factor endowments 
and/or policy changes. It is argued that changing patterns of production and trade 
could also be caused by other factors such as changes in energy price and trade policy 
as well as by unobserved heterogeneity. 
Another limitation concerns data. Our focus was on manufacturing industries. 
However, natural-resource extracting, electricity production and road transport also 
place a large burden on the environment. The impact of international trade on natural 
resource depletion34 in developing countries is hence not included in this analysis. 
In addition, the definition of "dirtiness" at ISIC 3-digit level by lumping together 
different emission intensities may cause some aggregation bias. At finer level of 
classification and/or for individual pollutants, different trade and specialization 
adjustments might be found. 
34 Lopez (1997) shows that a deepening of trade liberalization is likely to induce further losses of biomass 
and deforestation in the case of Ghana. 
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A2.5 List of countries served as the reference group 
County Name Code 
Algeria DZA 
Argentina ARG 
Armenia ARM 
Australia AUS 
Austria AUT 
Azerbaijan AZE 
Bangladesh BGD 
Belgium-Luxemburg BLX 
Benin BEN 
Bolivia BOL 
Botswana B WA 
Brazil BRA 
Bulgaria BGR 
Cameroon CMR 
Canada CAN 
Chile Cl-IL 
China CI-IN 
Colombia COL 
Costa Rica CRI 
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 
Cyprus CYP 
Czech Republic CZE 
Denmark DNK 
Ecuador ECU 
Egypt EGY 
El Salvador SLV 
Ethiopia ETH 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 
Gabon GAB 
Germany (76-90 West) DEU 
Ghana GHA 
Greece GRC 
Guatemala GTM 
Honduras HND 
Hong Kong HKG 
Hungary HUN 
Iceland ISL 
India IND 
Indonesia IDN 
Iran IRN 
Ireland IRL 
Israel ISR 
Italy ITA 
Japan JPN 
Jordan JOR 
Kenya KEN 
Korea KOR 
Kuwait KWT 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
75 
ntinued 
Latvia LVA 
Lithuania LTU 
Macau MAC 
Malawi MWI 
Malaysia MYS 
Malta MLT 
Mauritius MUS 
Mexico MEX 
Moldova MDA 
Mongolia MNG 
Morocco MAR 
Mozambique MOZ 
Myanmar MMR 
Nepal NPL 
County Name Code 
Netherlands NLD 
New Zealand NZL 
Nigeria NGA 
Norway NOR 
Oman OMN 
Pakistan PAK 
Panama PAN 
Peru PER 
Philippines PHL 
Poland POL 
Portugal PRT 
Qatar QAT 
Romania ROM 
Russian Federation RUS 
Senegal SEN 
Singapore SGP 
Slovakia SVK 
Slovenia SVN 
South Africa ZAF 
Spain ESP 
Sri Lanka LKA 
Sweden SWE 
Switzerland CHE 
Taiwan TWN 
Tanzania TZA 
Thailand THA 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 
Tunisia TUN 
Turkey TUR 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
UGA 
UKR 
United Kingdom GBR 
United States USA 
Uruguay URY 
Venezuela VEN 
Yemen YEM 
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A2.6 Spearman Test for BRCA and NRCA (China) 
obs 812 BRCA(exports) BRCA(imports) NRCA(exports) NRCA(imports) 
BRCA(exports) I 
BRCA(imports) 
-0.1382** 1 
NRCA(exports) 0.8181** 
-0.2284** 1 
NRCA(imports) 
-0.0725** 0.6877** 0.0961** 1 
Note: "" denotes significance at 95% level. 
A2.7 Changing Patterns of RCAs for China 
Figure A2.7.1 BRCA and NRCA for 371 "Iron and Steel" 
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Figure A2.7.2 BRCA and NRCA for 341 "Paper and Products" 
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Figure A2.7.3 BRCA and NRCA for 372 "Non-ferrous Metals" 
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Figure A2.7.4 BRCA and NRCA for 351 "Industrial Chemicals" 
r ti 
'4, 
N- 
Wý 
U') 
N 
T 
\ 
\ 
ý/\f 
ýý rý_". 
I 
1I 
1 
ý 
v 
t 
ý0 
_yq f 
-p- f ti a 
.o º 
ro 
N 
O 
O 
ý 
z 
ö 
C 
o-ý 
tiýtititi 
Year 
I 
--"-- 
BRCA 
- 
NRCA 
00 0 0 
Figure A2.7.5 BRCA and NRCA for 354 "Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products" 
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Figure A2.7.6 BRCA and NRCA for 322 "Wearing Apparel except Footwear" 
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Figure A2.7.7 BRCA and NRCA for 385 "Professional and Scientific Equipment" 
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Figure A2.7.8 BRCA and NRCA for 324 "Footwear except Rubber or Plastic" 
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Figure A2.7.9 BRCA and NRCA for 342 "Printing and Publishing" 
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Figure A2.7.10 BR('A and NRCA for 356 "Plastic Products" 
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Figure A2.7.11 NRCA values for top five (clean) dirty industries in China 
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A2.8 Changing Patterns of NRCA in China's Major Export 
Markets 
Figure A2.8.1 Structural Change of Dirty Industries in USA 
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Figure A2.8.2 Structural Change of Dirty Industries in Japan 
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Figure A2.8.3 Structural Change of Dirty Industries in Germany 
Structural Change of Dirty Industries in Germany 
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Figure A2.8.4 Structural Change of Dirty Industries in France 
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Figure A2.8.5 Structural Change of Dirty Industries in UK 
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Figure A2.8.6 Structural Change of Clean Industries in USA 
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Figure A2.8.7 Structural Change of Clean Industries in Japan 
Structural Change of Clean Industries in Japan 
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Figure A2.8.8 Structural Change of Clean Industries in Germany 
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Figure A2.8.9 Structural Change of Clean Industries in France 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DETERMINATION OF CHINA'S TRADE 
SPECIALIZATION 
Does Environmental Stringency Matter? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two, we examined the changing patterns of trade performance for industries 
with pollution intensity ranking between 1976 and 2004. We employed measures of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCAs) and found that China does not seem to be a 
`pollution haven'. Instead, clean industries have increased their revealed comparative 
advantage, whilst dirty industries have increased revealed comparative disadvantage in 
China. The investigation of five high income countries (the US, Japan, Germany, 
France and the UK) shows that dirty industries have not reduced their revealed 
comparative advantage in the five developed countries between 1976 and 2004, 
although there are some exceptions for individual industries. We conclude that 
whether countries become pollution havens with trade liberalization is determined by 
a complex bundle of factors such as factor endowments, regulatory gap as well as 
other distinctive features for individual countries and individual industries. As such, 
the PHH is an empirical rather than a theoretical issue. 
According to Copeland and Taylor (2003: 196), there is an important distinction 
between the pollution haven effect and the strong form of the pollution haven 
hypothesis. Their model suggests that there should always be a pollution haven effect 
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but the strong form of the pollution haven hypothesis need not hold if other factors 
dominate the pollution haven effect. Although support for the strong form of the 
pollution haven hypothesis was not found in the descriptive analysis for China, we 
cannot reject the existence of a pollution haven effect (which is a weak form of the 
pollution haven hypothesis) on this basis. To more formally identify and quantify the 
role of environmental stringency in trade specialization patterns, econometric analysis 
is required. In this chapter we examine the determinants of industrial trade patterns, 
especially the role of the environmental regulations in China. Due to data limitation, 
this chapter will focus on investigating whether environmental regulations affect 
cross-industry trade performance in China. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background on environmental protection in China. Section 3 presents the methodology 
and related empirical issues. Section 4 reports the econometric results while the 
conclusions and further research questions are considered in section 5. 
3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN CHINA 
China has undergone drastic changes in environmental protection policies and 
enforcement in recent decades. MacBean (2007): "China now has, on paper, the most 
enlightened set of laws on protecting the environment of any developing nation. " 
3.2.1 Institutional settings 
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, China's first step on environmental protection 
started even before the Economic Reform. The 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm marks China's pilot appearance in international forums of 
environmental protection. Soon after that, a domestic conference on air emissions 
89 
control was held and its related project was formalised in the same year (Ross, 1988). 
In the following several years, a National Environmental Protection Office and similar 
settings were established at local (provincial, city etc) level. However, it took two 
decades for the dependent small office with little power on legislation to evolve into a 
full ministerial status ranking. In 1998, the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) was elevated and renamed as State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA), which is at ministerial level. 
The 1978 amendment of the constitution also included protection of the environment 
as one of the most basic commitments made to the Chinese society (Panayotou, 1998: 
434). In 1979, a trial version of the Environmental Protection Law was promulgated, 
which sets out requirements on environmental impact assessment, industrial location, 
emission and effluent standards as well as pollution discharge fees. Ten years later, the 
Environmental Protection Law was amended and enacted. Together with these laws, 
numerous environmental regulations, standards, programs and special funds for 
environmental protection have flourished at both national and local level. 
These movements show that China was not far behind other countries in the course of 
enacting environmental protection laws and rules. It is reported that pollution 
monitoring networks in rich Western nations have only been well operated since the 
1960s (Smil, 1984). However, the compliance of environmental regulation in China is 
questionable and we will return to this topic in section 3.2.3. 
3.2.2 Industrial pollution regulations 
The environmental protection laws contain extensive rules and guidance for the 
establishment, operation of industrial enterprises (see articles 24-33 in China 
Environmental Protection Law 1989). 
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A polluter pays principle is embodied in Chinese environmental protection laws and 
regulations. For example, in article 28 of China's Environmental Protection Law 
(1989): "Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants in excess of the prescribed 
national or local discharge standards shall pay a fee for excessive discharge according 
to state provisions and shall assume responsibility for eliminating and controlling the 
pollution. " The provisions of Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution also 
have detailed rules for water pollution emissions and abatement. It is mandated that 
the income derived from the fee levied for the excessive discharge of pollutants must 
be used for the prevention and control of pollution and shall not be appropriated for 
other purposes. Charges are levied for water pollution, air pollution, solid and 
radioactive waste. Though criticized for some weaknesses, the levy system has been 
accredited by its broadest application of price-based pollution control instruments in 
the developing world. Wang and Wheeler (1996) comment "China's pollution levy is 
one of the few economic instruments with a long, documented history of application in 
a developing country". 
3.2.3 Environmental compliance 
It is generally admitted that China has made dramatic strides in developing a 
sophisticated network of environmental protection. However, more than a few 
researchers (Smil, 1984; Economy, 2004) blame the poor implementation of 
environmental laws for the ever worsening situation of China's environment. 
Economic development strategies, as well as interest collision between different 
bureaus and government agencies, often prohibit the full compliance of environmental 
laws, rules and norms. According to Wang and Wheeler (2000), however, plants in 
China were responding strongly to the levy either by abating air pollution in the 
production process or treating water pollution at the end-of-pipe. 
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It is reported that emissions of some industrial pollutants in China have been 
decreasing in total volumes as well as in intensity terms. Taking the example of SO2, 
we find that the pollution intensity (in value added) is decreasing (graph 3.1), while 
the ratio of removed SO2 to emitted SO2 has an upward trend (graph 3.2) for 12 
industries35 between 1994 and 2004. 
Graph 3.1 SO2 Emissions Intensity in China 
(Averaged among 12 industries) 
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Data source: China Environment Yearbooks, various years; same for graph 3.2. 
Note: in ton per 10000 RMB value added (value added deflated to 1978 price level). 
Graph 3.2 Removal Ratio of SO2 in China 
(Averaged among 12 industries) 
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A list of these industries can be found in table A3.1.1 in appendix 3.1. 
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The data point (graph 3.2) for 2003 is much higher due to the industry 342 (Printing 
and Publishing) has an unusually high volume of removed SO2 in that year. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The investigation of the impact of environmental stringency on competitiveness is 
better to be examined in the international context. However, due to scarcity of 
comparable data on regulation variables, most studies have been carried out for the US 
or OECD countries by implicitly assuming the absence or the stagnation of 
environmental regulations in the developing world. A few studies that do take into 
developing countries in their examination have to depend on income-proxied 
regulatory differentials. 
Similar to the US studies, we estimate the role of environmental regulation in trade 
specialization together with factor endowments (factor intensities) and trade barriers in 
Chinese industries. Due the shortage of comparable data, we do cross-industry 
regressions based on an H-O-S framework rather than cross-country investigation. 
3.3.1 Theory and Empirical model 
A cross-industry study of environmental stringency and trade specialization is based 
on standard H-O trade theory which has been employed by many studies some of 
which we have reviewed previously. Cross-industry (commodity) comparisons within 
H-O framework were criticized for their weak theoretical underpinning. Learner (1980, 
1984) demonstrated that industrial export performance did not rely on industrial factor 
intensities. Recent research (e. g. Romalis, 2004) shows that conditional on factor 
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prices (allowing for non-factor price equalization), industry export performance in a 
quasi-H-O model is determined by industry factor intensities and relative factor prices. 
Due to data constraints, however, we still adopt the traditional specification of cross- 
industry comparisons. The general form of the empirical model takes the form of: 
NX =f(X, ', E) (3.1) 
where NX is a vector of net exports of commodities, X is a matrix of control variables 
including factor intensities and tariffs, ENV is a measure of environmental compliance 
costs, and E is a vector of the composite error term which consists of time-specific 
effect and individual effect as well as an idiosyncratic error. 
3.3.1.1 Measuring trade specialization 
Specialization is a measure of the trade pattern. Numerous measures of trade 
specialization have been discussed and used in testing trade theories (see the 
discussion in Deardorff, 1984). In the literature of environmental regulation and 
industrial competitiveness, net exports scaled by value added (or import penetration by 
similar construction) is broadly used. Cole et al. (2005) employ different measures of 
specialization and obtain consistent results of a negative impact on specialization of 
environmental stringency. In this chapter, we also explore the relationship between 
environmental regulations and trade specialization by exploiting different measures of 
specialization. 
A. Trade specialization index (TSI) 
TSI_X-Ri 
X +At 
(3.2) 
This index is constructed as the percentage share of net trade (X-M) in total trade 
volume (X+M). Its value ranges from -1 when there are no exports at all to +1 when 
there are no imports. The larger TSI value, the more export specialized is the sector. 
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This index tells the relative importance of net exports in total trade of a particular 
industry; but it overlooks differences in trade volume both between industries and 
across time. For example, an industry with little trade volume may have the same TSI 
level as an industry with massive trade volume. Similarly, when an industry grows in 
terms of trade volume, its TSI level may remain consistent. The absolute value of this 
index also represents the portion of inter-industry trade in the total trade of the 
concerned industry. Cole et al. (2005) also use this index as one of the dependent 
variables which is then estimated as a function of inter-industry differences in factor 
intensities. 
B. Michaely index 
Michaely= ýX 
- 
AM (3.3) 
Originated from Michaely (1962), this index is constructed as the percentage share of 
industry exports in total exports minus the percentage share of industry imports in 
total imports. A positive value suggests that the industry is more involved in the 
exporting activities than importing, i. e. more export specialization; the opposite means 
less export specialization. Its range is [-1,1]. 
C. Net exports share in value added 
Netva = vÄ (3.4) 
This index evaluates the share of net exports in industry value added. Increasing value 
of the index implies the sector is increasing its specialization and vice versa. It takes 
care of the importance of net exports in an industry's value added. This 
index, as well 
as its transformation net imports (import penetration), has been widely employed in 
the literature, for example, Grossman and Kruger (1992), Cole et al. (2005) and 
Levinson and Taylor (2004). 
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3.3.1.2 Measuring environmental stringency 
A reliable measure of environmental stringency is required for the econometric testing 
of the hypothesis that environmental stringency exerts a negative effect on trade 
performance, especially for the pollution-intensive industries. One measure of 
environmental stringency is qualitative. For example, based on the 1976 UNCTAD 
survey Walter and Ugelow (1979) measure the degree of environmental stringency 
from one (tolerant) to seven (strict) for a number of counties. This qualitative variable 
has been adopted in Tobey (1990), as we mentioned in the section of empirical 
evidence. Wilson et al. (2002) adopt two qualitative variables for environmental 
regulation, the scope of environmental regulation and the control mechanism for 
environmental enforcement, are constructed based on the performance indices of 
countries in terms of environmental regulation. 
Other measures are developed for the US states, such as the Conservation Foundation 
index that measures each state's `effort to provide a quality environment for citizens'; 
the FREE (Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment) index which measures 
the strength of environmental program in each state; and the Green index which 
measures the number of statutes that each state has from a list of 50 common 
environmental laws. Levinson (1996) includes these measures in his study of 
environmental regulation and manufacturers' location choices. Although these 
qualitative measures of environmental stringency take into account of multi- 
dimensional property and are comparable across regions, they usually do not have a 
time dimension to match panel data estimation. 
A cost-based measure, such as pollution abatement cost and expenditures, has been 
adopted in previous studies as a measure of environmental stringency. Although cost- 
based stringency measures normally are confined in terms of measuring different 
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dimensions of environmental regulations 36, they are widely used due to their 
availability over time. 
At the Chinese industrial level, data for pollution abatement and environmental 
protection staff are available since the 1990s. We construct two measures of 
environmental stringency, one based on pollution abatement operating cost and 
another on the number of environmental protection personnel. 
A. ENVI pollution abatement operating cost/value added 
Annual pollution abatement operating cost refers to annual expenditures on operation 
pollution treatment facilities. Available data show the annual pollution abatement 
operating cost at industrial level in China. The effect of environmental regulation on 
competitiveness depends on abatement technologies. As new facilities (with new 
technologies embodied) are implemented, pollution abatement operating costs as share 
of value added may actually go down. This decrease in ENVI has little to do with 
relaxing environmental stringency (or deregulating). Lacking research and 
development data (R&D) at 3-digit ISIC industrial level, we count on time dummies 
and industry dummies to control for these unobserved influences. 
B. ENV2=en vironniental personnel*wage/value added 
Another measure of environmental stringency is related to the number of environment 
protection personnel in an industry. The increase in the number of environmental 
protection personnel shows increasing effort in regulatory enforcement. We assume 
that environmental personnel earn the same wage as the industrial average wage. The 
payment to environmental protection personnel is then scaled by industrial value 
added. Similar to ENVI, the increase in ENV2 may not reflect the extent of increased 
36 Jaffe et al. (1995) also point out that a substantial share of compliance costs for some federal 
regulations fall on state and local governments rather than private firms. 
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environmental stringency. Time dummies and industry dummies are adopted to 
control for the omitted variables. 
3.3.1.3 Measuring other control variables 
Human capital intensity (HCI) is defined as the payroll paid to skilled workers divided 
by value added. Since the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers is not well 
recorded at the industrial level in China Statistics Yearbooks, we follow the definition 
of HCI in Grossman and Kruger (1991,1994) as well as in other similar studies (Cole 
et al., 2005). 
HCI 
= 
(wrr 
- 
Wi )*L,, 
VA 
(3.5) 
where Wk represents the average wage in each industry i at year t, w, represents the 
average wage in the lowest paying industry at year t. VA represents value added and L 
for the number of employees. 
Physical capital intensity (PCI) is constructed as the non-wage share of value added, 
as adopted in Balassa and Noland (1989), Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Cole et 
al. (2005). 
jy, 
r 
* L,, 
PCI=I- 
VA 
(3.6) 
A more direct measure of physical capital intensity is to use the ratio of fixed assets to 
value added. We refer to it as man-made physical capital and denote it as MK. 
MK 
= 
FixedAsset 
VA 
(3.7) 
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Tariffs refer to import tariffs. We use weighted average tariffs as import barriers. 
Non-tariff barrier data are not available. 
3.3.1.4 Empirical models 
In this chapter, the variables used are all in levels since the dependent variable 
contains negative values. Following the previous studies based on H-O framework, a 
benchmark model is set out: 
SPEC,, 
= 
Qi ENV + ß2 NCI + ß3 PCI,, + ß4tar ff, + e,, (3.8) 
where, 
i: industry code. 
t: the year. 
SPEC: trade specialization index (TSI, Michaely, Netva). 
c=rl+y+v: the composite error term, 71; industry specific effect, y, time specific effect 
and v, the idiosyncratic error term. 
ENV: environmental stringency. 
HCI: human capital intensity. 
PCI: physical capital intensity. 
tariff: weighted import tariffs as proxy for trade barriers. 
This specification examines the relationship between trade patterns and a set of 
independent variables including an environmental pricing factor together with 
traditional factor endowments. With environmental stringency and factor intensities 
varying across industries and over the years, it is possible to estimate the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. 
To explore the heterogeneous effect of environmental regulation on pollution- 
intensive industries, we use an interaction term of environmental stringency and 
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pollution intensity (`dirtiness' variable) which is defined as the ratio of emissions to 
value added in constant prices (due to data limitation, we only use two pollutants, SO2 
and COD). 
SPEC 
= 
ß, ENV,, +ß2HCl +ß3PCI,, +ß4tariff +/35ENV,, * dirtiness, + 
(3.9) 
Other things equal, an increase in environmental regulations in industry i means 
higher pollution taxes or greater pollution abatement efforts which will lead to an 
increase in production costs (or a comparative price disadvantage). As a result, 
domestic production and exports may contract and imports may expand. It is hence 
hypothesized that the environmental stringency has negative impact on trade 
performance, i. e. P, (the coefficient of environmental stringency) is expected to be 
negative. 
The sign of each coefficient for factor inputs in the inter-industry regression indicates 
whether the corresponding factor is a source of comparative cost advantage in the 
country being examined. Since the relative abundance of factors determines 
comparative costs in the 11-0-S model, a positive (negative) sign is taken to indicate 
that the corresponding factor is abundance (scarce) within the country. In some 
empirical studies that based on US industries (for example, Cole et al. (2005)), a 
positive effect is found for the human capital intensity and physical capital intensity 
on industrial competitiveness. Conventional wisdom believes that human capital 
intensity and physical capital intensity are relatively scarce in China and hence are not 
sources of comparative cost advantage for China, which points to the prediction of 
negative-signed ß2 (coefficient of human capital intensity) and 03 (coefficient of 
physical capital intensity). However, our cost-based measures of capital intensities 
may not reflect correctly the factor intensities as measured internationally. An increase 
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in these variables may correlate to increasing productivity and profitability, which 
adds to the difficulty of sign prediction. As a sensitivity check, we use MK as an 
alternative measure of physical capital intensity. 
The impact of import barriers on trade specialization is predicted to be positive since 
import tariffs are set up to protect domestic industries and control imports. On the 
other hand, tariff scale is influenced by the trade liberalization process. The interaction 
term between environmental stringency and dirtiness is predicted to be negative as we 
expect to see a more significant effect of environmental stringency on dirtier industries' 
trade performance. 
3.3.2 Data Description 
The datasets from TPPS by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), UNIDO and CSID as well as 
China Statistical Yearbooks and China Environment Yearbooks enable our study on 
the determinants of China's trade pattern. The industry classification system for the 
database TPPS is the 3-digit level ISIC revision 2 which covers 28 manufacturing 
sectors. To make the data compatible across different sources, we have merged the 
manufacturing industries in 23 categories (see the description of the concordance in 
appendix 3.1). Detailed data sources and variable definitions can be found in table 
A3.2.1 in appendix 3.2. 
Most observations in our dataset are for the period of 1994-2004, because less 
information on pollution abatement operating cost and environmental protection at 
industrial level are available for previous years. According to the availability of 
environmental stringency measures, we split our datasets into two sub-samples: sample 
one, 2001-2004 for 22 industries (390 "Other Manufactured Goods" are excluded 
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because of its complex composition of goods) and sample two 1994-2004 for 12 
industries. 
From the correlation tables 3.1 and 3.2 (for the two sub samples), we can see there are 
high positive correlations between the three specialization indices. However, the relative 
ranking of each industry is considerably different in the three trade variables (see 
appendix 3.3). The two measures of environmental stringency are also highly and 
positively correlated. The simple correlations between trade specialization indices and 
environmental stringency indicators show a negative link between trade specialization 
and environmental stringency. Physical capital intensity and human capital intensity are 
negatively related to all three trade specialization indices. Tariff is positively correlated 
with TSI and Netva, while it is negatively correlated to the Michaely index in sample 
two. The interaction terms of environmental stringency and pollution intensity seem to 
be negatively correlated with trade specialization indices. The interaction terms are 
positively correlated to the related measure of environmental stringency which may 
cause a multicollinearity problem. In the regressions we will experiment with and 
without the interaction terms. Descriptive statistics for the two samples can be found in 
the Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.3 shows the average values of energy intensity, physical capital intensity, 
human capital intensity, weighted tariff as well as the two environmental stringency 
variables, ranked from highest to lowest in energy intensity. The industries with 
highest energy intensity include the four dirtiest industries we identified in chapter 
two: 371 (Iron and Steel), 372 (Non-ferrous Metals), 351 (Chemicals) and 341 (Paper 
and Products). It seems that pollution intensive industries are also highly energy 
intensive. Pollution intensive industries seem also to be physical capital and human 
capital intensive. Weighted tariffs are variable across industries with 314 (Tobacco), 
369 (Non-metallic Mineral Products), 322 (Wearing Apparels) and 313 (Beverages) 
having the highest average tariff levels. The measures of environmental stringency are 
positively correlated with energy intensity. To sum up, the more energy intensive an 
industry is, the dirtier and the higher pollution abatement operating cost ratio it is. It is 
less clear about the link between the SO2 removal ratio and other statistics. 
We also present environmental stringency measures for each of the 12 industries in 
sample one between 1994 and 2004 in table 3.4. Pollution abatement operating cost to 
value added (ENV1) seems to support the view of `small environmental costs'. On 
average, it is less than 2 percent of value added. Since industrial value added in China 
is only about 25% of gross output, operating abatement operating costs account for 
less than 0.5% of gross output on average. 
In addition, the value of ENV2 is smaller than that of ENV I. 
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3.3.3 Selection of estimators 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimation is identical to the cross-sectional 
data analysis predominantly adopted in the early literature of environmental stringency 
and industrial competitiveness. Using pooled cross-sectional data analysis may cause 
biased "results due to the existence of unobservable, unmeasured characteristics that 
are correlated with the included explanatory variables. Compared to cross-section 
data, panel datasets allow us to explore the unobserved but fixed characteristics of 
industries that may be correlated with dependent variables and key independent 
variables. The most common technique for accounting for heterogeneity is panel data. 
The fixed effects (FE) model and random effects (RE) model estimators have their 
own caveats and strengths. FE allows individual specific effects to be correlated with 
explanatory variables while RE does not. However, the FE is inferior to the RE in 
terms of degrees of freedom; and the estimated coefficients from FE tend to be less 
significant due to high correlation between the fixed effects and the explanatory 
variables. OLS, FE and RE estimation in STATA are designed to take into account of 
heteroscedasticity and provide robust estimates. However, they are not designed to 
correct for autocorrelation. 
In table 3.5 we present test results for heteroscedasticity. Though not always rejected, 
we find evidence that there is heteroscedasticity in some specifications. First-order 
autocorrelation is tested and the results are presented in table 3.6. At A 95% 
significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no first order 
autocorrelation for all the specifications. 
" Hsiao (1986: 6-7) demonstrates the occurrence of heterogeneity bias in slope coefficients, when 
omitting group-specific intercepts to account for heterogeneous cross-sectional units in panel data sets. 
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Table 3.5 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Ho: constant variance) 
ENV1 ENV2 
TSI Michaely Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
Sample 1 Chi-square 8.80 2.64 1.56 9.38 2.68 12.21 
p value 0.0030 0.1043 0.2116 0.0022 0.1013 0.0005 
Sample 2 Chi-square 1.91 0.02 6.48 5.24 14.96 12.00 
p value 0.1668 0.8900 0.0109 0.0221 0.0001 0.0005 
Table 3.6 Wooldridge test (Ho: no first order autocorrelation) 
ENV1 ENV2 
TSI Michaely Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
Sample 1 F-test 22.260 42.120 16.879 19.639 44.026 107.721 
p value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Sample 2 F-test 24.456 5.287 7.069 20.770 6.314 10.346 
p value 0.0004 0.0421 0.0222 0.0008 0.0288 0.0082 
In consideration of both heterogeneity and autocorrelation (non i. i. d, i. e. non 
independent and identically distributed disturbances), generalised least squares (GLS) 
estimators are not feasible with the variance-covariance matrix unknown. We adopt 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS thereafter) estimator which transforms the 
data controlling for both heterogeneity and autocorrelation (only AR(l) is controlled 
in our case). 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Main results 
Table 3.7 presents estimation results based on ENV1 (pollution abatement operating 
cost as share of value added) for 22 industries between 2001 and 2004. We find that 
the sign and magnitude of estimated coefficients vary across the three alternative 
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measures of trade specialization. Environmental stringency has a significantly 
negative impact on TSI and Netva; however, the coefficient on the Michaely index is 
counter-intuitively positive though insignificant. Human capital intensity and physical 
capital intensity seem to be significantly and positively influencing both TSI and 
Michaely which are contrary to our prediction. Only for Netva, human capital 
intensity and physical capital intensity seem to have expected negative signs. The 
unexpected factor intensity results may partly come from some measurement problem. 
For example, the wage information used to construct HCI may have little to do with 
human capital intensity itself. Other factors such as state intervention than human 
capital intensity lead Tobacco industry has higher wage level. It should also be noted 
that some Chinese exports may be relatively capital intensive by Chinese, but not 
international, standards. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between environmental stringency and 
pollution intensity is negative across the last three columns though insignificant for 
TSI. They provide evidence that dirtier industries seem to suffer more from stringent 
regulations. The tariff effect has mixed signs and significance levels. Only in the case 
of TSI, tariff seems to have a significant and positive sign, but the exogeneity of this 
variable is questionable as tariff design is often influenced by trade performance. 
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Table 3.7 FGLS results with ENV1 based on sample one 
2001-2004 22 industries 
TSI 1lfichaely Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
ENV1 
"2.469** 0.013 -4.892* -2.226** 0.013 -3.384 
(-2.471) (0.188) (-1.747) (-2.205) (0.186) (-1.337) 
IICI 0.870** 0.377*** 
-0.499 0.795** 0.277*** -1.114 
(2.511) (7.762) (-0.406) (2.271) (4.263) (-0.934) 
PCI 0.835*** 0.246*** 
-1.398* 0.768*** 0.189*** -1.702** 
(3.450) (7.386) (-1.816) (3.104) (4.599) (-2.222) 
Tariff 0.002** 
-0.000 0.002 0.002*** -0.000 0.002 
(2.429) (-0.013) (1.483) (2.651) (-0.165) (1.292) 
ENV1*dirtiness 
-0.683 -0.089** -4.066*** 
(-1.222) (-1.985) (-3.160) 
cons 
-0.563** -0.216*** 1.390** -0.508** -0.16*** 1.663** 
(-2.540) (-7.236) (1.970) (-2.258) (-4.436) (2.376) 
chit 1.77e+05 10141.158 16872.236 1.89e+05 9680.394 21531.279 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; 
**means significant at 5%; 'means significant at 10%. 
Based on sample one, we use the alternative measure of environmental stringency, 
ENV2. The regression results are provided in table 3.8. The results share similarity 
with table 3.7: the estimated coefficient of environmental stringency turns out to be 
significantly negative for the three different trade specialization variables; human 
capital intensity and physical capital intensity are unexpectedly positive and 
significant for TSI and Michaely while their impact seems to be insignificant and 
sometimes negative on Netva; the tariff coefficient is only significantly positive for 
TSI. However, for the interaction terms between environmental stringency and 
pollution intensity, there is no significantly negative effect. Hence the hypothesis that 
dirtier industries tend to suffer more from increasing environmental stringency is not 
supported here. 
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Table 3.8 FGLS results with ENV2 based on sample one 
2001-2004 22 manufacturing industries 
TSI Atichaely Netva TSI Alichaely Netva 
ENV2 
-90.8200 -9.239* 492.525*** -80.807* -5.563 
(. 2.42) (. 1.739) (-2.850) (-1.880) (-0.786) 
IICI 1.213*** 0.326*** 0.143 1.056** 0.314*** 
(3.42) (5.484) (0.086) (2.539) (4.295) 
PCI 0.8100** 0.193*** 
-1.773 0.747""" 0.196*** 
(3.13) (4.526) (-1.383) (2.778) (4.365) 
Tariff 0.0020" 
-0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.000 
(2.26) (-0.795) (0.398) (2.295) (-0.413) 
ENV2"dirtiness 
-3.139 -1.190 
(-0.426) (-0.820) 
_cons -0.532*0 -0.164000 
1.942 
-0.480" -0.169*** 
(-2.16) (-4.160) (1.614) (-1.889) (-4.080) 
chi2 3.08e+05 10954.182 15560.994 2.51e+05 12312.848 
N 88 88 88 88 88 
-543.63** 
(-2.556) 
0.454 
(0.251) 
-1.793 
(-1.423) 
0.001 
(0.542) 
16.243 
(0.386) 
1.974* 
(1.671) 
18652.49 
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Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. "'" means significant at 1%; 
**means significant at 5%; "means significant at 10%. 
We also present results using a panel of 12 industries with longer time span of 1996 
and 2004 (sample two). Most of these industries included in the sample are more 
pollution intensive than those that are not included. Table 3.9 gives the results based 
on ENV 1. In the first three columns of estimates, we find that pollution abatement cost 
only has a significantly negative impact on Netva while it is insignificant in terms of 
TSI and Michaely. Same as the results from sample one, we find that human capital 
intensity seems to have positive impact on trade specialization indices, though the 
effect is not significant in the case of Netva. Physical capital intensity has insignificant 
impact on trade specialization indices. The tariff now has a significant (though very 
small marginal effect) negative impact on Michaely, while it is insignificant for the 
other two trade specialization indices. The interaction term of environmental 
stringency and dirtiness has negative coefficient for all the three dependent variables, 
although it is not significant for TSI. This suggests that dirtier industries do seem to 
have more negative impact from increasing environmental stringency. 
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Table 3.9 FGLS results with ENV1 based on sample two 
1994-2004 12 industries 
TSI 1lfichatly Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
ENVI 
-0.595 0.018 -1.672* -0.638 0.060* -1.173 
(-1.119) (-0.574) (-1.902) (-1.057) (-1.759) (-1.293) 
IICI 1.669'"' 0.10200' 0.788 1.701*** 0.104*** 0.432 
(-2.643) (-3.231) (-0.93) (-2.609) (-3.206) (-0.502) 
PCI 0.13 0.016 
-0.517 0.15 0.014 -0.713 
(-0.407) (-0.932) (-1.126) (-0.459) (-0.81) (-1.547) 
Tariff 0.000 
-0.000" -0.002 0.000 -0.000** -0.002 
(-0.203) (-2.550) (-1.305) (-0.238) (-2.409) (-1.521) 
ENVI*Dirtiness 
-0.116 -0.075*** -1.752** 
(-0.426) (-4.046) (-2.421) 
cons 
-0.536" -0.041 "'* -0.086 -0.553* -0.039** 0.111 
(-1.722) (-2.580) (-0.196) (-1.742) (-2.492) (-0.251) 
chit 7726.097 2779.563 1097.148 6657.574 3384.174 1465.274 
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. "" means significant at 1%; 
"means significant at 5%; "means significant at 10%. 
If we use environmental protection staff information (ENV2) to proxy environmental 
stringency (see table 3.10), a significant, negative effect from environmental 
stringency can be found for TSI and Netva. The positive and significant coefficient for 
human capital intensity is consistent with earlier findings. For physical capital 
intensity, the coefficient remains insignificant across dependent variables. Tariff now 
turns out to be a negative effect and is significant in the cases of TSI and Netva. The 
interaction term between environmental stringency and dirtiness has mixed signs and 
remains insignificant across alternative trade specialization indices. 
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Table 3.10 FGLS results with ENV2 based on sample two 
1994-2004 12 industries 
TSI Afichaely Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
ENV2 
-26.934** -0.906 -49.193*** -25.447** -0.482 -41.403** 
(-2.283) (-0.648) (-3.053) (-1.977) (-0.333) (-2.309) 
IICI 1.871 *** 0.080** 1.958** 1.963*** 0.088*** 1.746** 
(-3.08) (-2.563) (-2.567) (-3.2) (-2.904) (-2.201) 
PCI 0.093 0.018 
-0.267 0.134 0.019 -0.426 
(-0.336) (-1.363) (-0.795) (-0.459) (-1.458) (-1.209) 
Tariff 
-0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** 
(-4.650) (-0.038) (-5.146) (-4.581) (-0.050) (-5.115) 
ENV2*Dirtiness 2.264 
-0.504 -14.282 
(-0.555) (-1.368) (-1.220) 
_cons -0.5110 -0.038*** -0.371 -0.557" -0.040*** -0.223 (-1.861) (-2.916) (-1.112) (-1.935) (-3.149) (-0.637) 
chit 5083.696 1329.007 1450.34 3880.473 1465.273 1576.689 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; 
"means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
Given the unexpected signs on some variables, appendix 3.4 provides estimates when 
the explanatory variables are added incrementally into regression models. In table 
A3.4.1 (sample one with ENV1), the sign of HCI seems to be influenced by the 
inclusion of PCI. However, other results (ENV2 with sample one as well as the 
estimates based on sample two) show that the inclusion of PCI as well as other control 
variables does not change the sign of HCI. 
Elasticities 
To evaluate the impact of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable we 
estimate the elasticities. Due to the differences in measurement of environmental 
stringency, trade specialization and even dataset, there are a wide range of elasticities. 
Based on sample one, we find that a 1% increase in ENVI would lead to a reduction 
of about 0.16% in TSI and Netva. The increase in ENV2 would result in 0.3 % 
reduction in TSI and a considerably larger reduction of 0.9 % in net exports. Human 
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capital intensity effect is also small in magnitude: a 1% increase in HCI would lead to 
0.26-0.36% increase in TSI, while the effect is insignificant for Netva. Physical capital 
intensity is much larger in magnitude: a 1% increase in PCI would lead to about 4% 
increase in TSI, but about a 4% decrease in net exports. The impact from tariff seems 
to be small and positive: the elasticity is about 0.2% and insignificant in the case of 
net exports. 
Table 3.11 Estimated Elasticities 
(For sample one: 2001-2004 22 industries) 
TSI TSI Netva Netva 
ENV1 
-0.157'' -0.163* 
(-2.46) (-1.72) 
ENV2 
-0.298" -0.858*** 
(-2.42) (-2.77) 
110 0.255" 0.356*** 
-0.077 0.022 
(2.50) (3.39) (-0.41) (0.09) 
PCI 3.994*'* 3.876'** 
-3.514' -4.508 
(3.45) (3.45) (-1.79) (-1.37) 
Tariff 0.172'' 0.204" 0.11 0.031 
(2.42) (2.25) (1.47) (0.40) 
Note: elasticities are obtained using the command mfx with option eyex (calculate elasticities in the form 
of d(lny}/d(lnx)) in STATA: for negative predicted values, the elasticities are not estimated; z-statistics 
are in paretheses. """ means significant at 1%; "*means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
Table 3.12 Estimated Elasticities 
(For sample two: 1996-2004 12 industries) 
ENVI 
TSI TSI Netva 
ENV2 
I ICI 
PCI 
Tariff 
-0.172 -4.892* 
(-1.75) 
-0.629* 
(-1.78) 
2.001" 3.61" 
-0.499 
(2.24) (2.08) (-0.41) 
1.932 2.114 
-1.398* 
(0.687) (0.33) (-1.82) 
0.069 
-1.429** 0.002 
(0.40) (0.40) (1.48) 
Note: elasticities are obtained using the command mfx with option eyex (calculate elasticities in the form 
of d(Inyyd(Inx)) in STATA: for negative predicted values, the elasticities are not estimated; z-statistics 
are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
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Table 3.12 presents estimated elasticities for sample two. The magnitudes of each 
effect change dramatically. Human capital intensity seems to be the largest in 
explaining TSI. For net exports, the impact from ENV I is much larger than the 
estimates obtained from sample one. 
3.4.2 Robustness check 
We have seen in different model specifications that the coefficients of physical capital 
intensity and human capital intensity have an unexpected sign, i. e. they are positively 
and significantly correlated with trade variables (TSI and Michaely). Since China is 
believed to have comparative advantage in labour intensive industries and comparative 
disadvantage in capital intensive ones, this finding is indeed puzzling. One possible 
explanation is that both physical capital and human capital intensities are 
endogenously influenced by trade performance. An industry with strong international 
competitiveness would have faster capital accumulation rate than other industries. In 
addition, the payroll-related measures of human capital intensity and physical capital 
intensity may be correlated with profitability of an industry. 
To provide robustness check, we employ a more direct measure of physical capital 
intensity which is man-made capital (fixed capital divided by value added). The 
results based on sample one and two are reported in tables3.13 and 3.14. Table 3.13 
shows that MK is significantly negative for TSI and Michaely index. But for Netva, 
MK shows a positive effect. ENVI is still negative though less significant across trade 
variables. By contrast, ENV2 is significantly negative for all the three trade indices. 
We find HCI a positive influence, while tariff has mixed signs and significance levels. 
In table 3.13 the man-made physical capital intensity is significant and negative for 
TSI while it is significantly positive for Netva. With sample two (see table 3.14), 
however, MK has an insignificant effect on all trade indices. 
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Table 3.13 Robustness check: FGLS with sample one 
Variable TSI TSI Dlichaely Michaely Netva Netva 
ENVI 
-1.940 -0.038 -4.367* 
(-1.843) (-0.533) (-1.995) 
ENV2 
-96.305' -19.75*** 
-486.26** 
(-2.572) (-5.296) (-2.812) 
IICI 0.185 0.542" 0.1110* 0.147*" 0.798 1.363 
(1.236) (2.857) (2.67) (4.061) (1.052) (1.417) 
DIK 
-0.086"' -0.087'* -0.010"* -0.006 0.007 0.143* 
(-4.325) (-3.186) (-4.273) (-1.567) (0.157) (2.032) 
Tariff 0.002"' 0.002*' 0.000 
-0.000 0.001 0.001 
(4.598) (2.712) (0.422) (-0.488) (0.413) (0.377) 
_cons 
0.261" 0.278*** 0.015*" 0.018'** 0.165* 0.206** 
(4.441) (5.132) (4.808) (5.602) (2.006) (2.692) 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 
chi2 914417.02 483173.52 11868.432 13793.824 15177.461 7387.874 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; 
**means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
Table 3.14 Robustness check: FGLS with sample two 
Variable TSI TSI Michaely Michaely Netva Netva 
ENV1 
-0.741 0.015 -1.583 
(-1.332) (0.427) (-1.828) 
ENV2 
-30.484* -1.271 -55.4*** 
(-2.366) (-0.878) (-3.472) 
IICI 1.497*** 1.626*** 0.083** 0.062* 1.225* 1.689** 
(3.464) (4.727) (3.078) (2.070) (2.010) (2.918) 
MK 0.025 0.027 
-0.000 0.001 0.030 0.063 
(0.989) (1.284) (-0.032) (0.453) (0.797) (1.915) 
Tariff 0.001 
-0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*** 
(0.513) (-4.562) (-0.867) (-0.451) (-1.085) (-4.036) 
_cons 
0.432*** 0.254*** 0.013 0.007** 0.270** 0.529*** 
(6.696) (6.932) (1.786) (3.003) (2.620) (14.461) 
N 108 132 108 132 108 132 
chi2 8002.397 6053.258 2432.215 1263.377 1170.89 1380.742 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; 
**means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
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3.4.3 Endogeneity concerns 
As already summarized in the literature section, several studies (Ederington and 
Minier, 2000,2001; Levinson and Taylor, 2004; Cole et al., 2005) suggest that 
environmental regulations are subject to endogeneity concerns. In addition, the 
counterintuitive signs of physical capital intensity and human capital intensity from 
our regressions also suggest a possibility of endogeneity in these variables. 
Approaches to eliminate the problem of endogeneity include taking lags and 
instrumentation. Taking lags would further reduce the number of our observations. 
Moreover, the number of lags, if not carefully considered, will lead to biased estimates. 
An IV estimator and a (difference or system) GMM estimator both can be applied to 
deal with the endogeneity issue. IV estimator requires valid instruments which must 
be correlated with environmental stringency measures but uncorrelated with any 
elements left in the error term. Another concern about using IV approach is that it 
causes loss of efficiency (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1998). The GMM approach is a 
general estimation method that includes OLS, IV and MLE as special cases. Due to 
panel size constraint, we look for outside instruments of environmental stringency. 
Levinson and Taylor (2004) propose two instruments which employ information on 
geographical dispersion of industries and state (their study is on the US) 
characteristics. The first one is based on pollution demand which is a weighted 
average of pollution emissions (excluding own industry's emissions) in the states and 
the second is based on pollution supply which is weighted average of income per 
capita in the states. The weights are industry i's value added in each state in the 
beginning of data period. Data on pollution emissions for each industry in each 
province at year t are less available. We use the instrument constructed with income 
per capita as follows: 
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30 
1: GDPa *VA, 
P, "4 
INS 
= 
°'' (3.10) 
where i refers to an industry, t refers to year, p refers to province, GDPpt is provincial 
gross product at year t, VA is value added. The instrument may fail (Levinson and 
Taylor, 2004) since: 1. `small industry' assumption may not hold and industry size 
may affect environmental stringency and 2. Geographic dispersion of industries may 
be influenced by trade liberalization. Since we use 1994 weights, the movement of 
industry to take advantage of preferential policies (opening up ports, tax rebate etc) 
may have been going on for a while and those industry with greater mobility may have 
been attracted to the coastal provinces. Another concern is that the instrument is not 
highly correlated to stringency measures. To increase the explanatory power of the 
instrument, we include the instrument and other explanatory variables in the first-stage 
regression. In the second-stage regression, the standard errors are corrected using a 
correction factor introduced in Gujarati (2004). 
Davidson-MacKinnon test statistics show that the endogeneity of stringency measures 
as instrumented by INS is not very meaningful. Despite this, we still carry out IV 
estimation and report the results for the two subsamples in table 3.15 and table 3.16. 
Most of the results are consistent with previous estimates and the environmental 
stringency variables are negatively influencing trade performance. When we use 
sample two and instrument ENV1 by INS, however, environmental stringency seems 
to be positively and sometimes significantly correlated to trade performance. 
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Table 3.15 IV-FGLS with sample one 
2001-2004 22 industries 
ENV I 
TSI Michaely Netva TSI Michaely Netva 
-0.92 -2.090*** -81.292*** 
(-0.174) (-5.838) (-9.127) 
ENV2 
-20.733 -47.102*** 
-1832.388*** 
(-0.174) (-5.838) (-9.127) 
HCI 1.048** 0.378*** 
-0.507 1.048** 0.378*** 
-0.507 
(-2.293) (-8.721) (-0.651) (-2.293) (-8.721) (-0.651) 
PCI 0.946*** 0.224*** 
-2.305*** 0.946*** 0.224*** 
-2.305*** 
(-4) (-7.295) (-4.772) (-4) (-7.295) (-4.772) 
Tariff 0.002* 0.000* 0,004** 0.002* 0.000* 0.004** 
(-1.746) (-1.656) (-2.032) (-1.746) (-1.656) (-2.032) 
_cons -0.675*** -0.182*** 
2.747*** 
-0.673*** -0.177*** 2.954*** 
(-3.102) (-6.673) (-5.67) (-3.034) (-6.477) (-5.998) 
chi2 73296.65 17183.77 35106.19 73296.62 17183.76 35105.98 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 
D-M (p-value) 0.36 0.31 0.12 0.06 0.99 0,36 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; 
**means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
Table 3.16 IV-FGLS with sample two 
1994-2004 12 industries 
TSI Dlichaely Netva TSI Atichaely Netva 
ENV I 13.704*** 0.114 18.848*** 
(-3.973) (-0.396) (-3.821) 
ENV2 457.101*** 
-7.12 
-649.196*** 
(-5.206) (-0.889) (-4.748) 
HCI 0.891 0.080* 0.309 5.178*** 0.143** 6.535*** 
(-1.358) (-1.807) (-0.363) (-6.406) (-2.193) (-5.358) 
PCI 
-0.217 0.019 -0.676* 0.193 0.024 -0.036 
(-0.760) (-1.026) (-1.954) (-0.735) (-1.447) (-0.113) 
Tariff 0.006*** 0.000 0.007** 
-0.007*** 0.000 
-0.010*** 
(-2.603) (-0.35) (-2.369) (-7.681) (-0.687) (-6.848) 
_cons -0.498* -0.042*** -0.343 -0.494* -0.043*** -0.408 (-1.826) (-2.700) (-1.054) (-1.899) (-2.666) (-1.297) 
chi2 3379.42 1392.296 1362.451 3715.088 1435.657 1353.656 
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 
D-M (p-value) 0.41 0.16 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.35 
Note: with time and industry dummies included. t-statistics in parentheses. *** means significant at 
"means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%. 
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we use cross-industry regressions to examine the role of environmental 
stringency in shaping trade patterns in China. Following the existing literature, we 
adopt the factor share version of Heckscher-Olin theory of trade. Specifically, trade 
variables (the dependent) are measured by three proxies: TSI, the Michaely and Net 
exports scaled by value added (Netva). Environmental stringency is measured by two 
proxies: the ratio of pollution abatement operating costs to value added and the 
payment to environment protection staff scaled by value added. Human capital 
intensity and physical capital intensity are constructed based on payroll. Tariff is also 
included as a control variable. 
Based on the availability of data, we divide the dataset into two sub-samples: sample 
one with more cross-section units (22 industries) but shorter time periods (2001-2004) 
whilst sample two with small cross-section units (12 industries) but longer periods 
(1994-2004). To control for unobserved heterogeneity in industries and only time- 
varying elements, we include both time and industry specific effects in our 
specifications. Also to control for both heterogeneity and autocorrelation, FGLS 
estimator is employed. In general, using the payment to environment protection staff 
as a proxy for environmental stringency (ENV2) gives us negative and significant 
coefficients across subsamples and trade variables. When environmental stringency is 
proxied by pollution abatement operating cost (ENV1), we find its impact becomes 
positive though insignificant for the Michaely index, whilst the negative coefficient is 
still found for TSI and Netva. These two measures also differ in the coefficients of 
their interaction with pollution intensity. For the traditional pollution abatement 
operating costs, we find that dirtier industries tend to be more affected by increasing 
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environmental stringency 38 
, 
in terms of export performance, with increasing 
environmental stringency; this finding, however, receives no support from the other 
measure of environmental stringency. 
For human capital intensity and physical capital intensity, we find that they both seem 
to have a positive impact on TSI and Michaely (especially so for human capital 
intensity). Their impact on Netva is insignificant most of the time. The tariff effect is 
inconclusive with varying signs and significance levels across different specifications 
and subsamples. 
To further investigate the counterintuitive result for PCI, we employ a more direct 
measure of physical capital intensity which is the fixed capital scaled by value added, 
MK. It is found in sample one that MK is negatively (and significantly sometimes) for 
TSI and Michaely; however, the impact of MK on net exports now turns to be positive 
and significant. For sample one, MK has mixed signs and is insignificant. Both 
elasticities and endogeneity concerns are discussed. 
We also run cross-section regressions without industry fixed effects (results are not 
reported to conserve space). Coefficients on environmental stringency are still 
significantly negative, while those for the physical capital intensity and human capital 
intensity are significantly negative as expected. 
There are some deficiencies of the present study. Firstly, a methodological issue, the 
unobserved foreign industry characteristics (rest of the world, ROW) are assumed as 
constant (relative to China) over time which is not very plausible. A better treatment 
 When pollution-intensive is proxicd by average environmental cost, Ederington et at. (2003,2005) find 
no evidence for the hypothesis that trade flows are more sensitive to changing environmental regulations 
in the more pollution-intensive industries. Measurement of pollution-intensive may have influence on the 
coefficient. 
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will be studying trade flows and relative industrial characteristics in a cross-country 
setting or even in a bilateral setting. Secondly, the cost-based stringency measures are 
rather partial in the sense that pollution abatement operating cost (or payment to 
environment protection staff) as a fraction of value added may not necessarily increase 
when environmental policy tightens in the presence of advanced and more efficient 
pollution abatement technologies and management. Indeed, we find that both 
measures are not increasing over time despite the increase in the removal ratio for S02- 
Lastly, the exogeneity of other right hand side variables besides environmental 
stringency may be questioned. 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER THREE 
Appendix 3.1 Concordance between industry classifications 
There are 28 3-digit manufacturing industries defined by ISIC (International Standard 
Industry Classification). Because pollution abatement costs for Chinese industries 
were reported on CS1C (Chinese Standard Industry Classification) 2 digit level, we 
have to convert the two classifications to make them compatible. To make data 
compatible, some industries are aggregated into a bigger industry. In particular, 322 
(Wearing Apparel except Footwear) and 324 (Footwear except Rubber or Plastics) are 
merged into a new industry 322F (Wearing Apparel except Rubber or Plastics); 351 
(Industrial Chemicals) and 352 (Other Chemicals) are aggregated into 351A 
(Chemicals); 353 (Petroleum Refineries) and 354 (Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products) 
are aggregated into 353A (Petroleum); 361 (Pottery, china, earthenware), 362 (Glass 
and Products) and 369 (Other Non-metallic Mineral Products) are aggregated into 
369K (Non-metallic Mineral Products). All these changes are listed in table A3.1.1. 
The conversion between CSIC industries and ISIC industries is detailed in table 
A3.1.2. Recycling as a sub-sector of manufacturing is excluded since there is not 
enough trade data. 
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TableA3.1.1 23 3-digit ISIC manufacturing data 
Industries sample ISIC 3-digit Description 
311 1 311 Food Products 
313 1 313 Beverages 
314 1 314 Tobacco 
321 1,2 321 Textiles 
323 1,2 323 Leather products 
322F 1 322+324 Wearing Apparels except Rubber or Plastics 
331 1 331 Wood Products, except Furniture 
332 1 332 Furniture, except Metal 
341 1,2 341 Paper and Products 
342 1,2 342 Printing and Publishing 
351A 1,2 351+352 Chemicals 
353A 1,2 353+354 Petroleum 
355 1,2 355 Rubber Products 
356 1,2 356 Plastic Products 
369K 1,2 361+362+369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 
371 1,2 371 Iron and Steel 
372 1,2 372 Non-ferrous Metals 
381 1,2 381 Fabricated Metal Products 
382 1 382 Machinery, except Electrical 
383 1 383 Machinery, Electric 
384 1 384 Transport Equipment 
385 I 385 Professional and Scientific Equipment 
390 / 390 Other Manufactured Products 
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Table A3.1.2 CSIC Industries Coded into ISIC Rev. 2 
CSIC Industries ISIC (Rev. 2) 3-digit 
Food Processing 311 
Food Manufacture 311 
Beverages 313 
Tobacco 314 
Textiles 321 
Wearing Apparel 322 
Leather products 323 
Wood Products, except Furniture 331 
Furniture 332 
Paper and Products 341 
Printing and Publishing 342 
Education and Sports Products 390 
Petroleum Refineries 353 
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 351 
Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Products 351 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibre 351 
Rubber Products 355 
Plastic Product 356 
Non-metallic Mineral Products including: manufacture of cement 369 
Processing of Ferrous Metals 371 
Processing of Non Ferrous Metals 372 
Fabricated Metal Products 381 
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 382 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 382 
Transport Equipment 384 
Manufacture of Arms 382 
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 383 
Manufacture of Electronic and Communication Equipment 383 
Manufacture of Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 385 
Other Manufacturing Industries 390 
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Appendix 3.2 Data sources and Variable description 
Table A3.2.1 Data information 
Variable Description and data sources 
TSI As defined in equation (3.2). 
Exports and imports data from reported trade data in Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2006). 
Michaely As defined in equation (3.3). 
Exports and imports data from reported trade data in Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2006) 
Netva As defined in equation (3.4) 
Exports and imports data from reported trade data in Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2006) 
ENV I ENV I =pollution abatement operating costs/ industrial value added 
Source: China Sustainable Industrial Development database (CSID) 
ENV2 ENV2=average wage in a industry*number of Environment protection 
personnel/industrial value added 
Source: China Sustainable Industrial Development database (CSID) 
IICI Ad defined in equation (3.5) 
The share of skilled payroll in industrial value added. Skilled payroll 
equals the difference of payroll and unskilled payroll. Unskilled payroll 
equals the product of unskilled sectoral wage and the number of 
employees. Unskilled wage is proxied by average manufacturing wage, 
lowest sectoral wage in a year or the wage in the textiles industry. 
Sources: Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), China Statistics Yearbooks 
(various years), China Labour Statistics Yearbooks (various years) 
PCI Ad defined in equation (3.6) 
Equal to non-wage share of value added and constructed as 1- 
payroll/value added where payroll equals the product of average sectoral 
wage and number of employees 
Sources: Chinese Statistics Yearbooks and Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
MK Ad defined in equation (3.7) 
Fixed assets divided by value added 
Sources: Chinese Statistics Yearbooks and Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
Tariff imports weighted tariffs from TRAINS; Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
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TableA3.2.2 Descriptive statistics for sample one 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TSI 92 0.1944496 0.460998 
-0.6877717 0.955217 
Netva 92 0.4647142 1.414144 
-3.238198 4.208955 
Michaely 92 
-7.03E-10 0.0398915 -0.1064446 0.127553 
ENV1 92 0.0104938 0.0129121 0.000409 0.048785 
ENV2 92 0.0005776 0.0005726 0.000055 0.002872 
PCI 92 0.8163789 0.0619048 0.6705454 0.968925 
IICI 92 0.0517742 0.0288925 0 0.121942 
Tariff 92 15.7506 12.40285 2.21 57.83 
Table A3.2.3 Descriptive statistics for sample two 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TSI 132 0.033868 0.442885 -0.77935 0.796757 
Netva 132 0.07772 0.628251 -1.14582 1.588088 
Michaely 132 
-0.00726 0.034864 -0.11385 
0.03909 
ENV1 108 0.015368 0.013375 0.000244 0.061699 
ENV2 132 0.000803 0.000564 8.75E-05 0.002656 
PCI 132 0.785892 0.054597 0.654917 0.927782 
IICI 132 0.066384 0.034627 0 0.168622 
Tariff 132 20.25424 18.17498 2.79 123.64 
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Appendix 3.3 Trade Specialization in 2004 
ID Description TSI Michaely Netva 
322 Wearing Apparels except Rubber or Plastics 0.955 0.096 4.209 
332 Furniture, except Metal 0.890 0.019 3.809 
356 Plastic Products 0.724 0.023 1.160 
390 Other Manufactured Products 0.642 0.036 2.512 
314 Tobacco 0.614 0.000 0.009 
381 Fabricated Metal Products 0.588 0.034 1.294 
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.506 0.011 0.242 
313 Beverages 0.456 0.001 0.042 
321 Textiles 0.397 0.028 0.614 
323 Leather Products 0.392 0.008 0.637 
331 Wood Products, except Furniture 0.387 0.004 0.635 
355 Rubber Products 0.315 0.003 0.323 
342 Printing and Publishing 0.192 0.001 0.124 
382 Machinery, except Electrical 0.130 0.024 0.687 
311 Food Products 0.094 0.001 0.082 
384 Transport Equipment 0.012 
-0.005 0.012 
383 Machinery, Electric 
-0.037 -0.058 -0.113 
371 Iron and Steel 
-0.219 -0.022 -0.153 
372 Non-ferrous Metals 
-0.314 -0.021 -0.521 
385 Professional and Scientific Equipment 
-0.397 -0.052 -3.238 
353 Petroleum 
-0.426 -0.016 -0.324 
351 Chemicals 
-0.444 -0.097 -0.738 
341 Paper and Products 
-0.629 -0.016 -0.733 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POLLUTION CONTENT IN 
CHINA'S TRADE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental quality is strongly related to the overall level of economic activity, 
including international trade activity. However, in most conventional comparative 
advantage frameworks, especially those of neoclassical ones, the role of the 
environment had been largely ignored. With rising global awareness of climate 
change, industrial pollution, species extinction and human welfare, the importance of 
the environment in accommodating production as well as in assimilating pollution is 
increasingly recognized and examined. As Leontief (1970) states, "frequently 
unnoticed and too often disregarded, undesirable by-products as well as certain 
valuable but unpaid-for natural inputs are linked directly to the network of physical 
relationships that govern the day-to-day operations of an economic system. " The 
increasing magnitude of international trade combined with the upsurge of foreign 
direct investment also triggers the concern over economic welfare across borders. 
Some studies (D'Arge and Kneese, 1972; Pethig, 1976; Copeland and Taylor, 2003) 
have modelled the environment or environmental policy as a factor affecting 
production and serving as a determinant of comparative advantage. 
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As we already mentioned in chapter two, two related hypotheses have been proposed 
about the trade-environment relationship. The Pollution Haven Hypothesis suggests 
that developing countries with relative laxer environmental regulations could gain 
advantage in producing dirty goods, and they could become pollution havens for dirty 
industries migrating from developed countries. By contrast, the Factor Endowment 
Hypothesis predicts that developed countries will have a comparative advantage in 
producing dirty goods, since polluting industries also intensively use physical capital 
and human capital with which developed countries are relatively well endowed. 
Numerous studies (Grossman and Krueger, 1992; Mani and Wheeler, 1997; Copeland 
and Taylor, 2003; Cole et al., 2005) have been carried out to investigate these two 
hypotheses. The empirical results are quite mixed. However, as Copeland and Taylor 
(2003) emphasize, these two hypotheses do not necessarily work against each other; as 
a matter of fact, both motives have their merits in determining the trade pattern. The 
question remains about what weight each effect has and which dominates. A cross- 
industry study for the US by Cole et al. (2005) found that, while environmental 
stringency (proxied by the ratio of pollution abatement costs to value added) is a 
statistically significant negative determinant of revealed comparative advantage, factor 
intensities seem to play a more important role in determining specialization in the US 
dirty industries. To sum up, a strong form pollution haven hypothesis is not supported 
by most of the literature but a weak form pollution haven effect has been identified in 
a few studies. 
A generalization from the PHH implies that with relatively laxer environmental 
regulations China would have a tendency to develop and accommodate dirty 
industries. As China involves itself to a greater extent in international trade, it is 
suspected that the environment has been sacrificed for GDP growth. However, China 
is relatively scarce in capital compared to its major trading partners (mainly OECD 
countries). According to the FEH, there is the possibility that trade liberalization has 
135 
induced greater specialization in clean (labour intensive) goods. In chapter two, we 
have shown that clean industries have increased their revealed comparative advantage, 
while dirty ones have increased their revealed comparative disadvantage in China 
between 1976 and 2004. In this chapter, we do not directly test the two hypotheses in 
econometric regressions either, rather we look at the pollution content of international 
trade in China, in a similar fashion to that used by trade economists to measure the 
factor content of countries' trade which goes back to the pioneering work of Leontief 
(1953). We explore whether the pollution embodied in China's exports exceeds that of 
the imports and whether China's exports are more pollution intensive than its imports 
as the PHI! implies. We rely initially on the assumption of a common technology 
across countries, which has traditionally been employed in empirical factor content 
studies of trade because the standard H-O model of international trade explains trade 
in terms of endowment differences across countries with assumed common 
technologies. It is, however, now widely recognised as a very strong assumption, and 
one that does not hold, especially across countries with marked development 
differences. It is, therefore, now common to allow for technological differences in the 
factor content testing of H-O trade models (Trefler and Zhu, 2000; Davis and 
Weinstein, 2001; Cabral et al., 2006,2009). To account for technological differences, 
we adopt the Japanese I-O table as reference for the production of Chinese imports. 
Under the common technology assumption, we find that not only does China avoid 
more pollution by importing than exporting but also China's exports appear to be 
cleaner than imports in terms of air pollution intensities (C02, SO2 and NOj. The 
results are confirmed by sensitivity checks. Using the technology matrix of the year 
2002, the projection of pollution embodiment in trade for recent years seems to 
confirm that trade mix (composition effect) is good for China's environment. 
However, the results based on heterogeneous technologies show that the actual 
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pollution embodiment in China's exports is greater than China's imports and that 
Chinese exports are much dirtier than its imports. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 provides a summary of 
literature review on measuring pollution content in international trade; the framework 
of the Leontief-type model and alternative assumptions are described in section 3; 
section 4 presents the data and sets out the main findings as well as extends to include 
pollution embodiment in Sino-Japanese trade and project pollution embodiment for 
the recent years; conclusions can be found in section 5. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Trade can be either conceived as the overt exchange of goods suggested by traditional 
theories or as the exchange of the services of production factors. Vanek (1968) 
introduced the factor services version (factor content) of the H-O model of trade, 
which we traditionally view in terms of factors of production such as capital and 
labour. Accordingly, the input of environmental factors or in other words the output of 
pollutants in producing a good is usually termed as the "pollution content" or 
"pollution embodiment" in many recent studies. 
In the process of globalization, international trade is increasingly playing a role in 
forging an economy's structure; the more open the economy is, the more influence 
international trade has on the economy. Pollution embodied in international trade has 
provoked intensive awareness in this regard. Since it is almost impossible to cover the 
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huge existing literature39 on the relationship of trade and the environment, we only 
review a selection of studies which are closely related to the pollution content of trade. 
There are a number of ways to estimate the pollution embodiment in production/trade 
which vary in accuracy and level of aggregation. A number of studies have measured 
the pollution content of trade, either using simple, direct measures of the emissions 
associated with production of exports compared with import-substitutes (e. g. Grether 
et al., 2006) or more ambitious measures of the direct and indirect emissions using 
input-output (1-0) techniques (Leontief, 1970; Walter, 1973; Machado et al., 2001). 
We group them into two broad schools according to the criteria whether the study 
catches only the direct pollution emissions or the overall effect (sometimes termed as 
the life-cycle effect). 
4.2.1 Measurement of direct effects 
Some studies measure only the direct pollution content of trade by multiplying the 
industrial emission intensities with the levels of industrial production corresponding 
with these trade volumes. Due to data limitations, quite a few studies of industrial 
pollution problems rely heavily on US industrial pollution emissions databases such as 
the Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) database (Heftige et al., 1995). 
Lucas et al. (2002) admit that the assumption of constant, US-based, output intensities 
limits the usefulness of some of their analysis (and similar studies). The assumption of 
constant and common output pollution intensities embodies three questionable 
components: that similar technologies and enforcement standards exist across 
countries; that there is a similar mix of products within each industry across countries; 
and that emissions are related to output not value added. 
39 For comprehensive reviews on this topic, see Chua, 1999; Copeland and Taylor, 2004; UNEP, IISD, 
2005. 
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Muradian et al. (2001) provided an insightful picture of the pollution embodiment in 
trade for 18 industrialized countries for various years over the period from 1976 to 
1994. Using the emissions intensities of five air pollutants from the Industrial 
Pollution Projection System (IPPS) database, the authors find that in the 1990s the 
industrialised world's embodied emissions in imports tend to be larger than that in 
exports for these industrial countries. By investigating further into individual 
industrial countries and individual pollutants, the authors find different patterns of the 
evolution of environmental terms of trade. 
Also using IPPS coefficients, Grether et al. (2005) measure the amount of pollution 
emitted per dollar of imports. The authors explore, in a gravity framework, the 
determinants of pollution content in trade as well as the influential factors of trade 
specialization for 16 different pollutants in more than 50 countries over the 1986-1996 
periods. Using CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP as preferred proxy for environmental 
stringency, their results suggest an influence of both standard factor endowment and 
laxer environmental standards on patterns of international specialization. However, 
data limitation greatly restrains the results since the IPPS coefficients they use are 
only available for 1987 for US industries. 
Cole (2004) examines US environmental load displacement over the period 1974-2001 
using IPPS coefficients. The results show that the US has experienced environmental 
load displacement (the pollution embodied in total US imports is greater than that 
embodied in exports) over the period due to the fact that US imports were growing 
more rapidly than exports. Furthermore, the results provide no evidence that the US is 
increasingly displacing its pollution to Mexico despite the concern that the creation of 
NAFTA would be detrimental to the environment in Mexico. The econometric 
analysis shows that the US's relatively stringent environmental regulations have 
contributed to environmental load displacement. 
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Using trade flow data with the country specific CO2 emissions per unit of GDP from 
China's trading partners, Wang and Watson (2007) estimate that about a quarter of 
Chinese CO2 emissions in 2004 can be attributed to the net exports of goods and 
services. However, they recognize this figure might be an over-estimate since they 
don't distinguish CO2 emissions intensities for different traded products while a large 
proportion of Chinese exports have low or medium level of carbon intensity. 
With growing data availability in China, more studies on China's environment now 
turn to the Chinese-specific industrial datasets such as those reported by China's State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). One example is Chai (2002) which finds 
that freer trade enables China to specialize in labor intensive, cleaner industries and 
that the aggregate pollution intensity in imports was much more intensive than that of 
its exports during the periods 1980-1982 and 1996-1998. 
To account for pollution emission intensity differences across industries, Dean and 
Lovely (2008) apply annual Chinese pollution intensities across industries and annual 
trade data for the years 1995 to 2004. Their results suggest that Chinese exports are 
much cleaner than Chinese imports. Of the four pollutants (COD, SO2, smoke and 
dust) being examined, they find the first three are more intensive in Chinese exports 
than in imports under the inherent assumption that imports were produced using 
Chinese technologies. While both exports and imports are becoming cleaner over 
time, they find that the difference in pollution intensity in exports and imports is also 
diminishing. 
4.2.2 Measurement of overall effects: I-0 techniques 
Most studies on this topic have applied input-output (1-0) techniques which have 
increasingly become popular in estimating pollution embodiment. Since Leontiefs 
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seminal work, Input-Output analysis has been employed among studies on various 
economic issues. It had already been used to analyze the interrelationships between 
the structures of economy and the factor endowments and comparative advantages 
before it was introduced into the area of the ecological economics. 
Walter (1973) examines the product-profile of US exports and imports and compares 
it with a pollution profile. Pollution content is defined as environmental control costs 
consisting of R&D, operating costs, capital cost and appreciation of equipments. For 
each product group, the direct environmental management cost is estimated and the 
1966 US input-output coefficients are applied to account for the indirect costs in 
intermediate inputs attributable to environmental management. Using 1968-1970 
imports and exports data, the author finds that the average annual overall 
environmental cost loadings in exports as a ratio of exports was insignificant though 
slightly larger than that of imports using common technology assumption. 
Contrary to Walter (1973), most studies investigating pollution content measure the 
physical flows of emissions such as greenhouse gases. 
Wyckoff and Roop (1994) argue that many greenhouse gas policies are flawed in the 
sense that by targeting at domestic emissions they ignore carbon embodied in 
international trade flows. In order to assess the magnitude of the importation of carbon 
rich products, they estimate the amount of carbon contained in imports of 
manufactured goods for six of the largest OECD countries in the mid-1980s: Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA. They use country specific input-output 
tables, origin specific imports40, country and industry specific energy use data, and 
carbon conversion ratio for each fuel type. The authors conclude that the embodiment 
'0 It is assumed that imports from any country other than the six OECD countries have been produced 
using the same technology as the importing country. 
141 
of carbon in manufactured goods is significant in the mid-1980s with about 13% of the 
total carbon emissions of the six countries estimated to be embodied in manufactured 
imports (excluding imports of refined petroleum products). 
Antweiler (1996) uses a notion of pollution terms of trade index to eliminate the 
balance of trade effect in pollution embodiment calculations and assigns weights to 
different pollutants to get a unique physical dimension. Using the US 1987 1-0 table, 
identical technologies assumption (US industrial pollution data) and trade flows, the 
author calculated the index values for 164 countries in 1987. The results suggest that 
exports of highly industrialized countries appear to be less environmentally clean than 
their imports while the opposite holds for the developing countries (including China). 
Hayami et al. (1997) investigate the applications of 1-0 techniques in environmental 
management. The emission of global warming gases in Japan is simulated conditional 
on the production technology (e. g. choice of cement production approaches) and 
consumer preferences. The authors also compare the SO2 emission in Japan and China 
in 1987. Replacing certain characteristics of the Chinese economy by the Japanese 
counterparts, they find that China could have increased SO2 emission by adopting 
Japanese consumption patterns. By contrast a substantial reduction in emissions would 
have occurred had Japanese energy usage (patterns, energy efficiency and removal 
ratio of sulphur and SO. ) been adopted in the Chinese economy. 
As international treaties such as the Kyoto protocol push the issue of global warming 
into higher platform, a number of researches have been carried out to investigate the 
question whether producer's responsibility or consumer's responsibility should be 
accounted for in burden sharing of GHG emissions reduction. For example, Proops et 
al. (1993) distinguish "CO2 emission" from "CO2 responsibility" in a comparative 
input-output study of Germany and the UK. Assuming identical technologies in 
142 
imports, Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001) use "consumer responsibility" and 
"producer responsibility" to examine the time series change in Danish CO2 production 
and consumption. Using country specific 10 tables mostly produced/converted by the 
OECD Secretariat, Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) compare "domestic consumption" and 
"domestic production" in 24 countries (responsible for 80% of global CO2 emissions) 
in the mid-1990s. Increased data availability has enabled related studies focus on the 
developing countries such as Brazil, Thailand, India and China. Machado et al. (2001) 
use the so-called hybrid input-output model (energy commodities in physical units and 
non-energy commodities in monetary units) and convert energy data to carbon figures 
using IPCC 1996 guidelines. They find that, in terms of energy and carbon 
embodiment in trade, Brazil is not only a net exporter in non-energy goods but also the 
embodiment in exports is more substantially intensive than that in imports in 1995. 
Using Indian input-output tables for 1991/1992 and 1996/1997 and IPCC guidelines, 
the two related papers Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty (2005) and Dietzenbacher and 
Mukhopadhyay (2007) examine the embodiment of the three pollutants, Carbon 
Dioxide, Sulphur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides (CO2, SO2, NON) in India's trade. They 
find that pollution emissions intensity in India's exports is smaller than those in its 
imports in 1991/1992 and 1996/1997 given Indian technology mix. They suggest that 
the results challenge the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. 
Using the same assumptions and 1-0 modelling as in the above two papers, 
Mukhopadhyay (2006)4' explores the PHH and FEH for Thailand's trade with OECD 
countries in the years 1980,1990 and 2000. It is concluded that Thailand moved from 
a net importer of pollution embodiment in earlier years to a net exporter of pollution 
41 Contrary to Copeland and Taylor (2004), the author views the two hypotheses in direct conflict with 
each other. 
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embodiment in 2000. It is also implied that the pollution embodied in FDI promoted 
exports accounts for more than 80% of the total pollution from the export sectors. 
Following the same 1-0 modelling and assumptions, Temurshoev (2006) examines the 
P11H and FE1i for the US and China by estimating the air pollutants emitted from 
fossil fuel combustion. The author concludes from the results that China gains and the 
US lose in terms of CO2, SO2 and NO,, in 1992 and 1997 in terms of pollution 
emissions in the same amount of extra imports and extra exports. Due to data 
limitation, the factor endowment embodied in trade was only calculated for the US 
and it turns out that, similar to the Leontief Paradox, the US is not exporting capital 
intensive goods. 
A "content" version of the "pollution haven hypothesis" could be phrased as: 
developed countries may relocate dirty industries to the countries with laxer 
environmental regulations by producing and exporting goods that embody less 
pollution than the imported goods (from developing countries). As a result, their 
consumption contains more pollution embodiment than their production does. The 
empirical results are inconclusive and the impression from the selected literature is 
that a developing country may well be a net importer of pollution content or importer 
of pollution intensive goods. The existing studies also show that the pollution content 
in trade changes as the trade volume (scale effect), trade mix (composition effect) and 
technology of production (technique effect) change. We aim to investigate these issues 
in the context of China's trade. 
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4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Pollutants chosen 
In this study, we focus on three air pollutants: Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Sulphur Dioxide 
(SO2) and Nitrous Oxides (NO, J which are directly linked to acid rain and volumes of 
total suspending particulates. It is estimated that the use of solid fuels (coal), liquid 
fuels (oil) and gaseous fuels (natural gas) contributes to over 90% of CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion42. Since these primary energy commodities are built in 1-0 
tables, we assume43 that all the coal, oil and natural gas are combusted whenever they 
are used as an intermediate input generating greenhouse gases. Combustion process 
and abatement technologies also affect the final release of air pollutant emissions. We 
estimate the emissions generated from combustion process but not the removal of 
them in the abatement process. The combustion process is assumed to derive the 
maximum amount of energy per unit of fuel consumed, hence delivering the 
maximum amount of air emissions. 
4.3.2 Methodology: the Environmental 1-0 Analysis 
The environmental input-output analysis (Leontief, 1970) demonstrates how 
"externalities" (e. g. pollution) can be incorporated into the conventional input-output 
picture of an economy. As available input-output tables do not treat pollutants 
explicitly as "bads" in the input-output matrix, the magnitude of pollution has to be 
42 Emissions can be generated from other sources such as biological metabolism, chemical reactions, and 
volcanic eruptions, burning wood etc. The magnitude of the emissions generated from these sources may 
not be negligible. I lowever, they are not explicately analyzed in this study. 
13 See also in Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty (2005), Temurshoev (2006) and Dietzenbacher and 
Mukhopadhyay (2007) 
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estimated through detailed analysis of the underlying technical relationships and 
energy dependence. 
Compared to measuring the direct pollution emissions in production, the 1-0 formula 
is advantageous in that it captures the life cycle effect. For example, the life cycle 
effect of pollution emission in the transport sector not only includes pollution in 
operation of vehicles but also contains pollution from manufacture and maintenance of 
vehicles as well as other induced demand. We adopt the environmental I-0 analysis 
developed in Miller and Blair (1985). This methodology has been used in a number of 
subsequent studies, for example, Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003), Dietzenbacher and 
Mukhopadhyay (2007), Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty (2005), and Temurshoev 
(2006). It combines the basic concepts of the 1-0 framework and the emission factors 
suggested by IPCC guidelines44. The linear relationships of the interlinked sectors in a 
Leontief model enable us to investigate the impact of demand (final consumption 
deliveries) on production and hence on pollution. The model basics are described as 
follows: 
In a particular year t, for an individual country c, there are N commodities each 
serving as final deliveries as well as intermediate inputs for themselves and other 
commodities. All the energies are derived from M primary energy commodities: Raw 
Coal, Crude Oil and Natural Gas. Let aq represent the input coefficient, i. e. the number 
of units of commodity i needed to produce one unit of commodity j (i, j=1,2..., N). 
M IPCC 1996, the manufacture fraction of secondary fuels should be ignored in the main calculation, as 
the carbon in these fuels has already been accounted for in the supply of primary fuels from which they 
are derived. Refined fuel products are for information only. In the case of fuel combustion, the emissions 
of non-CO2 gases contain very small amounts of carbon compared to the CO2 estimate and, at Tier l; it is 
more accurate to base the CO2 estimate on the total carbon in the fuel. This is because the total carbon in 
the fuel depends on the fuel alone while the emissions of the non-CO2 gases depend on many factors such 
as technologies, maintenance etc which, in general, are not well known. At higher tiers, the amount of 
carbon in these non-CO2 gases can be accounted for. 
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An N*N matrix of input coefficients is represented by A= {a1 }. X is an N*1 vector 
denoting domestic output of commodities and Y is an N*I vector denoting the final 
demand. The equilibrium condition of supply equalling demand is captured by the 
following equation: 
X=AX+Y (4.1) 
where Y can be further decomposed into final consumption of domestic goods (YD), 
final consumption of imported goods (Ym) and goods that are exported (YX). 
By matrix operational rules, we can solve X as 
X= (I-A)"Y (4.2) 
The N*N matrix (I-A)'1 is often referred to as "the Leontief inverse" which 
represents the totality of the direct and indirect input requirements on domestic goods. 
This relationship implies that any change in the components of final demand would 
affect domestic production and in turn any change in domestic production would result 
in the change of pollution emissions and on the environment if we view pollution 
emissions as "consumption" of domestic environment. 
The commodities Coal, Crude oil and Natural gas are the basic fossil fuels. We denote 
the energy requirement matrix (extracted from matrix A) as B of order M*N. Hence 
bU45 refers to the requirement in monetary units on energy commodity i per unit of the 
output of commodityj. 
Chemical emission factors are the product of the net calorific values for each fuel and 
the chemicals (Carbon, C; Sulphur, S; Nitrogen, N) content in net calorific values as 
suggested in IPCC guidelines. Denote E as a 3*M emission matrix for the three air 
emissions per SCE (Standard Coal Equivalent) of combustion for each fuel type. 
45 As Chinese 1-0 tables don't report imported intermediate inputs separately, this coefficient denotes fuel 
inputs both domestically produced and imported. 
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Since the coefficients in B are in monetary units while the coefficients in the emission 
matrix E are in physical units, we have to reconcile the two before multiplication. 
Comparing the physical units and the monetary units in total fuel output, we could get 
an approximation for the ratio of SCFJRMB46 for each energy type in producer's 
price. Denote the ratios in M*M diagonal matrix as R. Hence the pollution embodied 
in a final delivery Y (could be output, imports, exports etc. ) can be calculated using 
the formula: 
P= ERB(I 
-A)-'Y (4.3) 
We also break down the pollution intensity into three elements: direct pollution 
intensity (DPI) which is related to the direct combustion of fuel in producing a unit of 
goods or services; overall pollution intensity (OPI) is the total emissions induced by 
producing one unit of goods or services. Indirect pollution intensity (IPI) is the 
difference of OPI and DPI; Mathematically, 
DPI=E*R*B (4.4) 
IPI=E*R*B*[(I-A)''-I] (4.5) 
OPI=E*R*B*(I-A)'' (4.6) 
We use two measures to describe the pollution embodiment in trade: the balance of 
emissions terms of trade and the pollution terms of trade. The balance of emissions 
terms of trade (BETT thereafter) can be denoted as the difference of pollution 
embodied in exports and pollution embodied in imports: 
BETT= ECRCBC(1-A, )-'Yx 
-1: EfRJBf(I -Af)-'Yf (4.7) 
I 
SCE is an acronym of Standard Coal Equivalent which is applied in China and RMB is in current 
prices. 
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where c refers to China and f refers to a trading partner that has produced the relevant 
imports. BETT indicates the net pollution embodiment in China's trade. A positive 
BETT value suggests that China's exports contain more pollution content than its 
imports and vice versa. When using identical technologies for Chinese exports and 
imports, BETT represents the difference between pollution generated from exporting 
and pollution avoided from importing which can be simplified as: 
BETT= ERB(1- A)'' (Yx 
- 
YM ) (4.8) 
Similar to Antweiler (1996) but without assigning weights to pollutants, the pollution 
term of trade (PTOT) for a pollutant is constructed as the ratio of total pollution 
intensity in exports and total pollution intensity in imports: 
PTOT= 
Fx ERB(I 
- 
A)'' Yx / jý Yx 
FM - ERB(I 
-, 
4)-'Y4 / j, YM 
(4.9) 
Where j*= (1,.., 1) is aI by N vector. If the ratio for a GHG emission is greater than 
one, the country can be viewed as relatively more pollution intensive in exports than 
in imports and vice versa. 
Compared to BETT, PTOT is a per unit effect which allows for trade imbalance. 
BETT answers the question whether China's exports embody more pollution content 
than its imports while PTOT answers the question whether China's exports are dirtier 
than its imports. 
4.3.3 Assumptions of imported intermediate goods 
Since Chinese 1-0 tables do not distinguish domestic intermediate inputs from 
imported intermediate inputs, we have to impose alternative assumptions to gauge the 
estimation and check the robustness. The two alternative assumptions are explained in 
details in the following two sections. 
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Assumption 1: intermediate inputs are locally produced only 
By assuming no imported intermediate inputs, we adopt matrix A to construct 
Leontief inverse L. The product matrix of ERB (3*N) denotes emissions in physical 
units (in tonnes) generated by one monetary unit of output j. The product of the 
Leontief matrix (I 
- 
A)'' and any exogenously defined final demand Y (be it 
YD, Yxand / orY" ) denotes the overall requirement on domestic production. 
Assumption 2: import proportionality 
Since this study focuses on the impact of trade on pollution emissions by taking into 
full account of the interdependences of industries, the distinction between domestic 
produced intermediates and imported intermediates is crucial. Without adjustment, the 
results based on the technology matrix A will be overestimated (Dietzenbacher et al., 
2005; Lahr, 2001). 
However, the available technology matrices in the Chinese I-0 tables don't distinguish 
the domestic intermediate inputs and the imported intermediate inputs. If the supply- 
use matrix is applied directly as in assumption 1, it is equal to assuming that imports 
are all final goods. This obviously ignores the role of China in international vertical 
specialization. When one looks at the fact that China imports of intermediate goods in 
bulk to process and eventually to export 47, this omission may imply some serious 
measurement error. For example, it is estimated by Ping (2006) that China's vertical 
specialization ratio rose from 14.2% in 1992 to around 22% in 2003 implying a high 
volume of China's exports consists of processing trade. Since Chinese 1-0 tables do 
not give the details of the flows of imported goods (Dietzenbacher et al., 2005), we 
""Processing trade" accounts for almost half of China's total international trade since 1995. 
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have to make the assumption that imported goods are used as substitutes for domestic 
goods from which two propositions are generated as follows48: 
1. Imported goods are proportional in domestic use, be it final deliveries (which 
includes the possibility of re-exports) or intermediate use; 
2. Imported goods are proportional as intermediate use for other sectors. 
It is constructed in Chinese 1-0 tables that the sum of gross output and imports equal 
the sum of intermediate inputs and final demand. 
Hence, ad denotes the input requirement of combined (domestic produced and 
imported) good i to produce one unit of good j. One unit of good i imported is treated 
as final good as well as substitutive domestic input. Suppose p; unit of it is used as 
intermediate goods while 1-p; unit of it is used as final goods. p; is calculated as 
R= 
IM; 
where IM; is imports of good i and Gross Output is Gross Output; +IM1 
domestic production of good i. The above two proposition also imply that the ratio of 
imported input is identical across sectors. 
We denote the diagonal matrices of the ratios as follows49: 
D= 
1-pl 0 
0 i-ý 
(4.10) 
The change in the coefficient matrix changes the components of pollution intensity 
IPI and OPI). 
DPI=E*R*B (4.4)' 
48 It is also referred to as Import proportionality assumption which is used by OECD countries to help 
construct imported goods flow tables. See also Hummels et al. (2001) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
According to convention, a "hat" denotes that the off-diagonal elements are all Os. By doing so, we 
calculate commodity specific pollution content in trade. 
- 
Pl 
pý 
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IPI=E*R*B*[(I- D A)"-I] (4.5)' 
OPI=E*R*B*(I- D A)" (4.6)' 
The domestic Leontief inverse matrix becomes (I 
- 
DA)-' 
. 
This changes the BETT 
formula in (4.8) to: 
BETT=ERB(I-Iji)''(YX 
_1M) (4.8)' 
And PTOT in (4.9) becomes: 
PTOT= Fx = 
ERB(I 
- 
DA)-'Yx / j, Yx 
F"' ERB(I 
-DA)-l Y" /, j, Y" 
4.4 DATA AND RESULTS 
4.4.1 Data 
(4.9)' 
In China, basic 1-0 tables are published both at national and provincial level every 
five years. Up to now, four basic national 1-0 tables have been published for the years 
1987,1992,1997 and 2002. Based on the basic 1-0 tables, China also produces 
extended 1-0 tables every two or three years after a basic one is produced. Available 
extended 1-0 tables are for the years 1987,1990,1992,1995,1997,2000 and 2002. 
The basic 1-0 tables are more detailed in commodity classifications (over 100 
commodities) than extended 1-0 tables which are aggregated into only dozens of 
commodities. All the four basic 1-0 tables in China were composed using different 
commodity classifications highlighting the improved classifications of service sectors. 
The extended 1-0 tables are less complicated on classifications. The definitions of 
sectors in extended 1-0 tables are reported in Appendix 4.1. 
152 
We use the basic 1-0 tables to calculate the pollution content and pollution intensity 
embodied in China's trade. The results obtained by employing extended 1-0 tables can 
serve as a sensitivity check for aggregation effects. Because of lack of comprehensive 
data on technology matrix A, we assume initially identical technologies across 
countries, or in other words "if imports were made at home", which is common 
practice (see Trefler, 1995; Antweiler, 1996; Mukhopadyay and Chakraborty, 2005) in 
the study on pollution content of trade. Later we will relax this assumption by using 
the technologies of a reference country (Japan). 
Accurate gas emissions from fuel combustion depend on knowledge of several 
interrelated factors such as fuel types, combustion technology as well as abatement 
efficiency. Yet, CO2 emissions are primarily dependent on the carbon content of the 
fuel which enables calculation at a highly aggregated level (IPCC, 1996). However, 
for SO2 and NOR, IPCC guidelines suggest that they are calculated on a detailed 
activity/technology level. Detailed discussion and calculation of the emission factors 
can be found in appendix 4.2. We adopt the following emission factors to construct 
matrix E. 
Table 4.1 Matrix E: Average Emission Factors (TON/SCE) 
Raw coal Crude oil Natural gas 
CO2 2.712 2.15 1.633 
SO2 0.0225 0.0070 0 
NO. 0.0088 0.0059 0.0044 
Note: since crude oil and natural gas are reported together in the 2002 basic 10 table and all the extended 
10 tables, we recalculate the emission factors according to the mix of crude oil and natural gas using 
annual Chinese energy consumption data. 
Data on energy outputs in monetary units is obtained from Chinese 1-0 tables and 
energy outputs in physical units are obtained from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. 
We construct the diagonal matrix R as follows: 
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Table 4.2 Matrix R (10-3 SCE/RMB) 
Year Raw Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas 
1987 24.27 7.72 10.77 
1992 10.98 3.40 15.81 
1997 4.40 1.50 2.56 
2002 2.59 0.86* 0.86` 
* In 2002 Chinese 1-0 table. we only have two primary energy sectors since crude oil and natural gas are 
reported in a combined manner. We treat producer's prices of crude oil and natural gas as the same. 
The entries of matrix R can be viewed as the producer's price of energy, i. e., the unit 
of energy content can be bought per unit of RMB. The producer's price of energy 
differs significantly across fuel type. Crude oil is the most expensive fuel in terms of 
energy content while raw coal only costs about a third of crude oil. The relative prices 
of fuels are to great extent consistent with the affluence of resources endowments in 
China. Also we notice that the prices of fuels have been increasing (even under 
constant RMB) over the years due to sectoral price level changes. 
4.4.2 Results 
4.4.2.1 Sectoral pollution intensity breakdown 
We first show the overall pollution intensity (OPI) at sectoral level with the 
breakdown into indirect (IPI) and direct pollution intensity (DPI). Taking the example 
of the 122-sector 2002 1-0 table, the sectoral pollution intensities are plotted in 
columns (Carbon Dioxide are plotted in graph 4.1, Sulphur Dioxide in graph 4.2 and 
Nitrous Oxides plotted in graph 4.3). The sectors are ranked in descending order of 
overall CO2 on the horizontal axis for all the three tables. Due to space limitation, the 
codes for sectors are not shown in the graphs. 
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Graph 4.1 Sectoral Pollution Intensities CO: (2002 122-sector 1-0) 
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Graph 4.2 Sectoral Pollution Intensities SO2 (2002 122-sector 1-0) 
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Graph 4.3 Sectoral Pollution Intensities NO1 (2002 122-sector 1-0) 
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Note: the intensities are estimated using assumption one: in I0"' tonnes of NO, per RMB of output. 
Comparing the three tables, we find that they share great similarity in intensity 
rankings. Sectors which are intensive in CO2 emissions tend to be intensive in SO2 and 
NO, emissions. We also find that the most pollution intensive sectors have greater 
direct pollution intensity (DPI) than indirect pollution intensity (IPI) (for example, 
sectors 86 'Gas production and supply', 37 `Coking', 36 `Petroleum refineries', 85 
`Electricity and heat' and 39 'Fertilizer' have much higher DPI than IPI). Most sectors, 
however, have higher IPI than DPI which implies that the impact on the environment 
from these sectors is more influential than it first appears. These findings are 
consistent with that of Chung (1998) which shows that major polluting sectors have 
higher direct pollution intensity than indirect pollution intensity using 1987 1-0 table 
for China and 1990 1-0 table for Japan and South Korea. The five cleanest sectors (in 
terms of overall pollution intensity) are 84 'Recycles', 22 `Tobacco', 104 `Financial 
services', 106 'Real estate' and 109 'Tourism'. Same conclusions can be drawn when 
we use other Chinese 1-0 tables under different assumptions: the most pollution 
intensive sectors normally have higher direct pollution intensity than indirect pollution 
intensity while other sectors mostly have the opposite trend. 
156 
Since the extended 1-0 tables for 1987,1990,1992 and 1995 are constructed using the 
same 1-0 definitions (33 sectors), we further investigate the evolution of overall 
pollution intensity of CO2 at aggregate sectoral level. 
Graph 4.4 Evolution of CO2 Intensity 
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yearbooks; 10-' tonnes of CO2 per RMB of output. 
Graph 4.4 shows that over the years the emission intensities have been decreasing for 
almost all the sectors, with the most dramatic changes being for the heavily polluting 
sectors: 11 (Petroleum refineries), 12 (Chemicals), 13 (Non-metal mineral products), 
15 (Metal products), and 16 (Machinery). The most noticeable decrease in overall 
pollution intensity lies in 13 (Non-metal mineral products, including cement, stone 
and clay products which are in many studies listed as notorious heavy polluters); the 
overall pollution intensity of this sector decreased from over 0.8 tonnes CO2 per RMB 
of output to 0.27 tonnes CO, per RMB of output. 
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4.4.2.2 Potential pollution content (common technologies) 
We report the basic results for pollution generated from exporting and pollution 
avoided from importing using existing Chinese 1-0 tables. Trade data are from the 
Chinese 1-0 tablesSO. The results based on the basic 1-0 tables and assumption one are 
reported in table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 BETT and PTOT using Assumption one: no imported intermediates 
Year Pollutant Content in Content in BETT PTOT 
Exports Imports 104 tonnes 
104 tonnes 104 tonnes 
1987 CO2 
-- -18276 
SO2 
-- -140 
NOx 
-- -58 
1992 C02 
-- -11138 <1 
S02 
-- -73 <1 
NOx 
-- -34 <1 
1997 CO2 83779 82902 877 0.78 
SO2 591 563 28 0.81 
NOX 261 257 4 0.79 
2002 CO2 96942 108640 
-11698 0.74 
SO2 654 733 
-79 0.74 
NO,, 300 336 
-36 0.77 
Note: In 1987 and 1992 10 tables, only net exports are reported. In 1987, China has trade deficit equalling 
to 4343416 (104 RMB) and in 1992 net exports is 2507565 (10° RMB). 
Assuming same Chinese technologies to produce exports and imports (common 
technology assumption), it seems that China does not fit in the term "pollution haven" 
well. The table above shows that the China's pollution content in net exports turns out 
to be negative for the three air pollutants in the years except 199751. This absolute 
measure suggests that in most of the years investigated China has "pollution deficit" 
so There are some data quality issues concerning the trade data in Chinese 1-0 tables; firstly, imports are 
recorded as CIF while exports arc recorded as FOB. In other words, transportation and insurance costs lift 
the nominal value of imports. Secondly, imports also include custom duties. Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) 
assume 10% of the import value reflects both transportation and insurance costs. 
SI Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) also report positive net pollution exports for China in 1997. 
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relative to the rest of the world from international trade. The implication is surprising 
given that China has an enormous trade surplus since 1990s. The PTOT index shows 
that in terms of any of the three pollutants China's imports are more pollution 
intensive than its exports in 199252,1997 and 2002. Also the results suggest that 
China's exports are becoming slightly less pollution intensive from 1997 to 2002, 
which may be caused by advancement in production technologies and changes in trade 
mix. 
Now we turn to the results obtained from the adjusted domestic technology matrix 
(using assumption two). The results are reported in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 BETT and PTOT using Assumption two: import proportionality 
Year Pollutant Content in Content in BETT PTOT 
Exports Imports 10° tonnes 
10 tonnes 104 tonnes 
1997 C02 67623 68873 
-1250 0.76 
SO2 482 468 
-14 0.79 
NO2 211 213 
-2 0.77 
2002 cot 
sot 
NO2 
71152 84055 
-12903 0.74 
483 569 
-86 0.74 
221 260 
-39 0.74 
Given that the 1-0 tables of 1987 and 1992 do not report imports and exports of 
commodities separately, our import proportionality approach could only apply to the 
1997 and 2002 1-0 tables. The values of pollution content in both exports and imports 
are now smaller than those obtained without "proportionality". The BETT values in 
the table above shows that despite a substantial trade surplus in goods China runs a 
"pollution deficit", with imports embodying more pollutants than its exports, in both 
1997 and 2002. The average per unit content of exports must be significantly lower 
52 It is inferred from the data that the PTOT index for China in 1992 is less than 1. 
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than that of imports. After excluding the pollution embodied in imported intermediate 
inputs, the BETT values for 1997 change from positive in the previous estimation to 
negative in the table above, which may indicate the importance of processing trade in 
some polluting industries in China as well as measurement error due to the simple 
approach of "import proportionality". 
With smaller magnitudes than before, the PTOT ratios still suggest China's imports 
are more pollution intensive than its exports. And China's exports are becoming 
slightly less pollution intensive from 1997 to 2002. These results are consistent with 
other findings (discussed in the introduction) and with China having a comparative 
advantage in "cleaner" industries based on labour endowment advantages and with 
China "gaining" environmentally (in terms of local pollutants only; CO2 is a global 
pollutant) from trade overall and from matched expansions of exports and imports. 
We also use the more aggregated extended 1-0 tables to carry out a sensitivity check. 
There are 33 sectors for the 1987,1990,1992,1995 extended 1-0 tables, 40 sectors for 
1997, and 42 sectors for 2002. Same methodologies and assumptions are applied to 
obtain BETT and PTOT values. 
Table 4.7 BEET in 104 tonnes (Robustness Check) 
Year Assumption Sectors CO2 SO2 NOx 
1987 1 33 
-15511.1 -125.2 -50 
1990 1 33 
-879.3 -15.7 -3.6 
1992 1 33 
-5903.7 -40.7 -18.4 
1995 1 33 
-2768.7 -9.9 -7.7 
1997 1 40 3801.1 41.0 13.2 
1997 2 40 2181.7 30.0 8.2 
2002 1 42 
-2365.6 -9.8 -6.7 
2002 2 42 
-2652.3 -11.3 -7.6 
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The conclusion from our previous analysis hold in the sensitivity check for most of the 
years, i. e. China runs a "pollution deficit" in most of the years except 1997. It is also 
shown that even under the "import proportionality" approach; we find that China has 
more pollution embodiment in exports than that in imports in 1997. This does not 
coincide with the earlier results from using the basic 1997 1-0 table. It seems that 
aggregation level would affect the results. Should we use a more disaggregated 1-0 
table, the results for BEET may change too. 
The following table presents the PTOT values. Though larger than the previous 
results, the PTOT values consistently suggest China's imports are more pollution 
intensive than its exports. However, contrary to the previous estimation based on the 
basic 1-0 tables, the values are getting bigger from 1997 to 2002. It seems that to some 
extent aggregation level also matters to PTOT values. Extra care should be taken 
towards our earlier conclusion on whether China is moving further away from 
"pollution haven". 
Table 4.8 PTOT from Extended 1-0 tables (Robustness Check) 
Year Assumption Sectors CO2 SO2 NO= 
1997 
1997 
2002 
2002 
1 40 0.81 0.83 0.81 
2 40 0.80 0.82 0.80 
1 42 0.85 0.86 0.85 
2 42 0.84 0.85 0.84 
Based on the main results and those from the robustness checks, we conclude that 
China's imports more pollution embodiment than its exports in most of the years 
except in 1997 when there is ambiguity under different aggregation levels. Besides, 
China's exports are less pollution intensive than its imports. In other words, China's 
environment would be worsened for it to stop exporting and produce the imports 
domestically. 
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The fact that China's exports are greener than its imports has its root in the sectoral 
trade patterns. To understand this overall result we explore the (normalised) 
relationship between net exports and overall pollution intensity at the sectoral level 
using 2002 42-sector 1-0 table. Normalisation is carried out for the two variables. The 
sector with the largest net exports value (30 wholesale and retail) is taken as 1, with 
the net exports of the other sectors are expressed as its ratio. Similarly, the overall 
pollution intensity of the most polluting sector (24 Coking) is taken as 1. 
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Graph 4.5 shows that China has relatively large trade surpluses in the relatively clean 
sectors such as (7 Textiles, 8 Wearing apparel, 27 Transportation and warehouse, 30 
Wholesale and retail). In the dirty sectors, China either has a very small trade surplus 
(e. g. the sectors 13 Non-metal mineral products, 23 Electricity and heat and 24 Gas) or 
runs a trade deficit (sectors II Petroleum refineries, 12 Chemicals and 14 Metal 
smelting). These findings provide evidence to our earlier conclusions of BETT and 
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PTOT. It seems to suggest that China has competitive advantage in cleaner industries. 
If we analyse other 1-0 tables, similar conclusions can be drawn. To conserve space, 
the graphs based on other 1-0 tables are not reported. 
In the following analysis for pollution content projection and heterogeneous 
technology, we continue to adopt import proportionality approach to gauge the effect 
of imported intermediate goods. 
4.4.2.3 Projection for recent years 
As a further robustness test we explore the recent composition effects of post-WTO 
membership and liberalization by applying the 2002 1-0 technology (the latest year for 
which we have an 1-0 table) to China's import and export composition in the years 
2003 to 2006. The crucial assumptions in using the same 1-0 table to project pollution 
embodiment for later years are that the technologies in use and relative prices (1-0 
tables normally report coefficients in monetary units) have not changed over time. 
Although this is unlikely in a precise sense, for a short period of time, these 
assumptions are not unreasonable. But as a developing country, it is believed that the 
production techniques/process over the last decade has improved efficiency 53 
. 
To 
examine the overall energy efficiency, we plot the energy consumption per unit of 
output in the following graph. 
53Gabaccio et al. (1999) suggest that much of the fall in energy-output ratio for the 1987-1992 periods 
was due to technical changes. Smil (1994) suggest that structural changes have been the dominant factor. 
Sinton and Fridley (2000) attribute the fall to a number of factors, including both structural and efficiency 
changes. 
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Graph 4.6 Evolutions of Energy Intensities 
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Source: China Energy Yearbooks various years; in 2002 constant price. 
The energy requirement for per unit GDP output in China has experienced dramatic 
decreases in the last decade which may be attributed to a number of factors including 
both efficiency increase and structural adjustment. (See Garbaccio et al, 1999; Sinton 
and Fridley, 2000) However, this trend comes to a halt in 2002; the energy intensity in 
recent years has been higher than the lowest point in 2002 and remains rather stable 
since 2004. 
However, we do not have information on sectoral energy information as well as 
relative prices. To compromise, we restrict the analysis to the composition effect 
(trade mix) only. Other things equal, will China's deepened trade with the rest of the 
world reverse the trend and turn China into a pollution haven (in our definition, 
PTOT>I)? We examine whether the composition effect could have played an 
important role in later years given the 2002 production technologies. 
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Trade data is in IIS 2002 code and obtained from UNCOMTRADE database. It is then 
converted to Chinese 1-0 2002 code. The database only report data of commodity 
trade which can be grouped into 85 sectors. We hence forgo the service trade in the 
projection. These import values are on a CIF basis while export values are on FOB 
basis. No adjustment such as customs duties is applied. We produce (table 4.9) 
projections of the BETT and PTOT measures of the pollution content between 2002 
and 2006. 
Table 4.9 Pollution Embodiment in Commodity Trade 
Year Pollutant 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
C02 
S02 
NO. 
C02 
S02 
NO,, 
C02 
S02 
NO, 
CO2 
S02 
NO. 
C02 
SO2 
NOx 
Exports Imports BETT 
PTOT 
10° tonnes 10° tonnes 104 tonnes 
64515 77275 
-12760 0.78 
444 519 
-75 0.79 
200 239 
-39 0.78 
83710 106335 
-22625 0.76 
574 717 
-143 0.78 
260 329 
-69 0.77 
110033 137547 
-27514 0.78 
765 925 
-160 0.81 
343 426 
-83 0.79 
132676 150766 
-18090 0.79 
913 1012 
-99 0.81 
413 466 
-53 0.79 
159543 169163 
-9620 0.80 
1103 1121 
-18 0.83 
497 522 
-25 0.80 
Both measures are consistent with earlier results. BETT values are all negative 
regardless of the years and pollutants. It also shows that the net avoided pollution in 
commodities at first increased and then decreased for all the three pollutants. It is 
noticed that the PTOT values also experienced some variation across the years but still 
remain less than I regardless of the years and pollutants we examined. It seems that 
the composition effect alone does not change the trend that Chinese exports are 
greener than its imports. Graph 4.7 plots overall CO2 emission intensity in exports and 
imports between 2002 and 2006. With ups and downs in between, the export pollution 
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intensity is roughly the same in 2002 and 2006. In the meanwhile, the imports 
pollution intensity has slightly decreased in 2005 and 2006. 
Graph 4.7 Pollution Intensities of Exports and Imports (Commodity Trade only) 
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To sum up, our analysis based on common technology assumption shows that for the 
years we studied the volume of air pollution avoided by importing is larger than that 
of emitted by exporting. Also, it seems that China gains environmentally in the sense 
that Chinese exports are relatively less pollution intensive than imports. 
4.4.2.4 Heterogeneous technologies 
So far our calculations have been based on the implicit assumption that countries share 
the same production technologies. For a developing country like China that trades a lot 
with developed countries this assumption is likely to produce an overestimate of the 
actual pollution embodied in imports. Firstly, countries differ in their energy structure 
and energy efficiency. China has a coal predominated energy structure which depends 
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heavily on fossil fuels, while its trading partners especially OECD countries depend 
more on cleaner fuels (partly due to pollution limits constrained by international 
agreements and national regulations). Secondly, there are also likely to be different 
inter- and intra-sectoral linkages across countries expressed in the differences in 1-0 
matrices. A better way to tackle these issues is by distinguishing source origins of the 
trade and applying country specific 1-0 tables. We check the Chinese import structure 
by origin in graph 4.8. Imports from Japan account for around 18% of total Chinese 
imports between 1990 and 2003 as shown in the following graph. Chinese imports 
from the USA, Canada as well as the EU together account for between a third and a 
quarter of total Chinese imports for the selected years. 
Graph 4.8 China's Import Structure by Trading Partners 
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Japan is one of the most important trading partners to China and also adopts a similar 
structure of commodity by commodity 1-0 tables as China. Due to data limitation on 
1-0 tables, we use Japan54 as a representative exporting country to China. 
54 Japan has since 1955 been producing extensive bench-mark 1-0 tables every five years and producing 
extended 1-0 tables annually. The Japanese Statistics Bureau website provides the 1995 basic 1-0 tables 
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To make the 1-0 tables comparable, we need to aggregate the sectors. We use the 71- 
commodity Japanese extended 1-0 table (JP) and the 122-commodity bench mark 
Chinese 1-0 table (CN) for the year 200255. Then we aggregate the commodities into 
61 sectors. Trade data is derived from Chinese 2002 1-0 table. 
We initially compare the overall pollution intensities for China and Japan in 2002 in 
terms of carbon dioxide emissions. Graph 4.6 shows that Japan is generally more 
energy efficient than China. The only one exception is sector 21 (Coking), which is 
the most polluting industry in both economies. Japan has less sectoral variation in 
pollution intensity compared to China. There are several sectors in China which 
significantly lag behind their Japanese counterparts. For example, the second heaviest 
polluting sector in both economies is 52 (Electricity, steam and hot water production); 
however China's pollution intensity of sector 52 is about 3.6 times of that in Japan. 
(93 sectors) and the 2000 basic 1-0 tables (104) sectors. From the website of Japanese Ministry of 
Economy Trade and Industry, there are also 1-0 tables for various years based on the basic 1-0 tables. 
There are I-0 tables (71 or 50 sectors) for the years 1997 to 2002 based on the bench mark 1995 1-0 
tables and 1-0 tables (186,73 or 50 sectors) for the years 2003 to 2006 based on the bench mark 2000. 
ss We only focus on the year 2002 since the 1997 Japanese extended 1-0 table only has 41 sectors and 
does not distinguish coal from oil and natural gas. 
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Graph 4.6 Overall Pollution Intensities in China and Japan 
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Using the methodologies and data outlined in the previous sections, we re-calculate 
actual and potential pollution content using the two alternative measures for China's 
international trade in 2002. The results are divided in three groups as shown in the 
following table (table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 Pollution Content Based on Alternative Technologies 
10 tables 
1) Common Tech 
Exports using C N' 
Imports using CN 
2) Heterogenous Tech 
Exports using CN 
Imports using Jpb 
3) Common Tech 
Exports using JP 
Imports using JP 
Pollutants Exports Imports BETT (10" tones) PTOT 
CO, 70972 83505 
SO2 485 565 
NOX 220 259 
-12533 
-80 
-38 
0.74 
0.75 
0.74 
CO2 70972 46974 23998 
SO2 485 302 183 
NO,, 220 144 76 
CO2 35673 46974 
-11300 
SO2 225 302 
-76 
NOX 108 144 
-35 
a. Represents the 61 sector Chinese 10 table. b. Represents the 61 sector Japanese 10 table. 
1.32 
1.40 
1.33 
0.66 
0.65 
0.66 
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The first set of results replicates the calculations of pollution content based on 
common Chinese technologies (CN) for exports and imports using the newly 
aggregated 61 sector Chinese I-O table. The results are qualitatively consistent with 
what we already know from the previous analysis; BETT shows a net "environmental 
gain" in terms of the three air pollutants emitted from fossil fuel combustion; PTOT 
indicates Chinese exports are relatively cleaner than its imports. 
The second set of results is where differentiation of technologies in producing exports 
and imports is allowed for. Pollution content of exports is calculated by using exports 
reported in Chinese 2002 1-0 table (CN technology), while pollution content of 
imports is calculated by using Japanese 1-0 table (JP technology). In this case the 
BETT measure is now positive and the PTOT measure is greater than unity (indeed 
well in excess of unity). The sign on actual pollution content of China's trade which 
allows for technology differences between China and its trading partners is reversed 
relative to the hypothetical pollution content based on the common technology 
assumption. The actual measure shows that China actually exported more pollution 
content than it imported, in total and per unit terms. The BETT measure captures in 
part the influence of the trade surplus, but the results indicate that on average a unit of 
Chinese exports actually embodies (i. e. induce emissions of) about 32% to 40% more 
air pollutants than embodied in a unit of imports (produced outside of China). ` it 
implies that the globe as a whole could have to accommodate more air pollution 
because of this trade liberalization. Of course, the validity of using Japan as a 
reference country and the results are open to robustness checks. It is important, 
therefore, to recognise when it is appropriate to measure actual and potential pollution 
56 Although not explicitly reporting I3ETT values, Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) and Shui and Harriss 
(2006) report results for China with differentiation of technology between trading partners which are 
consistent with our finding on the actual pollution content of China's trade. In our case the fact that PTOT 
is also great than unity allows us to conclude that China's exports are actually more pollution-intensive 
than its imports having controlled for China's trade surplus. 
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content of trade. Potential measures are useful for commenting on the `gains' for a 
country from trade, given its endowments and technology. When searching or testing 
for the factors driving trade, for example when investigating the relative importance of 
national differences in factor endowments and environmental regulations, one needs to 
allow for technological differences in measuring the actual factor (pollution) content 
of trade. 
The final set gives out the simulation results are based on the common technology 
assumption that China's exports and imports were produced using Japanese energy 
structure and technologies (i. e. `as if China had the energy efficiency level of an 
advanced industrialized economy '). Not surprisingly, the pollution content of exports 
and imports is much lower than before. Compared to the first set of results, we see 
little change in net exports of pollution content and China would be a net importer of 
pollution content. With smaller PTOT values than those in the first set of results, 
China's exports would still be cleaner than its imports. The difference of PTOT values 
in the first and third sets of results can be viewed as the technique effect that would be 
generated from technological advances. 
In appendix 4.3, we report the projected results for the pollution embodied in bilateral 
trade between China and Japan using the 2002 Chinese and Japanese 1-0 coefficients. 
Bilateral trade data for each sector are from the Japanese 1-0 tables between 2003 and 
2006 (such bilateral trade data only available from 2003 onwards). Using bilateral 
trade data and Chinese technologies (table A4.3.1), China's trade with Japan seems to 
be friendly to domestic environment if we view imports from Japan as a replacement 
of domestic production. BETT values are negative except for the year 2004 when 
China has positive net export of pollution content. PTOT values also show that 
Chinese export structure is relatively cleaner than its import structure. 
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We also examine the actual pollution content in trade using country specific 1-0 
coefficients. The results in table A4.3.2 show that China would be exporting more 
pollution content to Japan than the imports from Japan if we assume the technology 
matrices for both countries follow the 2002 1-0 patterns. The high values of PTOT 
suggest that China's exports to Japan are much more pollution intensive than the 
imports from Japan. 
4.4.2.5 Further adjustment on fuel products 
All the above analysis is based on the assumption that the fossil fuels (Coal, oil and 
natural gas) are combusted in producing the final goods. However, as Dietzenbacher 
and Mukhopadhyay (2007) point out, the consumption of the fossil fuels count for 
pollution not their production. Hence the exports of these goods do not cause pollution 
emissions in China. Similarly, imports of these goods do not cause pollution emissions 
in the exporting country. Their remedy of the error is by setting both pollution 
embodiment in exports and imports of these fossil fuel sectors to zero. We do 
robustness checks by adopting the same method. The results are in appendix 4.4. 
Whether BETT and PTOT using basic 1-0 tables (table A4.4.1), or projected for 
recent years (table A4.4.2), or under heterogeneous technology assumptions (table 
A4.4.3), the new results are consistent with earlier findings. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper extends on the previous studies on pollution content of trade in China in a 
number of ways. Firstly, we use recent Chinese 1-0 tables which are most 
comprehensive in details compared to those used in other studies. This extensiveness 
also enables sensitivity checking on the effects of aggregation bias in measuring 
pollution content. Secondly, we break down pollution intensity into three elements 
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(DPI, IPI and OPI) based on the directness of pollution generation. Our results are in 
consistence with Chung (1998)'s findings. Thirdly, based on the 2002 Chinese 1-0 
table, we explore the compositional effect of international trade on the environment 
since China's accession into WTO in 2001. Finally, and importantly, we calculate the 
`potential' and `actual' pollution content in trade using alternative technology 
assumptions (using Japan as a reference country of China's trading partners). Other 
research typically assumes a common technology to produce both exports and imports 
of an economy. 
Our study shows that China "avoids" more air pollution by imports than it "puts in" by 
exports with few exceptions in the 1-0 years being examined. Given China's growing 
trade surplus, this finding implies that the composition effect alone overwhelms the 
trade imbalance effect. Our finding is also consistent with the existing evidence in that 
China's exports are cleaner than imports under common technology assumption. 
Time-series breakdown also shows that Chinese sectoral pollution intensities have 
been decreasing in recent years. Based on the technology matrix in 2002, we find that 
the composition effect continues to contribute in a positive way to China's 
environment and it alone overcomes trade surplus effect and benefits China's 
environment in terms of balances of emission terms of trade (BETT). In other words, 
freer trade enables China to specialize in cleaner goods production and reduce the 
environmentally damaging importable production. 
However, the good news for China may not be good news globally as we have shown 
that air pollution would have been less were the Chinese exports produced using 
advanced technologies as in a developed country (such as Japan). There are several 
sectors (for example, Electricity production, Petroleum refineries and Chemical 
fertilizers) in China which have much higher overall pollution intensities than their 
Japanese counterparts and are likely to be higher than other OECD countries. The 
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simulation results imply that China's progress in technologies matters significantly for 
the control of global environmental issues. 
We carry out a few robustness checks to ensure our findings are not biased due to 
methodological manipulation. Such checks include using different assumptions for 
imported intermediate usage, heterogeneous production technologies, different 1-0 
tables, as well as pollution emissions of fuel coming from consumption rather than 
production. 
Our findings are generally consistent with many other studies as shown in the table 
A4.5.1 in Appendix 4.5. However, we are also aware that our study has several issues 
which need to be addressed in further research work. The first shortcoming stems from 
our adjustment method of imported intermediate inputs. The "import proportionality" 
assumption may be oversimplified and the results without any robustness check need 
to be dealt with caution. In addition, most of the pollution contents are calculated 
based on Chinese 1-0 tables. Whilst such calculations show China's trade off in terms 
of pollution content, they by no means exactly reflect the impact of trade liberalisation 
on the environment of the globe as whole. Although we have employed Japanese 1-0 
tables to elaborate, the results are open to be scrutinized. Finally, our calculations only 
focus on pollution generation side (maximized pollution emissions from fuel 
combustion in the process of production) and ignore pollution abatement. 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
Appendix 4.1 Definition of 1-0 codes 
Table A4.1.1 Definitions of Codes in Different Extended 1-0 Tables 
Code 1987/1990/1992/1995 1997 2002 
I Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture 
2 Coal mining and washing Coal mining and washing Coal mining and washing 
3 Crude petroleum and natural 
gas 
Crude petroleum and natural 
gas 
Crude petroleum and natural 
gas 
4 Metal mining Metal mining Metal mining 
5 Other mining Other mining Other mining 
6 Food and tobacco Food and tobacco Food and tobacco 
7 Textiles Textiles Textiles 
8 Wearing apparel Wearing apparel Wearing apparel 
9 Wood and furniture Wood and furniture Wood and furniture 
0 
Paper and educational 
products 
Paper and educational 
products 
Paper and educational 
products 
II Electricity, steam and 
hot 
water 
Petroleum Petroleum 
12 Petroleum Chemicals Chemicals 
13 Gas and coke products Non-metallic products Non-metallic products 
14 Chemicals Iron and steel Iron and steel 
15 Non-metallic products Metal products Metal products 
16 Iron and steel Machinery, non-electric Machinery, non-electric 
17 Metal products Transport equipment Transport equipment 
18 Machinery, non-electric Machinery, electric Machinery, electric 
19 Transport equipment 
Electronic and communication 
apparatus 
Electronic and communication 
apparatus 
20 Machinery, electric 
Professional and scientific 
equipment 
Professional and scientific 
equipment 
21 Electronic and 
communication apparatus 
Machinery repair Other manufacturing 
22 Professional and scientific 
equipment 
Other manufacturing Waste recycle 
23 Machinery repair Waste recycle Electricity and steam 
24 Other manufacturing Electricity and steam Gas production and supply 
25 Construction Gas production and supply Water production and supply 
26 
Transportation and postal 
services 
Water production and supply Construction 
27 Business Construction Transportation and warehouse 
28 Restaurant Transportation and warehouse Postal services 
29 Passenger transportation Postal services Information and software 
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Table A4.1.1 continued 
Code 1987/1990/1992/1995 1997 2002 
Public and residential 30 Business Whole sale and retail 
services 
31 
Cultural, Educational, sports Restaurant Hotel and restaurant and scientific research 
32 Finance and insurance Passenger transportation Finance and insurance 
33 Administration Finance and insurance Real estate 
34 Real estate Renting and business services 
35 Social services Travel 
36 Health, sports and social Scientific research 
welfare 
37 Education, arts, cultural and General technical services 
recreational services 
38 Scientific research Other social services 
39 General technical services Education 
40 Public administration Health and social welfare 
41 
Cultural, sports and 
recreational 
42 
Public administration and 
public organizations 
Table A4.1.2 61 aggregate sectors for China and Japan in 2002 
Code Description 
I Agriculture 
2 Metal mining 
3 Other mining 
4 Coal 
5 Crude oil and natural gas 
6 Food and tobacco 
7 Beverage 
8 Textiles 
9 Clothing and other fiber products 
10 Wood products 
11 Furniture 
12 Paper and paper products 
13 Printing and publishing 
14 Chemical fertilizers 
15 Basic chemicals 
16 Plastic products 
17 Chemical fibers 
18 Chemical products 
19 Medical and pharmaceutical products 
20 Petroleum 
21 Coking 
22 Plastic products 
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Table A4.1.2 continued 
Code Description 
23 Rubber products 
24 Glass and glass products 
25 Cement 
26 Ceramic ware 
27 Other non-metal mineral products 
28 Pig Iron and crude steel 
29 Steel pressing 
30 Steel products 
31 Nonferrous metal smelting 
32 Nonferrous metal processing 
33 Metal products 
34 General industrial machinery 
35 Special industrial machinery 
36 Other general industrial equipment and parts 
37 Office equipment 
38 Household electronic and electrical apparatuses 
39 Computers and accessories 
40 Communication machines 
41 Other electronic instruments 
42 Electronic element and device 
43 Generators 
44 Other electrical machinery 
45 Car 
46 Parts and accessories for cars 
47 Other transport equipment 
48 Instruments 
49 Other manufacturing products 
50 Construction 
51 Public projects 
52 Electricity, steam and hot water production and supply 
53 Water production and supply 
54 Commerce 
55 Finance, Insurance and real estate 
56 Transport 
57 Communication and broadcasting 
58 Official business 
59 Other public services 
60 Other business services 
61 Other personal services 
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Appendix 4.2 Construction of Emission Factors 
1. Emission factors used in other studies 
In this study of air pollutants from fossil fuel combustion, we are concerned with the 
content of carbon, sulfur and nitrogen in fuels. However, there are many types of coal, 
oil and natural gas which vary dramatically in their chemical contents in physical 
units. Less variation is found in terms of emission in calorific terms. That is why most 
energy resources give out emissions factors in calorific terms rather than emission 
factors in physical terms. Because of this complexion, some emission factors are 
misused in some studies. The following is a comparison of average emission factors in 
four related studies: 
Table A4.2.1 Comparison of Emission factors 
Carbon in Sulfur in Nitrogen in 
Author(s) Unit Coal Oil Gas Coal Oil Gas Coal Oil Gas 
Mukhodpadhyay 
(2002) mt/mt' 0.55 0.77 0.67 n/a` n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Mukhopadhyay 
and Chakroborty 
(2005) mt/mt 0.55 0.79 n/a 0.003 0.015 n/a 0.018 0.001 n/a 
Dietzenbacher 
and 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2007) mt/mtoe° 0.55 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Temurshoev mt/mtoe 
(2006) 0.55 0.77 n/a 0.003 0.015 n/a 0.018 0.001 n/a 
Note: a. mt/mt is acronym for million tons per million tonnes; 
b. mt/mtoe is acronym for million tonnes per million tonnes oil equivalent; 
c. not explicitly mentioned in the text. Iiowever the emission factors of oil and natural gas usually 
adopt the same values. 
While we find the numbers used in these studies are almost the same, the units they 
are using are surprisingly different: mtoe is a measure of energy and mt is a measure 
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of physical mass. In the case of coal, 2 mt of coal would release about I mtoe of 
energy. Hence, the emission factors in some, if not all, of the studies, are misused. 
2. Emission factors used in this study 
CO2 emissions are primarily dependent on the carbon content of the fuel and hence we 
can calculate them from fuel combustion accurately at a highly aggregated level. But 
for SO2 and NO., emissions estimation requires more detailed information. Accurate 
estimation of their emissions depends on knowledge of several interrelated factors, 
including combustion conditions, technology, and emission control policies, as well as 
fuel characteristics. IPCC guidelines suggest that they are calculated based on applied 
on a detailed activity/technology level. 
Emission factors vary in fuel types as well as across industries and from different data 
sources. Peters et al. (2006) compare emission factors from Chinese Energy Statistics 
Yearbooks, CCCS and IPCC guidelines as well as other studies. We use these sources 
to construct emission factors for the three air pollutants. 
Table A4.2.2 Carbon Emission Factor and Fraction of Carbon Oxidized 
Soft Natural Motor Fuel 
Fuel Type Coal coke gas LPG Naphtha gasoline oil 
Emission factors 
(T C/TJ) 25.8 25.8 15.3 17.2 20.0 18.9 20.2 
Oxidization factors' 0.98 0.98 0.995 0.995 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Source: IPCC guidelines. a. Oxidization factor vary across industries ranging from 0.8 to 0.98. We use 
the default values which are overestimates for some industries. 
We use the values in bold to construct our carbon dioxide emission factors. To make 
the values comparable to other studies and to suit the Chinese case, we also present the 
carbon emission factors in different units. 
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Table A4.2.3 Carbon emission factors in different units 
Fuel type 
Raw Coal 
Crude Oil 
Natural gas 
T ClTJ T C/SCE' T C/TOEb T C/ T` 
25.8 0.75613608 1.0801944 0.5394264 
20.2 0.59201352 0.8457336 0.8446832 
15.3 0.44840628 0.6405804 n/a 
Note: a. SCE is an acronym of Standard Coal Equivalent which refers to the amount of energy released by 
burning one metric ton of coal. It is widely used in Chinese energy statistics. I SCE=29.3076* 10-3TJ 
b. TOE is an acronym of Ton Oil Equivalent which refers to the amount of energy released by 
burning one metric ton of oil. It is accepted by many nations to record their energy statistics. I 
TOE=4I. 868010'3 TJ. I SCE is about 0.7 TOE. 
c. T denotes one metric ton. We use net calorific values for raw coal 0.020908 TJ per ton and for 
crude oil 0.041816 Ti. per ton. Natural gas is often measured in volume and thereby we don't report the 
carbon content in physical mass. 
3.66 is applied as the molecular weight ratio of carbon dioxide to carbon. The 
following is carbon dioxide emission factors based on the methodology and data 
mentioned above. 
Table A4.2.4 Carbon Dioxide Emission factors 
Fuel type 
CO2 ton per SCE 
CO2 ton per TOE 
Raw Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas 
2.712 2.145 1.633 
3.874 3.064 2.333 
2.2 Sulfur Dioxide Emission Factors 
Sulfur dioxide emission factors are constructed by multiplying the sulfur content of 
the corresponding fuel by the fraction of sulfur oxidized and the molecular weight 
ratio of sulfur dioxide to sulfur. 
Table A4.2.5 Sulfur Content in Different Fuels (%) 
Fuel type 
IPCC low 
IPCC medium 
IPCC high 
Jingru 
Raw Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas 
0.5 1 n/a 
1.5 30 
34 n/a 
1.1 0.5 n/a 
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Not all the sulfur content in fuels will be oxidized; there will be certain proportion of 
remains in ash. Sulfur content and retention in ash varies dramatically in fuel types. 
IPCC provides various values of sulfur content and retention in ash according to fuel 
types. The table below shows a variation in estimation in different data sources. 
Fuel type 
IPCC, hard coal 
IPCC, brown coal 
Jingru 
CCCS, P53 
Source: Peters et al. (2006) 
Table A4.2.6 Sulfur Retention in Ash (%) 
Raw Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas 
5 n/a n/a 
30 n/a n/a 
20 n/a n/a 
27 n/a n/a 
We use IPCC medium sulfur content values (in bold) and sulfur retention ratio in ash 
27% according to CCCS. Due to data limitation, we imply a strong assumption that 
sulfur removal technology is absent/ inefficient. We use 2 as the molecular weight 
ratio of sulfur dioxide to sulfur. 
Table A4.2.7 Sulfur Dioxide Emission Factors using jingru sulfur content 
Fuel 
Raw coal 
Crude oil 
Natural gas 
t /SCE t /TOE t/ T KT/PJ 
0.0225 0.0322 0.0161 0.768127 
0.0070 0.0100 0.0100 0.2391429 
00 n/a 0 
Source: Peters et al. (2006) 
2.3 Nitrous Oxides Emission Factors 
Similar to SO2, nitrous oxides from fuel combustion are highly technology dependent. 
Nevertheless, we use IPCC default nitrous oxides emission factors numbers for 
industry/energy and construction as follows. 
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Table A4.2.8 Nitrous Oxides Emission Factors 
Fuel 
Raw Coal 
Crude Oil 
Natural gas 
t /SCE tlTOE t/T kg/TJ 
0.00879228 0.0125604 0.0062724 300 
0.00586152 0.0083736 0.0083632 200 
0.00439614 0.0062802 n/a 150 
Note: Nitrogen emission factors are IPCC default numbers for the sectors Industry, Energy and 
Construction. 
3. Summary 
To sum up, we use emission factors as the following table listed 
Table A4.2.9 Emission factors ton/SCE 
COs SO2 
Raw coal 
Crude oil 
Natural gas 
NOX 
2.712 0.0225 0.0088 
2.145 0.0070 0.0059 
1.633 0 0.0044 
For 2002, where crude oil and natural gas are referred to in the IO tables as one 
commodity, we recalculate the emission factors based on the mix of crude oil and 
natural gas in Chinese energy production/consumption. 
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Appendix 4.3 Pollution content in bilateral trade 
Table A4.3.1 Pollution content in bilateral trade between China and Japan 
(Common technology assumption, Chinese 1-0 coefficients) 
Exports Imports BETT 
Year Pollutant 
.,,.. 
PTOT 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
C02 
S02 
NO,, 
C02 
S02 
NO, 
C02 
S02 
NO,, 
C02 
S02 
NO. 
tu"tonnes iu tonnes lu wnnes 
7069 9265 
-2196 0.82 
33 45 
-12 0.78 
165 208 
-43 0.85 
8801 8032 770 0.82 
40 39 2 0.78 
206 181 25 0.85 
9816 11774 
-1958 0.83 
45 59 
-l3 0.77 
228 259 
-30 0.88 
9816 12223 
-2407 0.82 
46 61 
-15 0.76 
228 268 
-40 0.87 
Table 4.3.2 Pollution content in bilateral trade between China and Japan 
(Heterogeneous tech technology assumption) 
Exports Imports BETT 
Year Pollutant 
--A- 
. -A. , n4 
PTOT 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
C02 
S02 
NO. 
C02 
S02 
NO. 
C02 
S02 
NO,, 
C02 
S02 
NO. 
IU-tonnes 1u- tonnes lu IULIICJ 
7069 1097 5971 6.91 
33 8 24 4.13 
165 13 152 13.59 
8801 1059 7742 6.18 
40 8 32 3.66 
206 12 193 12.28 
9816 1563 8253 6.25 
45 13 33 3.61 
228 17 211 13.45 
9816 1621 8195 6.18 
46 13 33 3.57 
228 17 211 13.29 
183 
Appendix 4.4 Further Adjustment on Fuel Products 
Table A4.4.1 Under common technology assumption BETT and PTOT 
(Basic 1-0 tables) 
Pollutant Export Import BETT PTOT 
104 tonnes 104 tonnes 10° tonnes 
1997 CO2 66423 67523 
-1100 0.76 
SO2 474 459 15 0.80 
NO. 208 209 
-1 0.77 
2002 CO2 70324 81773 
-11449 0.75 
SO2 477 553 
-76 0.75 
NO2,218 253 
-35 0.75 
Table A4.4.2 Projected BETT and PTOT for 2003- 2006 
Year Pollutant Exports Import BETT PTOT 
104 tonnes 104 tonnes 104 tonnes 
2002 CO2 64306 74975 
-10669 0.80 
SO2 442 503 
-62 0.82 
NO2200 232 
-32 0.80 
2003 CO2 83448 102916 
-19467 0.79 
SO2 573 694 
-121 0.80 
NO2,259 319 
-59 0.79 
2004 CO2 109835 132197 
-22362 0.81 
SO2 763 888 
-125 0.84 
NO2 342 409 
-67 0.82 
2005 co" 132299 143719 
-11420 0.82 
SO2 911 964 
-53 0.84 
NO. 411 445 
-33 0.83 
2006 CO2 159172 160031 
-859 0.84 
SO2 1100 1060 41 0.88 
NO. 496 494 2 0.85 
Table A4.4.3 Heterogeneous technology assumption, BETT and PTOT 
10 tables Pollutants Exports Imports BETT (10 tones) PTOT 
1) Common Tech CO2 70138 81202 
-11064 0.75 
Exports using CN' SO2 478 549 -71 0.76 
Imports using CN NO. 218 252 -34 0.75 
2)1leterogenous Tech CO2 70138 45912 24226 1.33 
Exports using CN SO2 478 295 183 1.41 
Imports using JPb NO , 218  141 77 1.35 
3) Common Tech CO2 35199 45912 
-10713 0.67 
Exports using JP SO2 222 295 -73 0.65 
Imports using JP NO. 108 141 
-33 0.67 
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Appendix 4.5 Summary of previous studies 
Table A4.5.1 Other Studies on Pollution Content in Trade for China 
Author Methodologies Pollutants Period Findings Consistency 
Antweiler EIOA; CO; S02; NO2, 1987 Composite YES 
(1996) Common tech Lead; Particulate PTOT: 
matter; 0.544 
volatile organic 
compounds, 
Chai Simple method: Sum of 11 water 1980- PTOT YES 
(2002) Chinese industrial pollutants; 1982; 1980-182: 
pollution intensities Sum of 3 air 1996- 0.54 
and annual trade pollutants; 1998 1996- 
data Sum of 7 solid 1998: 0.62 
waste pollutants 
Ahmad EIOA; CO2 1997 BETT>0 YES 
and Iletero tech 
Wyckoff 
(2003) 
Shui and (EIO-LCA) CO2 1997- BETT>0 YES 
Harriss software; 2003 
(2006) Common tech BUT 
Emission factors 
gauged for China 
Umed EIOA; CO2, SO2, NO 
, 
1992,  PTOT<1 YES 
(2006) US and CN 1-0 1997 
Wang and Simple method; CO2 2004 BETT>0 NO 
Watson Common tech; 
(2007) lEA CO2 emission 
per unit of GDP 
(country specific) 
Dean and Simple method: COD; SO2; Smoke; 1995- COD, SO2, Yes 
Lovely Chinese industrial Dust 2004 Smoke: in terms of 
(2008) pollution intensities PTOT>1 S02 
and annual trade Dust: 
data PTOT<1 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION: 
THE CASE OF CHINESE PROVINCES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Trade liberalization has been in the centre of political and academic debate for a long 
time. Despite the benefits of trade liberalization from various channels such as 
technology spillovers, market access, resources allocation efficiency and pro- 
competition effects, further international economic integration maybe constrained by 
concerns over loss in other aspects. On the one hand, competitiveness loss of domestic 
industries and increased volatility to the domestic economy are often associated with 
trade liberalization; on the other hand, the worldwide concern about the environmental 
impacts of trade liberalization is also on the rise. 
China has benefited significantly from its openness policies for the past three decades. 
Trade liberalization and FDI inflows are key contributors to China's two digit nominal 
GDP growth rate. However, concerns have been expressed about the environmental 
situation in China such as increased pollution, deforestation, soil erosion and loss of 
species and habitats. The annual economic cost of air and water pollution has been 
estimated as being between 24 and 54 billion US dollars, approximately 3.5 and 7.7 
percent, respectively, of China's GDP in 1997 (World Bank, 1997: 23). When 
combined with degradation and resources shortage, the total cost is estimated to be 
between 8 percent and 12 percent of annual GDP of China (Economy, 2004: 88). Other 
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issues related to public health deterioration and social unrest also pose an enormous 
threat to China's sustainable economic development. 
Environmental degradation in the process of industrialization is not rare in other 
societies and periods. But due to the extremity of degradation and the unique 
institutional settings, China has become a focus in almost every aspect of 
environmental degradation, be it global commons or local environmental devastation. 
Many researchers have tried to address the failure of environmental protection in 
China from historical, cultural and institutional perspectives (see Smil, 1984; 
Economy, 2004). Others have empirically examined the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental degradation by testing the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve Hypothesis (EKC) which suggests a hope for cleaning up the 
environment when the income level passes a certain threshold (e. g. World Bank, 1992; 
Shafik, 1994; Roberts and Grimes, 1997; Peng and Bao, 2006, and so on). Since early 
1990s, the increasing trends in globalization have increased the attention on the 
environmental implications of trade liberalization. Researchers have started to 
investigate whether trade liberalization would bring greater harm to domestic 
economy or if it would instead ameliorate the environment (Lucas et al., 1992; 
Antweiler et al., 1998; Frankel and Rose, 2005). A rich body of research work is also 
growing in the context of China's environmental problems in the quest of China's 
growth sustainability (Zeng and Eastin, 2007; Roumasset et al., 2007; Dean and 
Lovely, 2008). 
Since trade liberalization is an indispensible part of China's growth miracle, it is our 
interest to examine the relationship between trade liberalization and environmental 
degradation. Linkages between trade and the environment are subtle and complex, as 
suggested by both theory and empirical studies. Although hypotheses predict that 
countries may deplete natural resources and/or specialize in producing pollution 
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intensive goods, gains in efficiency and market access from trade liberalization also 
increase income levels which in turn increase the demand for a cleaner environment. 
In addition, the spillover following trade liberalization (especially FDI flows) is likely 
to lead to an updating of the old-fashioned (possibly heavy-polluting) machinery used 
in developing countries. In line with the established related literature, we attempt to 
decompose the effect of trade liberalization on the environment into different 
channels: the scale, trade-induced composition and income effects. 
This study aims to improve on the following aspects, some of which will be further 
discussed in next section as weaknesses of the existing literature. 
1) Functional form 
We adopt the theoretical ACT (developed by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 1998) 
model but use different empirical specifications (log-log). 
2) Indicators for environmental quality 
To improve the understanding of more dimensions of environmental quality, we apply 
comprehensive measures of environmental degradation including gaseous pollution, 
water waste and solid waste. 
3) Measuring capital abundance 
Capital abundance is traditionally measured as the capital to labour ratio and is 
expected to be positively correlated to emissions. For example, Mani and Wheeler 
(1997) found that the five most pollution intensive sectors (Iron and Steel, Non- 
Ferrous Metals, Industrial Chemicals, Pulp and Paper, and Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products) are about threefold as energy intensive, twofold as physical capital 
intensive, and two-and-half-fold less labour intensive than the five cleanest sectors 
(Textiles, Non-Electrical Machinery, Electrical Machinery, Transport Equipment, and 
Instruments). However, there is also evidence that capital intensive industries are often 
technologically sophisticated and hence more environmentally benign. We incorporate 
a squared term of capital intensity to account for the possible nonlinear relationship 
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between pollution intensity and capital intensity. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the 
impact of trade liberalization on the environment by discussing the possible channels. 
Section 3 reviews a rich body of the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
environmental consequence of trade liberalization. The theoretical framework for the 
study is set out in section 4. The empirical methodology and data are described in 
section 5. Econometric results and discussions are included in section 6, with 
conclusions set out in the final section. 
5.2 TRADE'S IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
We have seen in the last section both the importance of trade liberalization to China's 
rapid growth and the severity of environmental degradation caused by economic 
growth. A natural question to be asked is: does trade liberalization worsen the 
environment, in the context of China? The debate between environmentalists and 
economists on this question has been contentious. However, there is no clear cut 
answer to the question due to the complex and conflicting channels through which 
trade liberalization can affect the environment. It can work through the economic 
growth caused by increasing trade and FDI flows or through income increase, 
technology spillover and production specialization. The possible channels or linkages 
are grouped in what follows into two schools according to their effects on the 
environment. 
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5.2.1 Trade liberalization as a source of harm to the 
environment 
Opponents of free trade claim that trade liberalization causes harm to the local 
environment and/or the global environment. Their arguments are grouped into three 
negative effects. 
1) The detrimental scale effect via economic growth 
Economic activities use environment services as production factors and may also use 
the environment as a dump for wastes. The scaling up of economic activities will 
therefore harm the environment: by inducing more use of environment resources or by 
emitting more pollution. Grossman and Krueger (1995: 353) argue that "[I]f the 
composition of output and the methods of production were immutable, then damage to 
the environment would be linked unavoidably to the scale of global economic 
activity". Following the literature, this impact of simply scaling up is termed the 
"scale effect". Under the presumption that trade liberalization increases market access 
and the size of economy in China, the scale effect of trade liberalization is viewed as 
having a negative impact on the environment. 
2) Specialization in dirty industries 
According to neoclassical trade theories, trade liberalization induces greater 
specialization according to comparative advantages. For economies with comparative 
advantage in producing dirty goods, trade liberalization will induce more dirty 
production and the environment of these countries will suffer. The Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis (PHH) predicts pessimistically for developing countries, that weak 
environmental regulations will boost dirty production in these countries, making them 
pollution havens for pollution intensive industries. However, the Factor Endowment 
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Hypothesis (FEH) infers that developed countries with more capital endowments than 
developing countries will have a comparative advantage in producing dirty goods 
which are also capital intensive. Theoretical predictions are quite mixed and the nature 
of the compositional (structural) effect from trade liberalization depends on country 
characteristics. Much of the empirical literature, however, suggests the compositional 
effect of trade is not necessarily detrimental to the environment of developing 
countries because a) the effect of environmental regulatory differences on trade 
specialization is relatively small and b) developing countries tend to have comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive industries which tend to be relatively cleaner than 
capital intensive industries. It is generally agreed that China exports more labour- 
intensive goods, many of which are not heavily polluting. 
3) Regulatory chill and `Race to bottom' 
We have discussed thus far about passive reaction from the economy following trade 
liberalization. However, the issue of the endogeneity of environmental regulations 
merits more attention. In a pessimistic view, trade endangers standards of 
environmental regulations which results in damage to the environment. The so called 
`Regulatory chill' or worse `Race to bottom' hypothesis depicts the possibility of 
downgrading environmental regulations in individual economies to protect the 
competitiveness of domestic industries. The presumption here is that stringent 
environmental regulations are costly for firms to comply with; in fear of loss of 
international competitiveness, economies in general will adopt laxer standards of 
environmental regulations. There may, however, be offsetting pressures to raise 
environmental standards where consumers are concerned about such effects and firms 
are interested to market "green" standards. In the case of China, it is frequently 
reported that local governments have lowered compliance for employment 
consideration in return for financial inducements (e. g. bribery to individual corrupted 
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bureaucrats). 
5.2.2 Trade liberalization as a source of benefit for the 
environment 
While the pessimistic arguments towards the nexus of trade and the environment are 
credible, there are equally convincing counter-arguments from the optimists' side. In 
fact, in the viewpoint of optimists, `trade is the best way to protect the environment. ' 
(Eiras et at., 2001) 
1) Efficient allocation of resources 
Economies with comparative advantage in producing clean goods will enjoy a cleaner 
environment whilst consuming imported pollution-intensive goods. Further, trade 
liberalization allows more efficient allocation of resources by reducing policy 
distortions and brings the benefits of specialization following international differences 
in comparative advantage. According to Neumayer (2001)'s argument, "if goods and 
services are produced according to comparative advantage, then scarce resources are 
not wasted and no environmental pollution is unnecessarily created. " 
2) Technology and management improvement 
It is claimed that trade liberalization could also encourage the exports of 
environmental regulatory and product standards from advanced economies to less- 
regulated economies. With trade protection, domestic firms tend to be content with old 
technologies or may be limited in their ability to innovate. When subject to 
international competition, it is believed that domestic firms will have more incentive 
to employ the newest technologies available. An optimistic view (for example, see 
Frankel, 2003) claims that trade speeds up the absorption of frontier technologies and 
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best-practice management and demand for higher environmental quality which will 
translate into effective regulation and the desired reduction in pollution. However, it is 
also claimed that developed countries transfer out-of-dated technology to developing 
countries and worsen the environment in developing countries. China has seen 
technological spillovers and management improvement through international 
cooperation over the past three decades. 
3) Income effect 
It is claimed by some research (Beghin, 2000) that poverty is a key contributor to 
environmental degradation in many developing countries. Poorer countries with rich 
natural resource endowments tend to trade off environment and economic growth. The 
income effect stems from the gains-from-trade hypothesis. Given that environmental 
quality is often posited as a normal good, agents will increase their demand for a clean 
environment if trade liberalization raises real income. Also with rising real income, a 
country will be better equipped with financial and regulatory capacity to design and 
enforce environmental policies. 
4) International cooperation of environmental activism 
Increased openness and intertwined exchange enhances international cooperation of 
environmental activities. According to ACEF (All-China Environment Federation), by 
2008 there are over 3000 groups of environmental protection in China, many of which 
are linked with international environmental protection groups. Case studies show that 
international links helps to strengthen environmental protection. Also China has 
subscribed to many environment related trade treaties. 
Focusing on Chinese provinces between 1985 and 2007, this study investigates only 
some of the mechanisms discussed above, namely, the scale, composition (trade- 
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induced composition) and technique effects, which are broadly used in the literature 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1992,1995; Antweiler et al., 2001). 
5.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
General public awareness of the environmental implications of trade liberalization has 
been raised by the multinational trade negotiations such as the Uruguay Round of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. Initial research 
focused on the environmental issues relating to agriculture and natural resources 
(Barrett, 1990; Markandya and Pemberton, 1990; Anderson, 1992). With the 
negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a rich body of 
work has been developed both in the theoretical and empirical areas with an emphasis 
on industrial pollution in the Mexican border area (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). 
With the international integration process accelerating in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, this area has seen significant development in terms of methodologies and 
research objectives. We focus on the most relevant literature and group these papers 
according to their methodologies. 
5.3.1 Environmental Kuznets Curve: the role of trade 
This branch of the literature builds on the inverted-U shape hypothesis (commonly 
termed as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) Hypothesis, due to its 
resemblance to the Kuznets Curve postulated by Kuznets (1965) and used broadly in 
the studies of the growth and environment nexus (e. g. Grossman, 1995; Panayotou, 
1993,1997; Selden and Song, 1994; Shafik, 1994). 
The basic idea of EKC is that, pollution first increases with industrialization and then 
decreases after the economy reaches a certain income threshold. Since trade 
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liberalization is highly intertwined with economic growth, most empirical work 
includes a variable for trade liberalization or includes an interaction term of trade 
openness with key variables in their model of EKC testing. Most studies find that 
there is little evidence that trade has a detrimental effect on the environment; some 
studies even find that trade liberalization tends to reduce emissions of certain 
pollutants. 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) is the first paper to examine the empirical relationship 
between national income and measures of environmental quality. In their 
specifications, per capita GDP is regarded as the combined effect of income and scale 
effects of economic growth, while trade intensity is included as an additional 
explanatory variable. Their findings suggest that SO2 levels are significantly lower in 
cities located in countries that conduct a great deal of trade (relative to GDP). The role 
of trade openness on the emissions of suspended particles and dark matters', however, 
is not clear with the insignificant estimated coefficients. 
Lucas et al. (1992) contribute to the testing of the trade liberalization-environment 
relationship by interacting trade liberalization and income growth in their model 
specification. Their results suggest that trade liberalization (measured in terms of 
Dollar's price-based measure which seeks to capture the magnitude of price 
distortions induced by policy) may be good for a country, with increased trade 
openness reducing the growth rate of manufacturing toxic intensity. 
Using cross-country data for the year 1990, Frenkel and Rose (2005) address the issue 
of endogeneity of trade openness and income which was overlooked in previous 
studies. They construct an instrumental variable for trade openness by aggregating 
37 Suspended particles refer to gases and liquids suspended in the air while dark matter refers to smoke in 
their paper. 
195 
across a country's partners the trade flow predictions from a gravity equation and 
construct a set of instrumental variables for income using neoclassical growth 
equations. Their measures of environmental quality consist of seven indicators. Both 
OLS and IV results seem to support the view that trade openness reduces the tree 
measures of local air pollution (SO2, NO2 and suspended particulate matter) as well as 
stops further deforestation and energy depletion although the significance level varies. 
For the global externality Carbon Dioxide (CO2), a positive sign of openness with 
moderate significance in OLS estimation is found (although the effect loses 
significance in IV estimation). They argue that this is because a global externality is 
unlikely to be addressed at individual country level. As for rural clean water access, 
they find a beneficial effect of openness in OLS estimation which disappears in IV 
estimation. A critique on their geographically-constructed trade share to instrument 
trade openness is made by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001)58. 
Apart from the cross-country studies, there is a growing body of research on the 
determination of state/provincial pollution levels in individual countries. For example, 
examination of the role of trade openness as well as other control variables (such as 
technology advancement, the share of state ownership, industrial composition) is 
carried out by employing Chinese provincial characteristics. Peng and Bao (2006) test 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve using Chinese provincial data between 1996 and 
2002. Trade openness is included in their specifications as a control variable. Using 
various emission indicators, the findings suggest that trade openness seems to be 
pollution reducing for most of the pollutants (COD, industrial soot, industrial dust and 
SO2), while the effect on other pollutants (industrial waste water and industrial solid 
waste) remain insignificant. Another paper by Zeng and Eastin (2007) also examines 
S° Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) argue that the geographically-determined component of trade may be 
correlated with other factors and that IV estimate is biased unless these factors are explicitly controlled 
for in the income equation. 
196 
the determinants of industrial pollution in Chinese provinces. Zeng and Eastin argue 
that four different channels can be identified such that increased economic integration 
results in overall environmental quality improvement. The impact of trade openness, 
FDI, export intensity and import intensity (relative to GDP) are investigated in 
separate specifications. Their results based on ordinary least square models with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE estimation) suggest a significantly negative 
relationship between economic integration and environmental pollution which holds 
up across alternative measures of pollution and openness. 
EKC analysis itself has been criticized widely (for example, Arrow et al., 1995; Cole, 
2003; Nahman and Antrobus, 2005; He, 2007) in terms of its theoretical underpinning, 
choice of environmental indicators and empirical interpretations. One school of 
criticism (Chapman and Agras, 1999; Stern, 1998; Cole, 2003 and 2004) points out 
that the EKC is determined by certain important variables such as energy price and 
trade/FDI patterns rather than growth-induced pollution abatement. In addition, the 
traditional EKC analysis often have some econometric issues such as ignoring 
simultaneity of income and emissions as well as ignoring the issue of 
heteroskedasticity (Cole, 2003; Stern et al., 1996) which would incur biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Cole, 2003). Recent studies (Cole et al., 1997; Shen, 2006; 
Zhang, 2008) on the EKC relation have tried to deal with the criticisms in many ways 
such usage of panel data, model specification, alternative pollution indicators and 
inclusion of other variables. 
Accordingly, the research on trade liberalization and the environment done under the 
framework of EKC hypothesis inherits similar criticisms. Even if these issues are not 
serious problems with adoption of advanced econometric techniques and data, the 
EKC literature discussed above does not distinguish between the different mechanisms 
through which trade liberalization can affect the environment. Many other papers 
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(Grossman and Krueger, 1992,1995; Copeland and Taylor, 1994,1995; Antweiler et 
al., 2001) find it useful to decompose the impact of trade liberalization on the 
environment into three effects: the scale, (trade-induced) composition and technique 
effects; though they do not try to estimate their magnitudes individually. 59 
There are a number of reasons for examining the individual effects of trade 
liberalization. Firstly, trade liberalization should have different compositional effects 
in different countries. "A consistent relationship between additional pollution and 
openness to trade (across a panel of both rich and poor countries) is unlikely to be 
fruitful" (ACT, 2001). Secondly, the decomposition should also be stressed on the 
grounds of different welfare and policy implications. In the following section, we 
review a selection of studies which examine the different effects of trade liberalization 
on the environment. 
5.3.2 ACT and the mechanisms of trade liberalization 
Following Grossman and Krueger, other studies have tried to decompose trade's 
impact on the environment. One of the most prominent works was carried out by 
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) [thereafter ACT]. To isolate and identify the 
mechanisms mentioned above in a more structured and theoretically solid framework, 
they develop a general equilibrium model to disentangle the mechanisms (scale effect, 
composition effect, technique effect and trade-induced composition effect) for a small 
open economy. 
Using 1971-1995 GEMS (global environment monitoring system) data of SO2 
s' Grossman and Krueger and others investigate the combined effect of scale and income using per capita 
income and interpreting the inverted-U shape curve as reflecting the relative strength of the two effects, 
see Grossman and Krueger, 1995. 
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concentrations recorded in different sites located in different cities in a number of 
countries, ACT measured the elasticities of these effects. They found that for an 
average country in the sample further trade openness tends to reduce SO2 
concentrations and it seems that freer trade is good for the environment. The authors 
also warn that their conclusions are based on the assumption that factor endowments 
and technologies of an economy will not change when trade frictions fall. Since we 
adopt ACT modelling, the basics of the model will be explained in details in the 
section of methodology. 
Following ACT modelling, Cole and Elliot (2003) examined the trade-environment 
relationship using cross-country data for 1975 to 1995. They pay special attention to 
the nature of the trade-induced composition effect, while scale and income effect are 
not separately estimated. Their findings suggest different implications according to the 
pollutants and measures of pollution: the magnitude and sign of the effects vary by 
pollutants and measures of pollution. In summary, their results are partially supportive 
of ACT's empirical work by concluding that trade liberalization will reduce the 
pollution intensity of output but not necessarily pollution per capita (the reverse is true 
in the cases of NO,, and CO2). 
He (2006b) also employs a pollution decomposition method used by Grossman and 
Krueger (1992; 1995) and applies an ACT type model to investigate the role of trade 
openness on SO2, using Chinese provincial data for the period 1992 and 2003. The 
study's findings are relatively consistent with theoretical predictions: a positive signed 
scale effect and negative signed technique effect. The composition effect is 
counterintuitive, predicting that the increasing capital to labour ratio is beneficial for 
the environment. For the trade induced composition effect, He finds that it depends on 
the measurement of pollution. With small magnitudes, trade intensity acts as a 
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decreasing factor for sulphur dioxide density (measured as industrial sulphur dioxide 
emissions divided by the surface of a province) and as an increasing factor for total 
industrial sulphur dioxide density. 
Managi et al. (2009) address the issue of endogeneity of trade openness and income in 
ACT model using the instrumental variable approach (income equation and trade 
openness equation are used to get the fitted values of income and trade) adopted from 
Frankel and Rose (2005) as well as the differenced generalized method of moment 
(GMM) estimator. They find that the impact of trade on the environment depends on 
the pollutant and the country. Although trade lowers BOD emissions in both OECD 
and non-OECD countries, detrimental effects of trade on SO2 and CO2 emissions seem 
to occur only in non-OECD countries. They also find that the impact of trade is larger 
in the long term after the dynamic adjustment process. 
Despite the increasing popularity for disentangling empirically the impact of trade 
liberalization on the environment, the ACT framework has weaknesses. It assumes 
that the changes of factor endowments and technology progress are exogenous to trade 
liberalization, though in reality trade liberalization may well bring factor movements 
(especially capital flows in the context of North-South trade) as well as technology 
spillovers and standards transfers. This limitation is especially important in a study 
that deals with time-series data. In addition, the model is built on the basis of many 
classical assumptions about market structure, for example, competitiveness and small 
open economy assumption with world prices taken as given. However even individual 
countries can have greater than proportional impact on the world market price 
in terms of some important goods such as oil. 
The following section introduces some other models which address the issue of 
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endogeneity to take into account the full impact of trade on the environment. 
5.3.3 Structural models 
Dean (2002) develops a theoretical Hechsher-Ohlin model with endogeneous factor 
supply (the environment is modelled as a productive input). Dean identifies the direct 
effect of trade liberalization (through emissions growth determination) and the indirect 
effect (through income growth determination) using a two-equation simultaneous 
system. Dean then analyzes the model using 1987 to 1995 Chinese provincial waste 
water data. Her findings confirm the detrimental direct effect of trade liberalization on 
the environment, but its indirect income effect turns out to be beneficial. The relative 
strength of the two effects changes from a detrimental effect dominance to beneficial 
effect dominance when other variables (for example state ownership and provincial 
differences) are taken into account. The author also undertook a counterfactual 
simulation based on the assumption that in 1991 the old exchange rate regime did not 
shift to the managed float exchange regime. Without such a reform, the author 
predicted a more rapid growth in waste water in Chinese provinces. In addition, Dean 
argues that China may have a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods 
because an improvement in the relative price of exports increases emissions growth 
significantly. This is in contradiction to other studies which conclude China has 
comparative advantage in producing clean goods (He, 2006b). Dean's choice of trade 
openness indicator and the interpretations may not be sufficiently precise to ensure 
such a conclusion 60 
Inspired by Dean's model, He (2007) constructed a four-equation simultaneous system 
60 Dean uses Black Market Premium (BMP) as an indicator of trade openness which is criticized by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). In addition, the fact that a less distorted price regime induces more 
emissions growth does not necessarily imply China has a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive 
goods. 
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to capture both direct and indirect impacts of trade intensity on emissions. It is 
hypothesized in his model that imports and exports have different impacts on the 
emission situation: imported machinery and equipment are used to expand dirty goods 
production, while exports reflect comparative advantage. He's results suggest that the 
total impact of international trade on China's industrial SO2 emissions is relatively 
small and the impacts of exports and imports have opposite signs: exports are 
emission-reducing, while imports (stock of imported machinery and equipment) are 
emission-increasing. 
5.3.4 Miscellaneous methods 
Other methods have been employed to examine the trade-environment nexus. For 
example, He (2006a) investigates the impact of economic growth and openness on the 
environment using Divisia decomposition for Chinese provincial level SO2 emissions 
between 1991 and 2001. He's findings are consistent with international experiences: a 
positive signed scale effect, negative signed technique effect and inconclusive for the 
role of trade on China's industrial composition transformation. 
Several others have modelled the impact of trade liberalization on various pollutants 
using CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) models (see Madrid-Aris, 1998; 
Beghin et al., 2002; Anderson and Strutt, 1998). These studies generate mixed results 
for individual countries. For example, Anderson and Strutt (1998) predict that 
Indonesia would benefit from GATT Uruguay Round trade reforms and APEC MFN 
trade provisions up to 2010 and 2020 because the detrimental scale effect is 
overridden by the composition effects. However, Beghin et al. (2002) analyze the 
impact of various trade reform scenarios in Chile on various pollutants and conclude 
that integration into NAFTA is relatively benign to the environment, while unilateral 
trade liberalization induces more adverse movements to the environment and the 
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MERCOSUR (a regional trade agreement concerning south American countries) 
simulations do not create substantial changes in pollution. 
5.3.5 Summary 
The branch of EKC-type analysis that examines the role of international trade on the 
environment has been criticized due to its lack of solid theoretical grounding. 
Compared to the EKC models, the ACT model and Dean (2002) offer some 
improvement by decomposing the impact of trade liberalization on the environment 
into various countervailing channels. In regard to cross-country analysis, nevertheless, 
concern arises with the ACT model and the Dean model in that the small country 
specifications may not be suitable for large countries. Some countries may have a 
lion's share of certain industries and thus have the power to influence relative world 
prices. 
The other issues concerning the existing literature include measurement problems such 
as the choice and quality of trade liberalization index, environmental quality indicators 
and measurement of trade-induced composition effect. 
Most of the existing literature proxies trade liberalization using trade intensity. While 
trade flows can reflect to a certain extent economic integration and trade liberalization, 
they are by no means the only and best measure of trade liberalization. Studies have 
used different measures of trade liberalization. For example, Dean uses the black 
market premium (BMP) to measure trade liberalization, although changes in BMP 
may not be induced by trade liberalization (Rodiguez and Rodik, 2001). 
It is suggested that the impact of trade liberalization on the environment depends on 
the choice of pollutants and measures of pollution (Cole and Elliott, 2003). However, 
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the literature has focused on using SO2 emissions on the grounds that it is closely 
related to industrial activities and well documented. Since SO2 emissions have a strong 
local and easily discernible effect, it may not be too surprising that most studies 
identify an overall beneficial nature of trade liberalization on the environment when 
this pollutant only is used. This may not be the case for other pollutants or 
environmental degradation situation. 
Finally, it is often assumed the capital intensive industries are also heavier polluters. 
Although there is empirical evidence for the assumption (Cole and Elliott, 2003), it is 
potentially ambiguous since "capital intensive sectors could also be a more clean 
technology owner" (Dinda and Pal, 2000) and "the rise of the knowledge and high- 
tech industries during the last several decades obviously disrupts this assumption" 
(He, 2006b: 2) 
5.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical part of work. First, the theoretical framework 
to model the mechanisms of trade's impact on the environment is described. Second, 
the choice of key indicators-trade liberalization and environmental degradation are 
reviewed. 
5.4.1 Theory 
As summarized in the last section, both reduced form modelling (RFM) and 
simultaneous equation modelling (SEM) have been employed by the existing studies 
in the literature. Although SEM seems attractive in the sense that it controls for the 
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endogeneity problem better than RFM, it is not without shortcomings: ` expensive' in 
terms of data requirement, assumptions and estimation techniques61 
Copeland and Taylor (2003: 232-233) demonstrate that the recursive nature of their 
reduced form ensures the OLS estimates are unbiased and consistent. In the study we 
use a reduced form modelling following that of ACT to investigate the channels of 
how trade liberalization impacts on the environment. 
The basics of ACT modelling are as follows. A small open economy produces two 
final goods, capital intensive dirty good X and clean good Y using two primary factors 
L and K. Pollution demand z, is defined as in Grossman and Krueger (1992), as the 
product of emission intensity e, share of dirty good X in total output as Sp 
, 
and total 
output S as an economy's scale, i. e. z= ecoS 
. 
In differential form, z= S+0p+e 
. 
The 
first term is the scale effect measuring the increase in pollution generated by scaling 
up the economy, the second term is the composition effect measuring the mix of goods 
all else equal and the third term is the technique effect measuring the improvement in 
emission intensity. 
From the production side equilibrium (profit maximization given pollution tax T), the 
composition effect and the technique effect can be further decomposed as functions of 
capital abundance (K), trade frictions (ß), world relative price (pW) of X and the 
pollution tax (r) with elasticities and pollution abatement share (a) as parameters. So, 
the demand for pollution from the private sector is expressed as follows: 
1=9+ 6#w /C +W+ U)Efp + is. P/r 
Ift+ [(l + R) Eqp+ Er, P/r 
Ipw 
- 
ICI6pP + ee, 
P/r 
If 
(5.1) 
61 Wooldridge (2003) explains that OLS estimation for a SEM-type model incurs simultaneity bias. 
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The government chooses a pollution tax to maximize the weighted sum62 of consumer 
utilities. The optimal pollution tax is a function of country type (T) and the effective 
marginal damage (b(p, I)) which resembles Samuelson's rule63. In differential form, 
a decomposition of pollution supply can be expressed as 
z=T+EMDVß+BMD pp"+EMD. 1 I (5.2) 
where MD is the marginal rate of substitution between emissions and income 
measuring the willingness of a consumer to pay for reduced emissions and I is real per 
capita income. 
Combining pollution demand and supply ((5.1) and (5.2)) together yields a simple 
reduced form linking pollution emissions to a set of economic factors: 
I 
=7I, aS+7l2K-7r3I +7[4Ij+7ISpw -7I6T (5.3) 
All thee, are positive. P is a measure of trade frictions, for a dirty good exporter ß<1 
and for a dirty good importer ß>1. ACT argues that if factor endowments, world prices 
and country type are held constant, a fall in trade frictions will produce a scale effect, 
a technique effect and the trade-induced composition effect (the composition of factor 
endowments is not influenced by trade liberalization in their framework). 
dz P 
=1l 
Cl! S ß-7C; d1 N+7C4 
dý3 z'd, 6 S dýi I 
(5.4) 
Hence the effect of trade liberalization depends on a country's comparative advantage: 
for a dirty good exporter, it is a possibility but not necessity that trade liberalization 
causes more emissions while for a dirty good importer trade liberalization would 
reduce emissions. In their estimation models, the trade-induced composition effect is 
62 The government assigns different weights to different consumer groups. In ACT paper, they assume 
that governments' behaviour vary across Communist and non-Communist countries. 
63 Samuelson rule for public goods provision: the government chooses pollution so that firms face 
emissions price that is equal to the sum of the marginal damages across all consumers. 
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conditioned on country characteristics (capital abundance and income level) which are 
proxied by a second order Taylor series. 
V V0 +VIK-}-y/2K2 
-FV/3I +y/4I2 -FV/51d (5.5) 
Their empirical results also show that freer trade appears to be good for the 
environment in an average country in the sample. 
5.4.2 Variable selection 
In order to empirically test the ACT model, we discuss variable selection in this 
section. We first deal with the measurement of environmental degradation in the 
context of Chinese provinces. Next we turn to the measurement of trade liberalization 
in the following two sub-sections. Variables of economic scale, capital abundance 
(capital intensity), income level and others are also discussed. 
5.4.2.1 Environmental indicators 
The left-hand-side variable should be a measure of environmental degradation, but this 
is difficult to quantify. As Grossman and Krueger (1995: 353) recognize, 
"Environmental quality has many dimensions.... 
... 
Each of these dimensions of 
environmental quality (and others) may respond to economic growth in a different 
way. Therefore, a study of environment and growth should aim to be as 
comprehensive as possible.. "" A comprehensive set of environmental indicators is also 
required in the study of the linkages between trade liberalization and the environment. 
Copeland and Taylor (2003: 223) state a list of desirable properties that a pollutant 
should possess for it to be relevant to their model: 1) it is a by-product of goods 
w See also Grossman (1995) about different sensitivities from government to address the issue in respect 
for global and local pollutants; Arrow et al. (1995) warn that global pollutants may even increase 
monotonically with income. 
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production; 2) it is emitted in greater quantities per unit of output in some industries 
than others; 3) it has strong local effects; 4) it is subject to regulations because of its 
noxious effect on the population; 5) well-known abatement technologies are available 
for implementation; 6) data available fora mix of economies in terms of openness. 
The environmental indicators in this study are chosen on the basis of availability, 
comparability and reliability. China's environmental quality records are recorded at 
local level as well as national level. At the provincial level, data are comparable across 
provinces since 1) environmental data monitoring and recording are subject to the 
same regulations and laws at national level and 2) production and pollution are subject 
to same international prices (excluding differences in trade costs). Although the 
reliability of Chinese data is an issue raised by many studies, the shared institutional 
and social settings ensure the relative credibility for cross-province studies. Our study 
only focuses on the pollution generated by industrial production related activities due 
to data availability. Three categories of pollution are available: air pollution, water 
pollution and solid waste pollution from industrial processes. In the following, we 
describe the environmental indicators along with an explanation of their anthropogenic 
sources and the possible hazardous nature. 
Industrial Water pollutants 
1) Industrial waste water emissions 
One indicator is the total volume of industrial waste water emissions. It refers to the 
volume of waste water discharged by industrial enterprises through all their outlets, 
including waste water from the production process, directly cooled water, groundwater 
from mining wells which does not meet discharge standards and sewage from 
households mixed with waste water produced by industrial activities, but excluding 
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indirectly cooled water discharged (which should be included if the discharge is not 
separated from waste water). 
This indicator is too general in the sense that the pollutants in the same volume of 
industrial waste water can vary substantially across provinces and over time. 
Alternative measurement involves using the volumes of particular water pollutants. 
One error-correcting measure is to use the indicator of chemical oxygen demand 
which is a common test used to indirectly measure the amount of organic compounds 
in water. 
2) Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
The presence of organic compounds in water is problematic in aquatic systems 
because it causes algal blooms and contaminating drinking water. COD refers to the 
amount of oxygen required when chemical oxidants are used to oxidize organic 
pollutants in water. A higher value of COD corresponds to more serious pollution by 
organic pollutants. There are also data on individual compounds including cyanide, 
petroleum, phenol, PM (particulate matter), sulphide, and volatile hydroxyl-benzene. 
Toxic cyanide has been used as poison throughout history. Other indicators are more 
or less toxic. They can be viewed as an indicator of water quality. 
There are also other important water pollutants such as heavy metals, excess 
phosphorous and nitrates which can cause serious problems in aquatic systems and 
eventually in human bodies. Phosphorous is often the result of detergents entering the 
river networks and is associated with the use of phosphate fertilizers on agricultural 
land. Used in making fertilizers and pharmaceuticals, nitrates are soluble in water and 
contaminate soils. In this study, we focus on industrial waste water and COD, from 
which we draw generalizations concerning water quality. 
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Air pollutants 
Anthropogenic air pollution mostly originates from inefficient combustion of fuels. 
The available indicators in our dataset for air pollutants are industrial waste gas, SO2, 
industrial soot and industrial dust. 
1) Industrial waste air 
Industrial waste air refers to the discharge into atmosphere of waste air containing 
pollutants generated from fuel burning and production processes in enterprises within 
a given period of time. It is calculated at standard status (273K, 101325Pa). Similar to 
the volume of industrial waste water, this indicator is a generic measure of the total 
volume of all air pollutants emitted from combustion and production processes in 
industrial enterprises. 
2) SO2 (Sulphur Dioxide) 
SO2 is the most commonly-used environmental indicator in similar studies for many 
reasons (see Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Cole and Elliott, 2003; He, 2006a and 2006b, 
2007). Anthropogenic sources of SO2 are related to fossil fuel combustion especially 
in electricity generation, non-ferrous ores smelting and home heating. It is believed 
that anthropogenic sources account for a large share of all SO2 emissions (UNEP, 
1991). SO2 is linked to respiratory illnesses as well as acid rain problems (Lave et al., 
1970). We only focus on the emissions from combustion and production in industrial 
activities. 
3) Industrial Soot 
Industrial soot refers to airborne particulate matters resulting from the incomplete 
combustion of a hydrocarbon. It is related to activities such as mining and combustion. 
It not only stains clothing but is also considered hazardous to the lungs and general 
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health. In addition, it causes damage to vegetation growth. Here we use the volume of 
soot in smoke emitted in the process of fuel burning in the premises of enterprises. 
4) Industrial Dust 
Dust is referred to the category of solid particles with diameters less than 500 
micrometers. It occurs from various sources such as soil dust lifted up by natural 
forces (wind, volcanic eruptions etc. ) or from industrial pollutions. With its 
agglomerate nature, dust is especially hazardous for vulnerable humans such as 
children and older people and are suppressing to vegetation. We use the volume of 
dust emitted by production process of enterprises and suspended in the air for a given 
period of time, including dust from refractory material of iron and steel works, dust 
from coke-screening systems and sintering machines of coke plants, dust from lime 
kilns and dust from cement production in building material enterprises, but excluding 
soot and dust emitted from power plants. 
Other hazardous air pollutants are unfortunately less readily available at the provincial 
level in China. Important air pollution absent from this study are CO, NO and NO2 
which are largely generated from fossil fuel combustion especially with motor 
vehicles. With no odour or colour, CO can cause serious toxicity of the central 
nervous system and heart. We don't have the information for gases that have a global 
effect such as CO2 and CFC's, methane, nitrous oxide and tropospheric ozone. 
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Solid pollutants 
Industrial solid waste produced 
In our data this refers to the total volume of solid waste, semi-solid waste and high 
concentration liquid residues produced by industrial enterprises from production 
processes, gangue, tailings, radioactive residues and other wastes, but excludes stones 
stripped or dug out in mining 
- 
gangue and acid or alkaline stones not included (a 
stone is acid or alkaline according to the PH value of the water being below 4 or above 
10.5 when the stone is in, or soaked by water). 
5.4.2.2 Indicators of trade liberalization 
Defining and measuring trade liberalization is another crucial yet difficult job for the 
study. There are various potential indicators of trade liberalization with differing 
strengths and limitations 65 
A common definition of trade liberalization emphasizes the removal or reduction in 
trade practices that hamper the free flow of goods and services from one economy to 
another. A more detailed definition views trade liberalization as "the gradual reduction 
in trade frictions that moves domestic prices closer to world prices" and included in 
trade frictions are "explicit trade barriers limiting imports or restricting exports, the 
sum of communication and logistical costs endemic to any real world trading 
relationship, and, of course, the costs of international shipment" (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2003: 221). This definition is imperfect either, particularly when price changes 
are complicated by other institutional designs such as monetary and exchange rate 
policies. 
65 Criticisms and investigations on trade liberalization measures can be found in Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001) and Edwards (1998). 
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Direct measures of trade liberalization could be tariffs and non-tariff barriers. These 
direct measures, however, could be biased due to the coexistence of many intractable 
surcharges, taxes and subsides. 
Another group of indices are related to price differences and exchange rate distortions. 
For example, Dollar's price based indices are widely adopted (Dollar, 1992; Lucas, et. 
al, 1992). But since such indices are dependent on the Law of One Price hypothesis 
and nominal exchange rate movement, they suffer limitations as pointed out by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). Black market premium (BMP)66 measures exchange 
rate distortion and can be used to assess an economy's foreign exchange regime. It is 
sometimes adopted as an indicator of trade restrictiveness. For example, Harrison 
(1996) reports negative and significant correlations between the BMP and other 
indices of trade openness. Dean (1998; 2002) uses BMP to indicate the degree of 
trade liberalization in China. However, BMP is not an ideal indicator for the following 
reasons. It is closely related to a wide range of policy failures, for example, the 
effectiveness of regulation enforcements and other laws (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 
2001). In addition, BMP cannot be captured precisely (Lardy, 1992) and varies greatly 
(across time and local markets in the case of Chinese provinces). Last but not least, 
Dean only uses the national average level of BMP for all provinces while the left- 
hand-side variables are in provincial level. The Sachs-Warner indicator (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995) is a 0-1 type indicator reflecting a country's policy stance toward trade 
by looking at different aspects of an economy. To proxy a wide range of policy and 
institutional differences, this indicator is clearly too crude. Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001): "the Sachs-Warner measure is so correlated with plausible groupings of 
alternative explanatory variables-macroeconomic instability, poor institutions, and 
location in Africa-that it is risky to draw strong inferences about the effect of 
66 The black market premium is the percent over the official exchange rate that currency is traded on the 
black market. 
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openness on growth based on its coefficient in a growth regression. " Besides, 0-1 type 
indicators normally give ambiguous results when we change the threshold. There are 
studies (Edwards, 1998; Harrison, 1995) with attempt to compare different indicators 
of trade liberalization. 
To sum up, these indicators each have their merits and flaws in measuring trade 
liberalization. We go back to the definition in Copeland and Taylor (2003). Because 
movements in domestic prices are not easily observable, the authors use trade intensity 
(the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) (Harrison, 1996; Copeland and 
Taylor, 2003) to proxy movements in trade frictions. Changes in trade volumes can 
reflect changes in trade regulations as well as changes in transport costs and world 
demands which fit in the definition well. However, trade volume variations also reflect 
other aspects of macroeconomic changes. When trade liberalization is accompanied by 
domestic reforms, the role of trade is not easily separated and studied. Hence, the 
question we seek to solve is actually `what is the effect of increasing trade volume on 
the environment? ' 
In China, the degree of trade liberalization is not even across regions. Opened earlier 
than inland provinces, coastal provinces/municipalities have enjoyed favourable 
policies in export tax rebates, setting up industrial parks as well as cooperating with 
foreign investment. For each province, both exports and imports data are reported for 
each year. Imports data are recorded at the Customs for the destination province while 
exports arc recorded for the origin province. We denote the trade openness variable as 
trade intensity, namely the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. 
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5.4.2.3 Indicators of other variables 
Scale effect refers to the effect of economic activities and is measured by the 
industrial output at 1990 constant price level. Industrial output seems to be a better 
measure of economic scale than gross regional output in this study because all the 
emission levels accounted in the dataset are emitted by industrial production only. We 
expect that an increase in this variable (denoted by S) incurs increased pollution 
emissions. 
Composition effect is a measure of economic structure. It is measured by the ratio of 
capital stock to employment67 (denoted as KL). Capital stock is constructed for each 
province in each year adopted from Zhang et at. (2007) who use the perpetual 
inventory method (PIM). It should be noted that the capital stock only refers here to 
physical capital and does not include human capital accumulation. Employment is the 
sum of the employed in urban and rural areas. According to some studies, capital- 
abundance implies a comparative advantage in heavy-polluting industries (see 
Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Antweiler et al., 2001; Cole and Elliot, 2003; He, 2006b). 
Some studies also suggest a positive relationship between capital intensity and 
pollution intensity. Contradictory views argue that capital-abundance may imply a 
comparative advantage in high-technology green industries and thus in environmental- 
benign industries (see Dinda and Pal, 2000). These two contrasting views make the 
prediction of the coefficient sign rather difficult. For example, He (2006b) finds a 
negative relationship between capital intensity and industrial SO2 density in Chinese 
provinces. We include a squared term of capital intensity in our model to account for 
nonlinearity. 
67 Since inter-provincial labour migration is substantial, we use the employment data rather the labour 
supply in constructing the composition effect. Hence it is capital intensity rather than capital abundance, 
although these measures are positively and highly correlated in our dataset. 
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Income effect in each province68 is measured by the real income level; it is often 
referred as the technique effect although the actual income level accounts for only part 
of the technique effect (changes in the emission intensity). ACT exploits GNP per 
capita to differentiate the technique effect from the scale effect based on GDP data. A 
few studies (He, 2006b, 2007) use per capita GDP as a measure for income effect. We 
distinguish per capita GDP from real income for several reasons. Firstly, although per 
capita GDP and income level in a province is often positively related, they may have 
different influences on inhabitants' tolerance of pollution emissions. Per capita GDP 
often captures other influences than income itself, for example, the scale effect, the 
productivity level as well as FDI activities. Moreover, in our dataset, per capita GDP 
is highly correlated with capital intensity (>0.92). For each province in China, the 
income information is reported for urban (per capita annual disposable income) and 
rural households (per capita annual net income) respectively. We use per capita urban 
disposable annual income to represent a province's income level since 1) these two 
income levels are highly correlated (>0.93) and 2) urban disposable income relates to 
people who live in cities and towns where the industrial emissions data are collected 69 
In consideration of the above, we use per capita GDP (GDPPC) and income level (I) 
in two alternative empirical equations (see details in section 5.5.1). 
We also consider other control variables. The first is a measure of productivity. 
Although the ACT model doesn't specifically model technological differences, we 
w We use provincial income information to capture the differences in environmental policies and their 
implementation across provinces. In China, national environmental policies (basic standards) are set by 
the government and overseen by the environmental authorities and implemented by various government 
departments. Local governments and environmental authorities also have administrative power over local 
environmental policies and their implementation. As a result variations exist among provinces in the 
implementation of environmental policies. Local environmental policy can be more stringent than that set 
by the central government. Provinces with higher income level such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
set higher standards than others. 
69 Survey or annual data are better monitored and collected at city and town level. As for rural area, the 
data is not so precise given the weak environment regulatory institutions. 
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believe that an increase in productivity will drive down a (abatement cost share in 
producer's price) and ceteris paribus reduce emission intensities. We use output per 
worker to proxy this productivity (PROD) effect. Population density is another control 
variable. We construct population density as the ratio of population to the area of a 
province (POPDEN). Population growth increases the risk of environmental 
deterioration: demand for cultivation land and housing increases as does energy 
consumption. However, it is also argued by others that population growth spurs 
technological progress which is beneficial to the environment. Since our dataset 
concerns only about industrial emissions, we also expect that an increase in population 
density increase land prices which would deter industrial enterprises from entering. In 
addition, greater population density puts pressure on local authorities to use more 
stringent environmental regulations on industrial enterprises. To sum up, we expect a 
deterrent impact of population density on the emission level. 
5.5 DATA AND ESTIMATION 
This section describes empirical equations, data and definitions of the variables and 
choice of estimators. 
5.5.1 Empirical specifications 
The nature of panel data for Chinese provinces enables us to explore the mechanisms 
of trade liberalization's impact on the environment for a group of economic entities 
with the same general institutional settings. Economic studies on China provinces 
have been growing for the reasons that the variations in many aspects among 
provinces are prominent. Also, as the decentralization process continues, each 
province can be viewed as a small economic entity. Based on the choice of real 
income level discussed previously, we use two similar empirical equations which are 
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analogous to ACT's reduced functional form. We use logarithmic forms of the 
variables (in capital cases in the model specifications below). Logarithmic 
transformation has many advantages in our context. It incorporates possible nonlinear 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In addition, it reduces 
non-normality 70 in residuals. Moreover, it makes results easier to interpret; a 
coefficient representing the elasticity of the dependent variable with regard to the 
explanatory variable. In our case, the logarithmic format also suits the theoretical ACT 
model which is a linear relationship between the percentage changes of the variables 
(see equation 3). In theory, this specification would also produce the same results for 
emissions density (if we divide both emissions and scale variable by land size) and for 
emissions intensity (if we divide both emissions and scale variable by population). 
Model A 
E; t=a+ß l Su+ß: Kl, t+ß3KL; t2 
+ß4I; t. ll+ßs0,, +ß60; t* re1. KL; t+ß7O; t* rel. KL; t2+(380; t* rel. Iit-1 
+ß9O; t* re1. I; t_l 2+ß toO; t* rel. KL; t* rel. I; t_i+y1POPDEN; t+y2PROD; t+µ; +St+E; t 
(5.6) 
Model B 
Ei, =a+ß1S;, +ß2KL;, +ß3KL; t=+ß4GDPPC; t_, +ß50i, +(360; t*reLKL; t+(i7O; t* re1. KL; t 2 
+ßsO,, * reI. GDPPCit_1+ß9O, t* rel. GDPPC; t_12+ß, oOit* rel. KL; t* reLGDPPCit_1 
+µi+St+cit (5.7) 
where: i refers to a province; t refers to a year; a is the constant term, 83, 
-ß0 the 
coefficients of core variables, yi, 72 the coefficients of control variables; p represents 
provincial specific effect, S the time specific effect and 6 i. i. d error term. In Dean 
(2002), state ownership is accounted for in the estimation since stated-owned 
70 Normality of residuals is a requirement for t-statistic to be valid. 
218 
enterprises (SOEs) may be less responsive to environmental regulations if they face 
soft budget constraints (see Dasgupta et al., 1998; Wang and Wheeler, 1999). Due to 
limitation of data, we count on province dummies and time dummies to control for 
state ownership since SOEs are often concentrated in certain industries in certain 
provinces. The dependent variable E is an environmental indicator. S is the scale 
effect measured as industrial output in logarithmic form, KL the composition effect. I 
the urban disposable income and GDPPC per capita GDP" are alternative measures 
for the provincial income level. 0 is trade openness measure. PROD is labour 
productivity while POPDEN denotes population density. Detailed variable definitions 
can be found in the Appendix table A5.2.2. 
Trade-induced composition effect depends on comparative advantage which is a 
relative concept. Hence a province's capital intensity and income level are ideally to 
be expressed relative to the world average (see ACT, 2001; Cole and Elliot, 2003). 
Relative capital intensity (rel. KL) for province i (relative to world average) at year t 
shall be computed as: 
., 
)+In(kl,, /klwt) rel. Kli,, =ln(rel. kl,, )=ln (kl,, /Idw., )=ln (kl;, /klct*klc, /klwt)=1n(klit/klc 
=ln(kl; t) In(klct)+1n(klc, /klw. t)=1n(kl; t)-ln(1/30*Eklit)+ln(klCt/kl,, t) 
=ln(kl, t)- In(1/30*Ekl;, )=ln(kl; t/klýt) (5.8) 
where c refers to China and w refers to the World average, kl is the level form of 
capital intensity and KL is the logarithmic form of capital intensity 
. 
Although data for capital intensity at world average for each year is not in our dataset, 
we can leave it to the time dummies since the third term in equation 5.8 is same for 
71 We use lagged income term since the transmission of income growth into policy is considered to be 
slow. Antweiler et al. (1998) uses one period lagged three year moving average of GDP per capita to 
proxy income. 
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each province at time t. Hence the relative capital intensity is the provincial capital 
intensity (k1,, ) relative to the average across provinces (kl,, ). We do the same to the 
relative income terms. 
re1. I;, 
_=1 n(rel. i;,. )=1n(i;, _1/iw, _1)=1n (i; 1/ict-1 *ict-1/i,,. t-1)=ln(i; t_I/ict-1)+1n (it-I/i,, t-1) 
=In(i,,. 1)-ln(in_1)+1n(iý, 
_i/i,.. t_1)=1n(i;, _i)-ln(1/30*ýi; t_I)+ln(ict_1/iW, _1) 
ýIn(iýt-1)-ln(I/30*ýi; c-1)=In(i; r 1/iýa1) (5.9) 
re1. GDPPC;, 
-, 
=1n(rel. gdppc;,., )=In(gdppc;,., /gdppc.,., ) 
, 
t-i/gdPPcwa1) =In(gdPPcjt-j/gdPPc, t-j*gdPPcc 
=I n (gd P Pcit-t/gd Ppcct-t)+In(gd ppc, t-t/gd P Pcvt-1) 
=ln(gdPPcit-, )-ln(gdPPcct-, )+In(gdPPc, t-1/gdPPc,, 
-, 
) 
=ln(gdppcft-j)-In(1/30*Egdppcct-t)+In(gdppcc,. /gdppcN, t-1) 
=In(gdppc-i)-In(1/30* E gdppctt-, )=In(gdppcit-1/gdppcct-, ) 
(5.10) 
where i and gdppc are level format of urban disposable income and provincial GDP 
per capita. 
In model A we use one year lagged urban disposable income to proxy the effect 
caused by the changes in income level. We also include both population density and 
productivity as control variables. In model B we use one year lagged per capita GDP 
to proxy the technique effect. 
One problem associated with our model specification and variable selection is 
multicollinearity. Although multicollinearity does not violate the basic multiple linear 
regression assumptions and does not reduce the predictive power of a model as whole, 
it affects the validity of an individual predictor. The issue of multicollinearity merits 
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attention in this study since 1) multicollinearity is aggravated by adding interaction 
terms in the equation and 2) we are more interested in the decomposed effects of trade 
liberalization on the environment and 3) we don't have a large panel (multicollinearity 
issue would be attenuated with larger number of observations). A feasible solution is 
to centre the interaction terms. In both model A and B, we interact trade openness with 
relative capital intensity and relative income. Because each variable is in logarithmic 
form, the relative term is equivalent to subtracting an average (average across 
provinces for each year) from the original term. Detailed discussion of the extent of 
multicollinearity and how this arrangement works can be found in the appendix A5.5. 
Table 5.1 The expected signs for the coefficients 
ßl ß2 P3 P4 ßS P6 ß7 ß8 ß9 ß10 Y1 Y2 
sign ++--? +--+? - 
P, relates to the scale effect and is predicted to be positive; P2 and ß3 both relate to the 
composition effect. We expect an increase in capital intensity would result in more 
pollution emissions being generated. A negative signed ß3 is possible when there is 
diminishing effect of capital intensity changes on pollution emissions. 04 is the 
elasticity of emissions with regard to income level. For the direct impact of openness 
(ßs) on the level of emissions, there's no precise prediction because the trade-induced 
composition effect is reflected by the six openness-related terms collectively. The 
indirect impact of trade liberalization on the environment conditions on provincial 
characteristics: openness interacted with capital intensity implies that the 
environmental effect of trade liberalization conditions on factor endowments while 
openness interacted with income level implies that environmental effect of trade 
liberalization conditions on environmental stringency. To account for nonlinearity we 
also include interaction terms of openness and squared terms of capital intensity and 
income level as well as a three-way interaction term. If a province has a higher capital 
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to labour ratio than the rest of the world, the impact of further trade openness is 
supposed to make the province dirtier (more specialized in the dirty good), other 
things equal. Given our log-log specification, 06 is predicted to be positive for a factor 
endowment effect and ß? to be negative to account for diminishing effect. If a province 
has a higher real income level (more stringent environmental regulation) than the rest 
of the world, the impact of further trade openness is supposed to make the province 
cleaner (more specialized in the clean good), other things equal. Given our log-log 
specification, ß8 is predicted to be negative for a pollution haven effect and 09 to be 
positive to account for diminishing effect. The three way interaction term is difficult to 
predict. y, and Ti are predicted to be negative. 
5.5.2 Data description 
We collected information for each province (mainland China) betweenl985 and 2007 
to form a panel dataset. Important notes about the dataset, data sources can be found in 
Appendix A5.1 and A5.2. 
5.5.2.1 Trends in pollution emissions 
In Appendix A5.3 we include the basic descriptive statistics for the original data and 
the variables. Table A5.3.3 to table A5.3.9 present provincial emissions data every 
five years as well as the change in emissions over the twenty years in terms of total 
volume and per capita. The changes in pollution emissions are volatile across 
provinces and pollutants. For industrial waste water discharge (table A5.3.3), we see 
dramatic increases in emission levels for the rich coastal provinces (except Beijing), 
while other inland provinces have seen reduction (except Guangxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
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and Xizang72). With only a few exceptions, the reverse seems to be true for emissions 
of COD (table A5.3.4), industrial dust (table A5.3.7) and industrial soot (table 
A5.3.8): the coastal provinces have mostly seen reduction while the inland provinces 
have seen increases. For industrial waste air (table A5.3.5), SO2 (table A5.3.6) and 
industrial solid waste (table A5.3.9), the volume of emissions seems to increase for 
most provinces. Only Beijing has seen a reduction in emission levels of industrial 
waste air and SO2 while Heilongjiang has experienced a decrease in industrial solid 
waste emissions. The pollution emissions per capita have similar patterns for most 
provinces as total pollution emissions. However, for areas such as Hainan and Tianjin, 
pollution per capita is much lower due to their expanded population during the past 
decades. 
A visual examination of average trade dependence and average emissions levels is 
provided in figures A5.3.1"A5.3.9 which classifies the provinces into three groups 
according to the ranking. The geographical distribution of trade intensity is shown in 
figure A5.3.1. It shows that coastal provinces have the highest ratio of total trade 
volume to GDP while the border provinces have a medium level of trade dependence. 
Not surprisingly, the landlocked provinces have the lowest level of trade intensity 
(except Shaanxi which is landlocked but belongs to the medium level group). A 
glimpse at the average provincial trade volumes (figure A5.3.2) gives the impression 
that the distribution of trade flow is consistent with the division of three regions 
(eastern, central and western, see A5.1 for the classifications). The eastern provinces 
(except Hainan) are associated with the group of highest average trade volumes. The 
central region (except Jiangxi) has medium average trade volumes while most western 
provinces (except Xinjiang and Sichuan) have low trade volumes. However, the 
distribution of trade volumes seems to provide little information about the distribution 
n Ningxia and Xizang's phenomenal growth rates in industrial waste water seem to be caused by their 
low initial emission levels. 
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of pollution emissions. Both industrial waste water discharge and industrial COD 
emissions seem to concentrate along the coastal regions as well as in inland provinces 
in proximity to main waterways such as Yangtze River and Pearl River. Gaseous 
emissions and solid emissions seem to concentrate on Northern China and Sichuan 
Basin. 
5.5.2.2 Trends in the main economic indicators 
Table A5.3.10 to table A5.3.12 describe the trends in output, capital, employment, 
income and trade using the arithmetic average annual growth rate between 1985 and 
2007. Most provinces have experienced high gross output growth rate over the years 
(table A3.10). The eastern provinces have witnessed higher GDP growth rate than the 
central and western provinces. We also examine the growth rates for the components 
of GDP. As a result of industrialization, secondary and tertiary sectors have developed 
much faster than the primary sector in each province. 
In table A5.3.11, we report the growth rates for capital and employment. Average 
annual growth rate for capital stock and capital inflow is also large for each province. 
Average growth rate of total employment has also increased for most provinces except 
for Tianjin which is an old industrial city. In the case of average annual income 
growth rate, we find similar patterns of provincial GDP growth rate. In addition, 
growth rate for rural income seems to be lower than urban income in all the provinces. 
Population growth has been dramatically large in three municipalities (Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai) as well as in Xinjiang and Guangdong provinces. 
In terms of trade volumes, all provinces have witnessed dramatic increase in exports 
and imports (table A5.3.12). The eastern provinces have experienced higher increase 
in trade volumes in terms of exports, imports and the total volume. 
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5.5.2.3 Correlation tables 
A correlation table provides an initial investigation into the relationships between the 
variables. The correlation tables for model A and B are reported respectively in 
Appendix table A5.4.1 and A5.4.2. All the pollution emissions are positively 
correlated with each other. Economic scale is positively related to all the 
environmental variables. Capital intensity is negatively (and counter-intuitively) 
correlated to the environmental variables. It is also highly correlated with income and 
openness as well as the interaction terms with openness. Income is negatively 
associated with most environmental variables except for industrial air and industrial 
solid waste. The association between trade intensity and environmental variables 
depends on the type of pollutants. The interaction terms are still correlated to each 
other as well as other explanatory variables. We see from the correlation table that 
population density seems to be positively correlated with dependent variables while 
the reverse seems to be true with our productivity measure. 
5.5.3 Estimator selection 
In the following, we discuss the selection of estimator for our model. The discussion is 
based on Wooldridge (2003: chapters 13&14; 2002: chapter 10) unless otherwise 
specified. 
5.5.3.1 Fixed versus random effects estimators 
Both models include a provincial specific effect. Whether this provincial specific 
effect is fixed or randomly drawn determines the choice of estimator. In our case, we 
prefer a fixed effect (FE) estimator to a random effect (RE) estimator since the random 
effects (generalised least squares models) relies on the crucial assumption that the 
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provincial specific effects are uncorrelated win the explanatory variables. To 
statistically test whether a random effects estimator is more efficient than a fixed 
effects estimator, a Hausman test is often conducted under the null hypothesis that the 
difference in coefficients obtained from regression using the two estimators are not 
systematic. When the value from the chi-square distribution is too large we have to 
reject the null hypothesis of Hausman test that difference in coefficients are not 
systematic. In the cases when Hausman test value is either negative or the differenced 
variance matrix is not positive definite or the rank is lower than the number of the 
coefficients, we have to treat the test results carefully. It shows that if we include year 
dummies in the regression, Hausman test results are either negative or the differenced 
variance matrix is not positive definite. Also if we use VCE robust option, Hausman 
test will not be performed in STATA 10.1. 
Another test to compare FE and RE results is the Sargan-Hansen Test (see table 5.2) 
for over-identification issue. RE estimators impose an additional orthogonal condition 
to the model that the unit specific effects are not correlated to other explanatory 
variables. In all the cases, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no over 
identification problem. Hence we prefer an FE estimator to a RE estimator. 
Table 5.2 Sagan-Hansen Test 
Dep Var Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot Solid 
Water Air waste 
Model A Chi2 56.075 55.170 192.576 111.523 129.264 100.345 163.920 
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 
Model B Chi2 70.505 139.410 226.601 264.071 261.736 243.645 108.392 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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5.5.3.2 Ileteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
Next we check for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Heteroscedasticity is 
common in panel data and has many causes. For a particular year, heteroscedasticity 
may rise because of the scale differences (across panel). For example, a province that 
emits a large amount of pollution is likely to have a larger variance of the residuals. 
Moreover, our provincial data is an aggregation of micro data at the city or lower 
level. In addition, the variation over time is also a possible cause of heteroscedasticity. 
We use the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (see table 5.3) for heteroscedasticity. 
In all cases, we reject the null hypothesis of residuals homogeneity. 
Table 53 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 
Dep Waste COD Waste SO2 DUST SOOT Solid 
Var Water Air Waste 
Model A Chi2 32.38 103.62 39.03 119.48 48.77 67.49 440.77 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model B Chi2 26.86 104.73 23.30 94.01 87.48 63.98 444.12 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Autocorrelation is also very common in panel data since the errors for observations 
between adjacent periods will be more highly correlated. Here we only consider first- 
order autocorrelation (AR (1) process) and how to alleviate it. For higher orders of 
autocorrelation a structure of time series models has to be applied (AR, MA, or 
ARIMA). The test used is Wooldridge test (Drukker, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). The 
table below show that we reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation for 
both models with all the seven dependent variables at least at 95% confidence level. 
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Table 5.4 Wooldridge test 
Model Test Waste COD Waste SO2 DUST SOOT Solid 
value Water Air Waste 
Model A F-test 54.143 7.910 164.819 4.304 6.856 41.497 79.361 
p-value 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0470 0.0139 0.0000 0.0000 
Model B F-test 52.189 6.222 167.158 4.763 7.123 28.657 90.038 
p-value 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0373 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 
5.5.3.3 Ileteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimators 
The above discussion shows that both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation exist with 
our panel data and empirical specifications. We have two options to deal with non 
i. i. d. errors. The first one still uses the OLS point estimates with a different estimator 
for variance-covariance matrix of the point estimator (VCE). One of the common 
estimators for VCE is the Newey-West estimator which is proposed by Newey and 
West (1987). It gives the same point estimate results for the coefficients as the FE 
estimator; the main difference lies in the fact that the VCE is corrected to account for 
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The Newey-West estimator requires that 
the maximum order (L) of any significant autocorrelation in the errors specified. It is 
suggested that L=' can be used. For our 639 observations, one possible value for 
L is S. The number of lags has little impact on the significance levels for highly 
significant coefficients in our specifications. In the following we only report the 
results with one lag. 
Another option to deal with non i. i. d errors is to use a different point estimator with a 
specified structure of the errors. A Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
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estimator performs a different estimation process for the point estimates while 
controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Which approach to follow? Baum (2006: 142) summarizes, "although both the robust 
estimator of the VCE approach and FGLS estimators account for non-i. i. d 
disturbances, FGLS estimators place more structure on the estimation method to 
obtain more efficient point estimates and consistent estimators of the VCE. In contrast, 
the robust estimator of the VCE approach uses just the OLS point estimates and makes 
the estimator of the VCE robust to the non-i. i. d disturbances. " However, it is 
suggested that FGLS should be used in a case when N (provinces) is several times 
larger than T (periods). We use the Newey-West estimator including time and 
province dummies for the main results. FGLS results are also reported for the sake of 
robustness check. 
5.6 RESULTS 
In the following we present the main regression results for both empirical models 
using the Newey-West estimator which controls for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. A robustness check is also provided by using a different interaction 
method as well as using a different estimator (FGLS). Lastly our results are compared 
with similar studies in the empirical literature. 
5.6.1 Main results 
5.6.1.1 Newey-West results with model A 
Table 5.6 presents the estimation results for model A using the Newey-West estimator. 
After controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the p-values for each 
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coefficient are enlarged since the HAC robust standard errors are greater than the 
usual standard errors. It means that we have consistent coefficients with those 
estimates from the FE estimator or the LSDV estimator, but the significance level will 
be downsized. In general the results turn out to be consistent with our predictions. 
The coefficient for the scale effect is positive and highly significant (1% significance 
level) across all the seven environmental indicators. It is hence evident that about 0.5- 
1.0 percent more industrial pollution emissions will be generated if we simply scale up 
the economic activities by 1.0 percent. 
The sign and significance level for the coefficient of capital intensity (KL) is also in 
consistency with our prediction. It is significantly positive across all the environmental 
indicators. In addition, the negativity of the squared term on capital intensity indicates 
a turning point for the specific environmental indicators, COD, SO2, industrial dust 
and industrial soot with regard to increasing capital intensity. However the inference 
cannot be extended to the general environmental indicators since we find an 
insignificant and sometimes positive coefficient for the squared term of the capital 
intensity in these cases. We calculate the turning point of capital intensity (holding 
other variables constant) for the specific environmental indicators and find out that in 
each case the turning point is much higher than the maximum value of capital intensity 
in the dataset. It implies that an increase in capital intensity in any province would 
increase the emission levels during the period we are examining. The technology- 
reinforcing effect is suppressed by the pro-pollution intensive effect in the current 
capital intensities. 
Our predictions for the income effect are also not rejected by the results. One period 
lagged urban disposable income seems to have a negative effect on the emissions of 
all the environmental indicators, though the significance level varies. 
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The effect of openness is captured by the six terms related with openness in the model. 
The direct impact of openness is captured by 05. A positive 05 in our specification 
reflects the comparative advantage in pollution intensive industries for a mean 
(hypothetic) province73. Conversely, a negative ß5 implies a comparative disadvantage 
in pollution intensive industries for a mean province. The results show that the 
coefficient turns out to be positive for all the environmental indicators, among which 
industrial waste water, COD, industrial dust as well as industrial solid waste appear to 
be strongly and positively related to openness per se. 
The interaction terms related to openness are slightly more complicated than we 
expected to see, though there is supportive evidence for the predictions. The first 
interaction term is the product of openness and relative capital intensity. It shows that 
an increase in trade openness will result in rising pollution emissions for a province 
with relatively higher capital intensity, although this effect is not significantly positive 
for industrial waste water, industrial waste air and SO2. The second interaction term is 
the product of openness and squared relative capital intensity. We only find the 
coefficient to be significantly negative for the emissions of industrial dust and 
industrial solid waste. For the interaction between openness and relative income, we 
find supportive evidence that a province with higher relative income will have 
comparative advantage in cleaner industries for a given level of trade openness. This 
effect is only significant in the case of COD, industrial dust, industrial soot and 
industrial solid waste. Similar to the interaction between openness and squared capital 
intensity, the interaction term between openness and squared relative income also has 
mixed signs and varying significance levels. For industrial dust and industrial solid 
waste, this effect is significantly negative. For the three way interaction term, we find 
73 A hypothetic province is a province that has the mean relative capital intensity and the mean relative 
income (mean relative per capita GDP if we use model B) in level form. It implies that the centred 
interactions terms would be equal to zero for a hypothetically "sample mean" province). 
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mixed and varying significance level across the environmental indicators. The 
coefficient is significantly negative for industrial waste water and industrial dust. 
The terms with openness are not jointly equal to zero for most of the environmental 
indicators expect for industrial waste air and SO2. Evaluated at the sample mean of 
level variables, the trade-induced composition effect is positive though in a much 
smaller magnitude than the scale effect and the income effect. For a hypothetic sample 
mean province, we find that trade openness alone will result in specialization in dirtier 
industries. 
The coefficient for population density has mixed signs and is not significant in any 
specification, which may result from the fact that different effects of population 
density on pollution emissions cancel out each other. We also find that productivity 
measure has a significantly negative effect for all the environmental indicators. 
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Table 5.6 Newey-West estimation results for model A 
Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot Solid 
water air waste 
S ß, 1.015*** 0.930*** 0.807*** 0.714*** 0.615*** 0.732*** 0.497*** 
(9.775) (5.327) (10.006) (6.188) (4.409) (4.935) (4.511) 
KL 1t 0.649*** 1.182*** 0.528*** 0.676*** 1.534*** 1.050*** 1.015*** 
(3.670) (3.174) (3.012) (3.294) (5.566) (4.331) (5.672) 
KL2 03 0.011 
-0.125** 0.008 -0.09*** . 0.19*** -0.11*** -0.000 
(0.376) (-2.523) (0.338) (-2.59) (-4.69) (-3.05) (4007) 
I ß4 
-0.795** -2.996*** -0.258 -0.715** -0.718* -1.30*** -0.83*** 
(. 2.345) (-6.195) (-1.167) (-2.121) (-1.653) (-3.48) (-2.88) 
O Y3 0.132*** 0.248*** 0.020 0.043 
0.136* 0.052 0.169*** 
(3.084) (2.655) (0.394) (0.840) (1.886) (0.856) (3.312) 
O*rel. KL P6 0.121 0.302* 0.051 0.095 0.367*** 0.259** 0.189** 
(1.465) (1.702) (0.650) (1.147) (2.867) (2.273) (2.418) 
O*rel. KL2 ( 
-0.003 0.095 -0.018 0.013 -0.15*** -0.095 -0.16*** 
(-0.074) (1.072) (-0.543) (0.341) (-3.106) (-1.591) (-4.972) 
O*rel. I ßr 
-0.192 -0.837*** -0.063 -0.200 -0.65*** -0.52*** -0.46*** 
(-1.327) (-3.873) (-0.587) 0.550) (-2.98) (-3.175) (-3.112) 
O*rel. IZ (39 
-0.55*** -0.120 0.279 0.245 -0.772** 0.583* -0.217 
(-2.639) (-0.306) (1.522) (1.236) (-2.007) (1.741) (-1.126) 
O*rel. KL*rel. 1 ß10 
-0.666** 0.038 -0.161 -0.115 -0.988** -0.106 0.366 
(-2.004) (0.065) (-0.584) (-0.398) (-2.085) (-0.258) (1.233) 
POPDEN 
-0.294 0.162 -0.093 0.305 -0.614 -0.144 0.084 
(-0.721) (0.343) (-0.292) (0.850) (-1.492) (-0.306) (0.296) 
PROD 72 -0.76*** -1.04*** -0.71*** -0.76*** -1.16*** -0.99*** -0.74*** 
(-3.189) (-2.740) (-3.662) (-3.537) (-3.627) (-3.749) (-3.506) 
F 309.792 33549.559 282.911 256.369 121.893 144.572 298.329 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
KL turning point n/a 4.73 n/a- 4.89 3.99 5.0 n/a 
*** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means significant at 5%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
Newey-West estimator. 
Based on the estimates from model A with the Newey-West estimator, we calculate 
trade-induced elasticities for each province (with their relative capital intensity and 
relative income averaged over time). We plot the elasticity estimates in figures 5.1- 
5.7. The trade elasticities are positive though small in magnitude, which means that an 
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increase in trade openness shifts the pollution demand curve to the right (i. e. dirty 
production increases). Whilst it is not plausible that all countries in the world have 
negative (positive) trade intensity elasticities, it is possible for Chinese provinces. For 
Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai and Zhejiang, the relative income is much higher than 
inland provinces such as Henan, Inner Mongolia. A negative relationship between 
trade intensity elasticity and relative income (see figure 5.1) seems to exist across the 
environmental indicators: for provinces with lower relative income the trade elasticity 
is higher. To conserve space, the plots of trade-induced elasticities against relative 
capital intensity are not reported here. Based on correlation coefficients, a positive 
relationship between trade-induced elasticity and relative capital intensity seems to 
exist for all the environmental indicators except solid waste. 
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Figure 5.1 Trade-induced Elasticity (industrial waste water) 
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Figure 5.2 Trade-induced Elasticity (COD) 
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Figure 5.3 Trade-induced Elasticity (industrial waste air) 
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Figure 5.4 Trade-induced Elasticity (SO2) 
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Figure 5.5 Trade-induced Elasticity (industrial dust) 
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Figure 5.6 Trade-induced Elasticity (industrial soot) 
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Figure 5.7 Trade-induced Elasticity (solid waste) 
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5.6.1.2 Newey-West results with model B 
Next we discuss the results presented in table 5.7 from Newey-West estimation with 
one lag for model B. The scale effect, composition effect, income effect are highly 
consistent with the results in last section. 
The scale effect is positive and highly significant across all the seven environmental 
indicators. We also find that the magnitude of the scale effect estimated from model B 
is similar to that of model A. Holding everything else constant, a 1.0 percent increase 
in industrial output would increase pollution emissions by 0.3-1.0 percent. The sign 
and significance level for the composition and its squared terms are also similar to the 
results from model A. The composition term turns out to be positive and significant 
for all the environmental indicators except for industrial waste water. The results also 
show that after a turning point, capital accumulation will actually lead to less pollution 
emissions for the specific environmental indicators. Yet the capital intensities in our 
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dataset all lie to the left of the turning point. And we infer again an increase in capital 
intensity will promote more pollution intensive activities given current provincial 
capital stock. Provincial per capita GDP has significantly negative effect on the 
emissions levels (except for industrial waste water which has an insignificantly 
negative sign). 
The direct impact of openness, however, seems to be less consistent across the 
environmental indicators than model A. With mixed signs, openness per se only has 
significantly positive sign on industrial solid waste. This difference between the 
results from model A and model B may come from the fact that a hypothetic province 
with sample mean income level (2850.45 RMB 1990 constant price) is not equal to a 
hypothetic province with sample mean per capita GDP (3962.19 RMB 1990 constant 
price). The interaction terms related to openness are again complicated though we 
succeed to find supportive evidence for the factor endowment effect (P6>0) and the 
pollution haven effect (pg<O). The product of openness and relative capital intensity 
shows that an increase in trade openness will result in rising pollution emissions for a 
province with higher relative capital intensity although this effect is not significant for 
the general indicators (industrial waste water, industrial waste air and solid waste). 
From the interaction term of trade openness and the squared term of relative capital 
intensity, we only find a possible inverted U-turn for industrial solid waste. The table 
also shows that an increase in trade openness will generally cause increased pollution 
emission for a province with a lower relative per capita GDP although the effect is not 
significant for industrial waste air and solid waste. The sign for the interaction 
between openness and the quadratic term of relative per capita GDP is mixed and 
insignificant. For the three way interaction term, we only find a significantly negative 
coeflicient for industrial waste water while it is mixed in sign and insignificant for 
other environmental indicators. The interaction terms related to trade openness for all 
the dependent variables are not jointly equal to zero and hence we conclude that the 
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trade-induced composition effect exists though on a small scale. The predicted trade- 
induced composition effect has mixed signs for a hypothetic sample mean province. 
Table 5.7 Newey-West estimation with model B 
Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot 
water air 
Solid 
waste 
S 0.701*** 1.005*** 0.733*** 0.682*** 0.342* 0.578*** 0.496*** 
(6.623) (4.864) (8.008) (5.791) (1.882) (4.087) (4.061) 
KL ß2 0.310 1.541*** 0.438** 0.701*** 2.105*** 1.240*** 0.819*** 
(1.232) (3.638) (2.236) (2.773) (5.652) (4.157) (3.338) 
KL2 ß3 0.037 
-0.098** 0.004 . 0.067*** -0.160*** -0.097*** 0.001 
(1.388) (-2.091) (0.186) (-2.730) (-4.232) (-2.841) (0.032) 
GDPPC ß, 
-0.273 -2.704*** -0.460** -0.878*** -1.819*** -1.289*** -0.887**' 
(-0.919) (-6.289) (-2.419) (-3.240) (-3.947) (-3.610) (-3.610) 
O ßs 0.013 0.078 
-0.014 0.001 0.094 -0.013 0.130** 
(0.292) (0.903) (-0.287) (0.017) (1.353) (-0.201) (2.405) 
O*rel. KL P6 0.058 0.646*** 0.058 0.210* 0.684*** 0.476*** 0.167 
(0.536) (3.330) (0.650) (1.921) (4.190) (3.496) (1.549) 
O're1. KL2 ß, 0.242*** 0.456*** 0.071 0.049 
-0.133 -0.011 -0.105* 
(4.774) (3.366) (1.378) (0.902) (-1.512) (-0.128) (-1.862) 
O*reI. GDPPC ßs 
-0.242* -0.925*** -0.098 -0.281** -0.940*** -0.621*** -0.159 
- 
(. 1.950) (-4.841) (-1.181) (-2.425) (-5.842) (-4.424) (-1.413) 
O*reI. GDPPCl ß9 0.051 
-0.256 0.039 -0.196 -0.334 -0.268 -0.059 
(0.350) (-0.998) (0.287) (-1.380) (-1.402) (-1.099) (-0.411) 
O*re1. KL*re1. GDPPC ßio 
-0.512*** -0.413 -0.208 0.060 0.166 0.027 -0.082 
(-3.309) (-1.296) (-1.511) (0.401) (0.720) (0.104) (-0.550) 
CONS 10.457*** 28.698*** 7.677*** 16.246*** 26.928*** 20.295*** 12.431** 
(4.811) (9.653) (5.343) (8.181) (8.571) (7.982) (5.820) 
F 320.501 96.701 322.454 265.652 125.239 150.409 318.737 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
KL turning point n/a 7.87 n/a 5.25 6.56 6.37 n/a 
*** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
Newey-West estimator. 
Overall, it seems that the two models are consistent in predicting the scale effect, the 
composition effect, and the income effect. Five out of the seven environmental 
indicators, we find that the magnitude of income effect seems to be larger than that of 
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the scale effect which is consistent with the findings in ACT (2003). However, it is 
difficult to compare the trade-induced composition effect since we have different 
"sample mean" values for income level and per capita GDP. 
We also carry out regressions by including one variable or several interaction terms at 
a time for both models. Table A5.6.1 through to table A5.6.7 in the appendix A5.6 
presents the regression results for each dependent variable in model A with the 
Newey-West estimator. We also do the same to model B though the tables are not 
attached. The coefficients for each independent variable are relatively stable across 
different regressions although some small differences in sign and significance level 
are evident. 
5.6.2 Robustness check 
In this section we discuss the sensitivity of our results to the variables and estimator in 
use. The examination of the results obtained by replacing the centred interaction terms 
with the original interaction terms is followed by a discussion based on results 
obtained from an FGLS estimator and a Random Effect estimator (GLS). 
5.6.2.1 Interaction terms not centred 
The following table 5.8 shows the Newey-West results with original interaction terms 
using the specification of model A. For the scale effect, the composition effect and the 
income effect, we find the coefficients are relatively consistent with those in the main 
results section. Some estimated turning points for capital intensity now locate within 
the range of current capital intensities. Consequently, an increase in capital intensity in 
a province with enough capital accumulation would result in less pollution emissions 
(for COD, SO2 and industrial dust). 
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The direct impact of openness is obtained when both capital intensity and income (in 
logarithmic form) are equal to zero (which implies both capital intensity and income 
in level terms equal to 1). Hcncc Ps no longer reflects the trade-induced composition 
effect for a hypothetic sample mean province. The interaction term between openness 
and capital intensity also seems to have a weak positive relationship with COD 
emissions, while the other pollutants have insignificant and sometimes negative signs 
(industrial soot). It also shows that an increase in openness would increase emissions 
in COD and S02 in a lower income province. The interaction between openness and 
the squared terms and the three way interaction term all have mixed signs and 
significance level across dependent variables. We estimate the trade-induced 
composition effects at sample mean. The trade-induced composition effect is 
significantly positive for many environmental indicators, except COD and industrial 
waste air. Compared to the main results, the magnitude of trade-induced composition 
effect is now much larger for industrial waste water, industrial waste air, S02. 
industrial dust and soot. Population density seems to be emissions-reducing for most 
pollutants. However, it shows that an increase in population density would also 
increase COD emissions. Productivity measure also holds as a pollution-reducing 
factor, except for COD emissions. 
Table 5.8 Results for model A with not centred interaction terms 
Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot Solid 
water air waste 
S 0.895*** 0.865*** 0.878*** 0.570*** 0.506*** 0.733*** 0.713*** 
(8.743) (4.645) (9.158) (4.584) (2.986) (4.584) (6,294) 
KL 1.045*** 0.897** 0.552*** 0.555*** 1.387*** 1.032*** 0.843*** 
(6.169) (2.555) (3.384) (2.724) (4.921) (4.062) (4.496) 
KV P3 
-0.118*** -0.205 ***0.017 -0.152*** -0.353*** -0.153*** 0.083** 
(-3.303) (-3.225) (0.478) (-3.880) (-6.661) (-3.206) (2-076) 
1 P4 
-1.100*** -2.273 *** -0.271 -0.225 -0.580* -0.860*** -0.754*** 
(4.366) (-5.545) (-1.358) (-0.928) (4841) (-2.636) (-3.735) 
0 Ps 4.954 32.146*** 
-4.001 7.876** -1.297 -1.266 -2.418 
(1.526) (3.876) (-1.085) (2.054) (4230) (4225) (-0.564) 
O*KL 0.642 2.949** 0.283 0.235 0.219 
-0.362 0.181 
(1.170) (2.333) (0.475) (0.407) (0.282) (4448) (0.262) 
O*KO P7 
-0.034 0.004 0.017 -0.039 -0.129*** -0.053 0.030 
(-1.095) (0.072) (0.534) (-1.263) (-3.059) (4304) (0.871) 
0*1 PS 
-0.972 -7.650*** 1.192 -2.020** 1.037 0.805 1.112 
(-1.177) (-3.630) (1.267) (-2.062) (0.725) (0.553) (1.027) 
0-11 0.045 0.457*** 
-0.087 0.130** -0.109 -0.082 -0.101 
(0.851) (3.393) (-1.436) (2.061) (4-189) (-0.868) (-1.472) 
O*KL*l Pie 
-0.047 -0.349** -0.025 -0.024 0.027 0.086 0.001 
(-0.666) (-2.184) (-0.330) (-0.331) (0.277) (0.829) (0-006) 
POPDEN TI 
-0.378 1.021 * -0.100 0.358 -0.167 -0.278 -0.077 
(-0.913) (1.742) (-0.304) (0.850) (-0.353) (4506) (-0.266) 
PROD 
-f, 
-0.803*** -0.101 -0.751*** -0-515** -0.843** -0.843*** -0.841*** 
(-3.240) (4259) (-3.873) (-2.213) (-2.225) (-2.897) (-3,767) 
-. 
Yon3 13.4370** 29.673 ***4.206** 12.622*** 14.739*** 14.192*** 9.436*** 
(5.047) (7.265) (2.092) (5.415) (4.206) (4.620) (4.330) 
F 316.273 97.903 277.556 252.671 146.146 153.056 346.655 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
Turning point KL 4.43 2.19 n/a 1.83 1.96 3.37 n/a 
Trade-induced 2.23*** 11.54 
-0.88** 2.48*** 1.05*** 0.52*** 0.26*** 
Composition effect 
* 0* means significant at 10/9; "means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
Newcy-Wcst estimator. Trade-induced composition effect is evaluated with capital intensity and income 
level at sample mean (level format) and the significance level is obtained by evaluating the overall 
significance of trade related variables. 
Table 5.9 shows the Newey-west results with original interaction terms using the 
specification of model B. The scale effect, the composition effect and the income 
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effect are relatively consistent with our main results. As in table 5.6.3, the composition 
effect seems to have a turning point for the specific environmental indicators. 
We find a large and significantly positive coefficient for the direct impact of openness. 
Since the direct impact of openness does not represent the trade-induced composition 
effect for a hypothetic sample mean province, we need to calculate the average trade- 
induced composition effect based on the estimates of all the six terms related to trade 
openness. The interaction term between openness and capital intensity suggests that 
increased openness will result in more pollution emissions in a province with higher 
capital intensity. An inverted-U shape seems to exist only in the case of industrial 
dust. It also shows that an increase in openness would result in more pollution 
emissions if the province has lower per capita GDP. The three way interaction term 
seems to be mixed in sign and significance level. To make the trade-induced 
composition effect compatible among different model specifications, we estimate the 
trade-induced elasticity by using arithmetic mean of capital intensity and income in 
their level forms. The trade-induced composition effect is highly significant and 
positive. 
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Table 5.9 Results for model B with not centred interaction terms 
Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot Solid 
water air waste 
ßi 0.752*** 1.061*** 0.683*** 0.590*** 0.221 0.477*** 0.489*** 
(7.606) (4.794) (7.165) (4.880) (1.287) (3.390) (4.309) 
ß2 0.811*** 0.870** 0.455** 0.804*** 2.362*** 1.401*** 0.481 
(3.247) (2.168) (2.245) (2.772) (5.127) (3.850) (1.523) 
P3 
-0.130*** -0.217*** -0.065* -0.219*** -0.443*** -0.265*** 0.029 
(-2.964) (-3.210) (-1.819) (-5.381) (-8.405) (-5.570) (0.599) 
ß* 
-0.715** -1.664*** -0.271 -0.739*** -1.861*** -1.105*** -0.513* 
(-2.452) (-4.613) (-1.316) (-2.717) (-3.459) (-2.660) (-1.709) 
ßs 18.589*** 47.594*** 17.444*** 9.720** 6.065 19.493*** 13.465*** 
(4.718) (4.037) (4.538) (2.275) (0.985) (3.467) (3.277) 
P6 3.753*** 6.902*** 2.574*** 0.767 0.183 1.765 1.413 
(4.869) (3.277) (3.213) (0.898) (0.142) (1.473) (1.632) 
ß7 0.126** 0.156 0.079 
-0.066 -0.182** -0.041 0.049 
(2.516) (1.466) (1.586) (-1.325) (-2.323) (-0.571) (0.864) 
ßa 
-4.411*** -11.74*** -4.439*** -2.360** -0.561 -4.500*** -3.296*** 
(-4.372) (-3.957) (-4.570) (-2.171) (-0.361) (-3.127) (-3.121) 
ß9 0.261*** 0.726*** 0.282*** 0.143** 
-0.023 0.257*** 0.203*** 
(4.015) (3.878) (4.573) (2.055) (-0.230) (2.770) (2.950) 
ßio 
-0.437*** -0.853*** -0.323*** -0.075 0.086 -0.167 -0.178 
(-4.359) (-3.207) (-3.183) (-0.686) (0.543) (-1.100) (-1,604) 
13.568*** 20.545 6.734*** 15.695*** 28.091*** 19.894*** 10.177*** 
(6.494) (. ) (4.300) (7.112) (7.101) (6.439) (3.883) 
0.752*** 1.061*** 0.683*** 0.590*** 0.221 0.477*** 0.489*** 
(7.606) (4.794) (7.165) (4.880) (1.287) (3.390) (4.309) 
S 
KL 
KL= 
GDPPC 
O 
O*KL 
O*KL2 
O*GDPPC 
O*GDPPC2 
O*KL*GDPPC 
cons 
F 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
Turning point KL 3.12 2.00 3.49 1.84 2.66 2.64 n/a 
Trade-induced 6.58*** 15.72*** 5.38*** 3.18*** 3.85*** 6.88*** 4.42*** 
Composition 
effect 
""" means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
Newey-West estimator. Trade-induced composition effect is evaluated with capital intensity and income 
level at sample mean (level format) and the significance level is obtained by evaluating the overall 
significance of trade related variables. 
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5.6.2.2 Results obtained from the FGLS estimator and GLS estimator 
We also present regression results obtained from the FGLS estimator controlling for 
AR (1) and heteroscedastic disturbances. The results are presented in table 5.10 and 
table 5.11. The scale effect and the composition effect are relatively consistent with 
our previous results. However, we find the income effect (measured in urban 
disposable income or per capita GDP) is not consistently negative across the 
environmental indicators. The significance level of the income effect also varies 
considerably. 
The direct impact of trade openness (equivalent to the trade-induced composition 
effect for a hypothetic sample mean province) is found to be mixed in signs and 
significance level. Similarly to the main results, we find that the trade-induced 
composition effect for a hypothetic sample mean province is much smaller than the 
scale, the composition and the income effect. The interaction terms provide similar 
evidence as before and we find traits of both FEH and PHH effects. 
The random effect estimator (GLS) is less efficient than the FGLS estimator. Reported 
in table A5.6.8 and table A5.6.9 in the appendix, the random effect results are highly 
consistent with the results from the Newey-West estimator. 
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Table 5.10 FGLS estimation results for model A 
S 
KL 
KL2 
ßi 
P2 
P3 
(-0.494) (-3.727) (0.917) (-2.804) (-4.811) (-1.375) (0.365) 
ß4 
-0.146 -1.251*** 0.047 0.100 -0.258 0.078 
-0.53*** 
(-0.908) (-4.124) (0.331) (0.611) (-0.862) (0.317) (-3.112) 
ßs 0.069** 
-0.005 -0.013 0.002 -0.014 -0.056 0.023 
0.454*** 0.678*** 0.449*** 0.347*** 0.345*** 0.520*** 0.323*** 
(6.975) (5.169) (7.228) (4.943) (2.835) (5.187) (5.276) 
0.419*** 0.409* 0.339*** 0.526*** 1.032*** 0.417** 0.526*** 
(3.974) (1.690) (2.821) (4.418) (4.718) (2.345) (4.147) 
-0.009 -0.126*** 0.015 -0.051*** -0,163*** 
-0.038 0.006 
I 
0 
O*reLKL 
O*rel. KL2 
O*rel. I 
O*reLI2 
O*rel. KL*rel. l 
POPDEN 
PROD 
cons 
chit 
N 
Turning point 
N. 
ß-y 
pa 
P9 
Pie 
TI 
T: 
Waste COD Waste SO2 Dust Soot Solid 
water air waste 
(2.527) (-0.077) (-0.518) (0.051) (-0.239) (-1.308) (0.764) 
-0.002 -0.016 -0.028 0.006 0.105 
-0.084 0.115** 
(-0.036) (-0.175) (-0.585) (0.117) (1.110) (-1.100) (2.279) 
-0.061** -0.016 -0.065** 0.007 -0.152*** -0.18*** -0.061** 
(-2.154) (-0.318) (-2.564) (0.274) (-3.275) (-4.453) (-2.486) 
-0.043 -0.452*** -0.015 -0.007 -0.426*** -0.133 -0.33*** 
(-0.545) (-3.090) (-0.225) (-0.100) (-2.819) (-1.139) (-4.399) 
-0.416*** 0.113 -0.070 -0.090 -0.353 0.212 
-0.270* 
(-2.930) (0.435) (-0.540) (-0.587) (-1.278) (0.958) (-1.897) 
-0.377* 0.316 0.150 -0.291 -0.298 0.296 0.230 
(-1.752) (0.805) (0.737) (-1.313) (-0.696) (0.876) (1.099) 
0.351" 0.213 
-0.298 0.432** -0.585 -0.050 -0.014 
(1.649) (0.591) (-1.604) (2.126) (-1.525) (-0.160) (-0.072) 
-0.324*** -0.421* -0.37*** -0.811*** -0.842*** -0.98*** 
-0.35*** 
(-2.697) (-1.783) (-3.355) (-6.658) (-3.423) (-4.814) (-2.995) 
11.540*** 18.460*** 3.898*** 11.174*** 11.174*** 8.199*** 9.669*** 
(7.402) (6.055) (2.767) (7.118) (3.552) (3.427) (5.934) 
10875 4919 9737 9176 4781 5515 10052 
639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
KL 
-0-4.56 2.75 3.54 
- 
*** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means significant at 10%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
FGLS estimator. 
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Table 5.11 FGLS estimation results for model B 
KL 
KL= 
GDPPC 
0 
O*reI. KL 
O*reI. KL= 
O*re1. CDPPC 
O*re1. CDPPC= 
O*KL*re1. GDPPC 
cons 
chit 
N 
Turning point 
PI 
ß: 
P3 
P4 
ßs 
P6 
P7 
ßa 
P9 
RIO 
Waste COD Waste SO2 
water 
0.323*** 
(5.295) 
0.094 
(0.707) 
0.002 
(0.121) 
0.207 
(1.323) 
0.027 
(0.954) 
-0.035 
(-0.556) 
0.148*** 
(3.281) 
-0.043 
(-0.619) 
0.029 
(0.296) 
-0.35*** 
(-3.141) 
8.743*** 
(7.442) 
7307 
639 
KL n/a 
air 
Dust Soot Solid 
waste 
0.715*** 0.336*** 0.230*** 0.163 0.283*** 0.270*** 
(5.897) (5.618) (3.131) (1.277) (2.746) (4.292) 
0.775*** 0.401*** 0.393** 1.332*** 0.603*** 0.432*** 
(3.196) (3.084) (2.572) (5.072) (2.806) (3.227) 
-0.105*** -0.007 -0.060*** -0.155*** 
-0.053** 0.008 
(-3.585) (-0.407) (-3.047) (-4.780) (-1.973) (0.490) 
-1.312*** -0.138 -0.357** -0.885*** 
-0.589** -0.39*** 
(-4.522) (-1.080) (-2.064) (-2.910) (-2.369) (-2.641) 
-0.069 -0.012 -0.003 -0.006 -0.063 0.041 
(-1.152) (-0.452) (-0.079) (-0.099) (-1.462) (1.421) 
0.259** 0.106* 0.082 0.392*** 0.216** 0.096 
(2.181) (1.812) (1.178) (3.222) (2.128) (1.604) 
0.501*** 0.002 0.056 
-0.088 0.091 
-0.026 
(5.860) (0.060) (1.456) (-1.092) (1.442) (-0.719) 
-0.433*** -0.117** -0.137** -0.586*** -0.414*** -0.091 
(-3.572) (-2.044) (-1.984) (-4.716) (-4.013) (-1.627) 
0.197 
-0.137* -0.127 -0.201 0.177 
-0.015 
(1.025) (-1.752) (-1.232) (-1.080) (1.143) (-0.166) 
-0.886*** 0.013 0.002 0.021 -0.471*** -0.101 
(-3.973) (0.152) (0.020) (0.103) (-2.717) (-1.085) 
18.090*** 7.395*** 14.604*** 20.191*** 16.099*** 9.553*** 
(8.343) (7.556) (11.148) (9.333) (9.018) (8.830) 
4360 9997 10207 4041 5487 10772 
584 639 639 639 639 639 
3.69 n/a 3.28 4.29 5.66 n/a 
"' means significant at 1%; "means significant at 5%; 'means significant at 10%; t statistics are in 
parentheses; All equations are estimated time dummies and province dummies. We specify one lag for the 
FGLS estimator. 
248 
5.6.2.3 Endogeneity considerations 
So far we have tried to tackle the problems associated with our panel data set: 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, we have assumed 
away the issue of endogeneity which may originate from omitted variables, 
measurement error and simultaneity. Since we only focus on a few of explanatory 
variables, a model specification error could happen we miss out an important variable. 
Ramsey's RESET test is often employed to test for omitted variables. Measurement 
error also exists in our specification. The endogeneity issue is associated with trade 
and income in this literature. Helpman(1988: 6) asks "Does growth drive trade, or is 
there a reverse link from trade to growth? " For example, a negative effect of 
environmental regulation on growth together with a positive effect of growth on trade 
would make trade seem to be bad to the environment. Similarly, pollution emissions 
could have impact on income: a positive effect as income could be increased via more 
production and hence more pollution emissions; a negative effect as income might be 
reduced because of haza dous pollution problem in the area. 
As reviewed in the literature section, Frankel and Rose (2005) and Managi et al. 
(2009) address the issue of endogeneity of trade openness and income. Antweiler et at. 
(2001) points out a possibility of a simultaneous determination of pollution and 
(current period) per capita income. 
To tackle endogeneity, instrumental variable approach is a common cure. Instruments 
from outside the model have a problem of reliability. To examine the simultaneity of 
environment input (pollution emissions) and output, a structural model such as that in 
Dean (2002) is a good candidate. 
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Another possibility is to adopt dynamic panel approach which usually employs 
difference or system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) (see Hansen, 1982; 
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). One 
problem associated with GMM estimators is that instruments from the system itself 
may be too many (ovcr-identifying restrictions) (see Roodman, 2007). Like FGLS, 
GMM estimators prefer that units be several times larger than time periods. Also, the 
problem associated with proper identification of endogenous variables and exogenous 
variables as well as number of lags renders the credibility of estimation results. 
However, GMM results do not quantitatively change the sign of scale effect, 
composition effect and income effect although the signs for trade related variables 
vary considerably across specifications. Results based on GNIM estimation are 
available upon request. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Compared with similar studies using ACT type modelling, we find our results f'it in 
the model well even with different environmental indicators and alternative 
estimators. We find a significantly positive scale effect under alternative interaction 
methods and estimators. An inverted-U shape is found for the composition effect, 
although current provincial capital intensities are too low to have a strong technology 
reinforcing effect for some environmental indicators. A negative income effect is 
found under both model specifications using Newey-West estimator and is greater 
than the scale effect for many environmental indicators except for industrial waste 
water and industrial waste air. However, the negative income effect is less significant 
when we use the alternative FGLS estimator. The trade-induced composition effect 
depends on provincial characteristics in factor endowments (measured as capital 
intensity) and income level (measured as one period lagged urban disposable income 
or the per capita GDP). We do find evidence for both effects of trade liberalization on 
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the environment (the pollution haven effect and the factor endowment effect) working 
against each other. We also discussed the trade-induced composition effect for a 
hypothetic sample mean province for each regression. The main regressions give me 
more consistent results for this effect: for an "average" province in our sample, trade 
openness seems to promote advantage in dirty industries. However, this trade-induced 
composition effect is smaller in magnitude, which is consistent with Antweiler et al. 
(2001), Copeland and Taylor (2003). 
Although we succeed in decomposing the impact of trade openness on the 
environment into several mechanisms, it is difficult to combine them together and 
evaluate the overall impact. Even if we assume that an increase in trade openness 
increases the economic scale and income level by the same percentage, and the scale 
effect is outweighed by the technique effect, we still have a positive trade-induced 
composition effect. Whether trade openness harms the environment seems to be 
environmental indicator specific, provincial specific as well as time specific issue. 
Another study on this topic that uses the ACT model for Chinese provinces is He 
(2006). Our paper differs from He (2006) in that we use a longer time period, more 
indicators as well as different specifications and estimators. The longer period of data 
enhances the strength of our model's fitness with the theory. We also check the theory 
against different indicators. As to the model specifications, we would argue that a 
logarithmic form fits the theory better. Contrary to He's findings, our results show a 
positive composition effect which offer evidence to the common hypothesis that 
higher capital intensity is associated with pollution-intensive industries. We also 
separate the composition effect into pro-pollution and technology-reinforcing effect. it 
is evident in most spccif ications that further capital accumulation after a turning point 
will promote technologies in a province and result in less Pollution emissions ceteris 
paribus. Our specifications also enable us to extend our results for total emission 
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volumes to emission intensity (emission per capita) and emission density (emissions 
per surface) if we alter our scale measure in the mean time. 
There are also some I imitations with this chapter. One of them relates to the difficulty 
to evaluate the overall impact of trade liberalization after we decompose it into the 
individual effects. A few studies have tried to use simultaneous equations to tackle this 
problem. Secondly, a deficiency lies in ACT framework itself The model assumes 
that trade has no impact on factor endowments and technology; however, further trade 
may have impact on capital accumulation or knowledge spillovers that hastens 
technological progress. Another limitation is that we treat trade openness as if it is 
exogenous; however, trade openness (measured as trade intensity in the context) is 
affected by many aspects. Frenkel and Rose (2005) address the issue of endogeneity of 
trade openness and income by instrumentation. An ideal robustness check would 
incorporate addressing endogeneity. 
There are also other aspects for further research, for example, how to incorporate 
technological spillovers in the model. The long-run impact of trade liberalization on 
the environment may benefit from technology advances/environment management 
practice transfer. Another related area is to extrapolate provincial specific 
characteristics from the estimation. The standards required by environmental 
regulations vary substantially across provinces for the following reasons: 1) Income 
inequality. Same as in the case of cross country differentials, the desire for a cleaner 
environment is presumably a normal good. This can sometimes be internalized and 
viewed as provincial effect. 2) Environmental absorptive capacity. Some provinces 
may have less population, larger land area as well as stock of natural resources than 
others. 3) Regulatory capability. Differences in the ability to design and enforce 
environmental regulations may explain some of the differences in similar developed 
provinces. 
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Most of the existing models view pollution externality as fully internalized or 
compensated; however, the issue of efficient regulations rises as corruption is rife in 
the areas of environmental monitoring and standards regulating. This topic is often 
investigated in the framework of regulatory efficiency and hence is not included in the 
chapter. 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
A5.1 Explanatory notes 
The administrative separation of Hainan Island from Guangdong to form a 
separate province happened in 1988. Before that, data on Hainan were not 
separately reported. So for 1985 and 1986, there was no comparable data for 
Hainan. 
2. Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Chongqing municipality (which was part of 
Sichuan province until 1997. In this analysis we still consider Chongqing as 
part of Sichuan). 
3. We group the provinces into three groups as follows: 
Eastern-Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang; 
Central-Anhui, Heilongiiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin and 
Shanxi; 
Western-Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Xizang and Yunnan. 
4. In China, economic activities are categorized into the following three strata 
of industry (China Statistical Yearbooks): 
Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery and services in support of these industries; 
Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction; 
Tertiary industry refers to all economic activities not included in the primary 
or secondary industries. 
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A5.2 Data sources and variable definitions 
Table A5.2.1 Data sources 
Data Source 
Industrial waste water 
Industrial COD (chemical oxygen demand) 
Industrial waste 
Industrial SO2 
Industrial soot 
Industrial dust 
Industrial Solid waste 
China Environment Yearbooks, 1990-2000; 
China Statistical Yearbooks, 1986-1989; 
2001-2008; 
COD data for the years 1987-1989 and 1991 
are from the World Bank's DECRG-IE 
division (with data for 1990 missing) 
Total output; industrial output; price levels 
Income for urban and rural households; 
price levels 
Total population 
Capital stock; Capital flow; price level 
Employment 
Total trade; exports; imports; exchange 
rate 
Map data for provinces 
China Statistics Compilation 1949-2004; 
China Statistic Yearbooks 2006-2008; 
Chongqing Statistic Yearbook 2007 
1985-2005 from Zhang Jun et. al. 2006-2007 
are calculated based on their method and data 
from China Statistic Yearbooks 2006-2008; 
Capital flow is derived from Capital Stock for 
each province in each year. 
China Statistics Compilation 1949-2004; 
China Statistic Yearbooks 2006-2008 
China Statistics Compilation 1949-2004; 
China Statistic Yearbooks 2006-2008 
Shapefile from CDC (Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention, US)website 
Note: a few provinces have missing observations for some years (especially in early years when some 
inland provinces have no data for trade or FDI inflows) 
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A5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Figures 
Table A5.3.3 Trends in Industrial Waste Water 
(Left series: in 10 thousand tons; right series: in ton per capita) 
Province 
Anhui 
Beijing 
Fujian 
Gansu 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Guizhou 
Hainan 
lie bei 
lleilongjiang 
Henan 
11 ubei 
Ilunan 
Inner Mongolia 
Jiangsu 
Jiangxi 
Jilin 
Liaoning 
Ningxia 
Qinghai 
Shaanxi 
Shandong 
Shanghai 
Shanxi 
Sichuan 
Tianjin 
Xinjiang 
Xizang 
Yunnan 
Zhejiang 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Change % 
100958 19.6 98620 17.4 87006 14.7 63106 10.4 
38983 39.7 40641 37.4 36997 29.6 23164 17.0 
66430 24.0 76217 25.1 66381 20.5 57617 16.9 
41294 20.2 38375 17.0 38393 15.7 23795 9.3 
133314 23.6 140250 22.5 128259 18.9 114055 15.2 
89906 23.2 105248 24.8 96563 21.3 81571 17.2 
45263 15.2 34224 10.5 28206 8.0 20598 5.5 
7064 11.8 8041 12.1 6985 9.7 7064 9.0 
99378 17.9 99181 16.1 82825 12.9 89600 13.4 
205069 61.1 112398 31.7 69389 18.7 52644 13.8 
128056 16.3 104934 12.1 98364 10.8 109210 11.5 
160820 32.3 162302 29.8 139938 24.2 106733 17.9 
167512 29.8 188633 30.9 145251 22.7 112563 17.2 
21301 10.6 26225 12.1 28239 12.4 21844 9.2 
198173 31.9 233503 34.5 220184 31.2 201923 27.6 
68291 19.5 77123 20.2 66880 16.5 41956 10.1 
62847 27.3 57645 23.6 46891 18.4 37386 14.2 
154525 41.9 163714 41.5 140193 34.3 109044 26.1 
8644 20.8 8612 18.5 7813 15.2 10942 19.7 
8580 21.1 6865 15.4 5029 10.5 4661 9.0 
43938 14.6 40168 12.1 40652 11.6 30903 8.5 
105375 13.7 87631 10.4 95343 11.0 110324 12.3 
149921 123.2 133218 103.8 116116 89.2 72446 54.8 
45655 17.1 58430 20.2 40656 13.2 32406 10.0 
236830 23.2 196499 18.2 191593 17.2 201323 17.5 
27716 34.4 22865 25.9 21897 23.2 17604 17.6 
13060 9.6 15501 10.1 19001 11.4 15365 8.3 
129 0.6 2155 9.1 1006 4.0 
45490 13.3 42422 11.4 48937 12.3 35117 8.3 
106680 26.5 107247 25.3 102807 23.4 136433 29.7 
63487 10.4 
-37,1 -47,0 
12813 8.3 
-67.1 -79.0 
130939 37.0 97.1 54.4 
16798 6.5 
-59.3 -68.0 
231568 25.2 73.7 6.9 
145609 31.2 62.0 34.6 
14850 4.0 
-67.2 -73.9 
7428 9.0 5.2 
-24.1 
124533 18.2 25.3 1.5 
45158 11.8 
-78.0 -80.6 
123476 13.2 
-3.6 -19.3 
92432 16.2 
-42.5 -49.9 
122440 19.4 
-26.9 -35.0 
24967 10.5 17.2 
-1.0 
296318 39.6 49.5 24.3 
53972 12.5 
-21.0 -35.7 
41189 15.2 
-34.5 -44.5 
105072 24.9 
-32.0 -40.6 
21411 35.9 147.7 72.3 
7619 14.0 
-11.2 -33.4 
42819 11.5 
-2.5 -21.4 
139071 15.0 32.0 9.8 
51097 28.7 
-65.9 -76.7 
32099 9.6 
-29.7 -44.0 
207475 18.8 
-12.4 -18.9 
30081 28.8 8.5 
-16.3 
20052 10.0 53.5 4.0 
991 3.6 668.2 504.7 
32928 7.4 
-27.6 -44.4 
192426 39.3 80.4 48.4 
Note: for Xizang, the change in percentage is between 1990 and 2005 since we don't have observation of 
industrial waste water in 1985. 
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Table A5.3.4 Trends in Chemical Oxygen Demand 
(Left: in tons; right: ton per 10 thousand people) 
Province 1985 1991 1995 2000 2005 Change% 
Anhui 273353 53.0 299630 52.2 310101 52.4 167503 27.5 136492 22.3 
-50.1 -57.9 
Beijing 71318 72.7 98285 89.8 73235 58.5 21538 15.8 10979 7.1 
-84.6 -90.2 
Fujian 95850 34.6 186950 60.7 218043 67.4 125676 36.9 99411 28.1 3.7 
-18.8 
Gansu 
- 
60038 26.3 60533 24.8 57828 22.6 58832 22.7 
-2.0 -13.7 
Guangdong 39693 7.0 381480 60.1 349802 51.5 281662 37.6 291599 31.7 634.6 351.9 
Guangxi 177351 45.8 383620 88.7 731028 160.9 281662 59.3 664388 142.6 274.6 211.4 
Guizhou 9721 3-3 28256 8.5 44214 12.6 51508 13.7 22440 6.0 130.8 83.9 
Hainan 
-- 
62430 92.6 35600 49.2 26978 34.2 11766 14.2 
-81.2 15.3 
Ifebei 164697 29.7 334270 53.7 261578 40.6 492415 73.8 389338 56.8 136.4 91.4 
Ileilongjiang 421430 125.5 282940 79.1 216918 58.6 167795 44.1 136798 35.8 
-67.5 -71.5 
Ilenan 228745 29.2 389660 44.5 647305 71.1 443739 46.8 342606 36.5 49.8 25.3 
Hubei 158865 31.9 426480 77.4 268239 46.5 266457 44.7 176733 31.0 11.2 
-3.0 
Hunan 1124752 200.0 371140 60.2 314831 49.3 323588 49.3 293765 46.4 
-73.9 -76.8 
Inner Mongolia 72096 35.8 115240 52.8 96253 42.1 128652 54.2 154760 64.9 114.7 81.4 
Jiangsu 523514 84.3 471130 68.8 503981 71.3 241391 32.9 337778 45.2 
-35.5 -46.4 
Jiangxi 149093 42.5 173360 44.9 146567 36.1 86057 20.7 111438 25.8 
-25.3 -39.1 
Jilin 318447 138.6 266410 108.3 288739 113.2 217201 82.7 161302 59.4 49.3 
-57.1 
Liaoning 406546 110.2 476610 119.5 329342 80.5 327476 78.3 268192 63.5 
-34.0 -42.3 
Ningxia 52014 109.8 75741 147.8 140398 253.3 107549 180.5 106.8 164.4 
Qinghai 4266 9.4 4036 8.4 3872 7.5 33864 62.4 693.8 663.7 
Shaanxi 75934 22.6 119975.4 34.2 162243 44.5 149342 40.1 96.7 177.8 
Shandong 1037215 134.8 637250 74.7 1067586 122.7 511409 57.0 356650 38.6 
-65.6 -71.4 
Shanghai 252835 207.8 247510 192.3 122878 94.4 69318 52.4 36610 20.6 
-85.5 -90.1 
Shansi 108458 40.6 177430 60.3 81259.24 26.4 157922 48.6 168160 50.1 55.0 23.6 
Sichuan 536009 52.6 378930 34.8 450260.6 40.3 684131 59.5 416577 37.8 
-22.3 -28.1 
Tianjin 214404 266.4 159170 175.1 89440 95.0 70300 70.2 59091 56.7 
-72.4 -78.7 
Xinjiang 88039 56.6 262494.1 158.0 100666 54.4 153286 76.3 74.1 134.7 
Xizang 
- 
228 1.0 591.95 2.5 2720 10.8 1072 3.9 370.0 376.3 
Yunnan 72401 212 195250 51.6 253049.8 63.4 177404 41.8 106941 24.0 47.7 13.5 
Zhejiang 681353 169.1 354320 83.0 260162.5 59.3 358356 78.0 289579 59.1 
-57.5 -65.0 
Note: for I lainan. Ningxia. QinghaL Shaanxi, Xinjiang and Xizang, there are no COD data prior to 1991 and 
hence the last two columns present the change between 1991 and 2005. COD data for 1990 is missing for all 
provinces. 
258 
Table A5.3.5 Trends in Industrial Waste air 
(Left: in 100 million m3; right: 10 thousand m3 per capita) 
Province 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Change% 
Anhui 2(M 0.4 2327 0.4 3559 0.6 3945 0.6 6960 1.1 
Beijing 5921 6.0 2770 2.6 2910 2.3 3227 2.4 3532 2.3 
Fujian 754 0.3 1347 0.4 1940 0.6 2828 0.8 6265 1.8 
Gansu 2519 11 1820 0.8 2425 1.0 2800 1.1 4250 1.6 
Guangdong 1864 0.3 3586 0.6 6476 1.0 8326 1.1 13447 1.5 
Guangxi 906 01 1389 0.3 2349 0.5 4607 1.0 8339 1.8 
Guizhou 1226 0.4 1597 0.5 2342 0.7 3882 1.0 3852 1.0 
11111020 80 0.1 182 0.3 434 0.6 910 1.1 
IIcbcl 3310 0.6 5669 0.9 7370 1.1 9858 1.5 26518 3.9 
IlcilongjiAng 4214 1.3 4946 1.4 4224 1.1 4326 1.1 5261 1.4 
licnan 7343 0.9 3764 0.4 6092 0.7 7436 0.8 15498 1.7 
Hubei 2425 0.5 3416 0.6 3901 0.7 5674 1.0 9404 1.6 
Hunan 2492 0.4 2716 0.4 3466 0.5 3569 0.5 6014 1.0 
Inner Mongolia 1709 0.8 2952 1.4 3171 1.4 4768 2.0 12071 5.1 
Jiangsu 3419 0.6 5046 0.7 7872 1.1 9078 1.2 20197 2.7 
Jiangxi 1703 0.5 1659 0.4 2396 0.6 2220 0.5 4379 1.0 
Jilin 2216 1.0 2895 1.2 3163 1.2 3082 1.2 4939 1.8 
Liaoning 8112 2.2 8135 2.1 9498 2.1 9432 2.3 20903 5.0 
Ningxia 237 0.6 611 1-3 932 1.8 1445 2.6 2844 4.8 
Qinghai 270 0.7 388 0.9 442 0.9 607 1.2 1370 2.5 
Shaanxi 1523 0.5 1775 0.5 2378 0.7 2379 0.7 4916 1.3 
Shandong 4292 0.6 6684 0.8 7386 0.9 12179 1.4 24129 2.6 
Shanghai 3010 2.5 3334 2.8 4625 3.6 5755 4.4 8482 4.8 
Shansi 2705 1.0 4970 1.7 4790 1.6 6635 2.0 15142 4.5 
Sichuan 4598 0.5 4996 0.5 6359 0.6 6687 0.6 11795 1.1 
Tianjin 1711 2.1 1335 1.5 1705 1.8 1749 1.7 4602 4.4 
Xinjiang 744 0.5 1071 0.7 1735 1.0 1944 1.1 4485 2.2 
Xizang 
-60.0 9 0.0 15 0.1 13 0.0 
l'unnan 1140 0.3 1559 0.4 1674 0.4 2749 0.6 5444 1.2 
Zhejiang 1601 0.4 2537 0.6 3108 0.7 6509 1.4 13025 2.7 
232.4 180.0 
-40.3 -62.0 
730.9 550.9 
68.7 32.7 
621.4 343.8 
820.4 665.0 
214.2 150.4 
1037.5 810.5 
701.1 548.8 
24.8 9.7 
111.1 76.6 
287.8 238.2 
141.3 114.5 
606.3 496.8 
490.7 391.0 
156.8 109.1 
122.9 88.6 
157.7 125.2 
1100.0 734.8 
407.4 280.3 
222.8 160.5 
462.2 367.8 
181.8 92.8 
459.8 346.1 
156.5 137.4 
169.0 107.5 
502.8 308.2 
116.7 70.6 
377.5 266.8 
713.6 569.3 
Note: for I lainat. there are no industrial waste air data prior to 1990 and hence the last column presents the 
change bctwrcn 1990 and 2005 for it 
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Table A5.3.6 Trends in Sulphur Dioxide 
(Left: in tons; right: ton per 10 thousand people) 
Pnrisct 
A. b. i 
üetjiat 
i. jtsa 
Canso 
GuKdoK 
Cas. szl 
GaltLoe 
Il. laa 
I Itbci 
I lsilo. =jisq 
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1l. bd 
lle. s* 
laser Alo. toU. 
Jbagse 
, 
ILaxtl 
jilim 
Uso. lo= 
iii. =tü 
Qiatial 
sk. a. tl 
sr.. doag 
slar=kal 
sLa. tl 
skMesa 
Tt. eji. 
7üejisaz 
XWK 
1'. eese 
Zl. qjtso= 
Iri3 1990 1943 2000 2005 Change% 
60.9 35.6 
-67.2 -79.1 
339.0 243.9 
61.6 27.1 
339.3 170.2 
170.8 125.1 
46.4 16.7 
120.0 76.1 
103.3 64.7 
65.8 45.7 
297.6 232.6 
11.8 
-2.5 
12.7 0.2 
241.1 188.2 
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0.9 
-17.8 
28.3 8.6 
4.5 
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-10.8 
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L%ý 2734 220000 243-9 262375 278.6 241815 241.5 241000 231.1 
1300DO 93's 160000 1046 222000 133,6 187689 101.5 348000 173.1 
1994 9.0 756 3.0 1000 3.6 
320ow 936 2mm 61-7 259454 64.8 323853 76.4 429000 96.4 
300000 744 440000 103.8 413229 94.2 561847 122.2 831000 169.7 
Now-, km Ila, nan t1we is no 503 data prior to 1990 wW hence the last column presents the change between 
1490 and 2005. Similarly. for Xizang,. it is bctwun 1992 and 2005. 
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Table AS-3.7 Trends in Industrial Dust 
(Lett: in tons; right: ton per 10 thousand people) 
Ymisct 19iS 1990 1995 2000 2005 Change% 
Ashei I 19UM 23011 290OW S11 219742 37.1 284977 46.8 462000 75.5 
-61.2 -67.3 
1klj; aC 40000 408 -, M 64-S 6,1609 50.0 93681 68.7 33000 21.5 
-17.5 -47. + 
F&JI&O 32ý 115-6 160OW $2.7 217095 67.1 187076 54.9 193000 54.6 
-39.7 -52.9 
Comm 270" In3 I Sam 66.5 122061 50.1 146347 57.2 166000 64.0 
-38.5 -51.6 
Camesdeat 430" 760 420000 672 641727 94.5 579895 77-3 321000 34.9 
-25.3 -54.1 
Gasatil 3' IXK)O C6 210000 49.3 276033 60.9 567717 119.5 556000 119.3 73.8 444 
G81911we 240WO 907 221M 67.3 205183 58.5 406234 108.2 191000 51.2 
-20.4 -36.6 
114648 NOW 301 14040 19.4 13470 17.1 11000 13.3 
-45.0 -56.0 
Ilebei 900000 1442 410000 66,6 371139 57.7 812663 121.8 713000 104.1 
-10.9 -27.9 
11CO006ses IOOOM 'N. 7,9 2tM 79.0 M362 36.4 103853 27.3 124000 32.5 
-87.6 -89.1 
11#884 760000 %9 5 to" 590 402321 44.2 817734 86.2 704000 75.1 
-7.4 -22.5 
Ilabci 490DOO 994 31 OODO STO 237561 41.2 410286 68.8 338000 59.2 
-31.0 -39.8 
Ileass 650M 1136 390000 63-8 271287 42.4 639667 97.5 769000 121.6 18.3 5.2 
18"r Meetead 42"M =13 I 
-VM) 69.4 194961 853 175644 74.0 456000 191.1 8.6 -8.3 
As" 960000 1314 4SM 70.9 269509 38.1 256790 35.0 355000 47.5 
-58.7 -65.1 
ASOCS1 34M 969 34M $9.2 228823 563 343351 82.8 350000 81.2 2.9 
-16.2 
J$A* 230" 1 W. 1 140" S7A 148165 0.6 123792 47.1 137000 50.4 
-40.4 -49.6 
1.1200iss q., M= 2494 690000 174.9 398765 97.4 429231 102.6 453000 107.3 
-50.8 -57.0 
Siftilla qww 2171 1 : 0000 257.7 54248 105.9 132781 239.5 90000 151.0 0.0 
-30.4 
Qiatbai 15000() W6 3OU00 67A 34250 712 41658 90.7 93000 171.3 
-38.0 -53.5 
Slisand 250" 1133 150000 452 243653 69.4 377237 103.5 340000 91.4 36.0 9.8 
Skjado" ? Iww 921 4110000 37.0 U9886 44.9 745589 83.1 373000 40.3 47.5 
. 
563 
Sbaeshal go" 740 70000 543 62898 483 26941 20.4 11000 6.2 
-87.8 -91.6 
Shasif 570" 213.2 300000 103.5 2-10853 71.8 504133 155.2 695000 207.2 21.9 
-2.8 
Skbeas 7SOM 766 740000 69A 42"56 38.5 779921 67.8 597000 54.2 
-23.5 -29.2 
7USj1* ? WW 870 60000 6T9 2%95 31.5 37891 37.8 19000 18.2 
-72.9 -79.1 
X10JIS&C ISOMO IU2 WOW 52.3 132256 79.6 112574 60.9 173000 86.1 
-3.9 -34.9 
xis-Sag 10000 451 11315 48.0 2114 8.4 2000 7.2 
-80.0 -84.3 
Voss&& 240" 702 ISM 40.2 178117 44.6 122818 29.0 155000 34.8 
-35.4 -50. + 
ZAWJISSS 640" IS1111 3SOM 19.7 187149 42.6 489627 106.5 231000 47.2 
-63.9 -70.3 
t4ge, W Xijwg them is no ukhga" duA data twoor to 1990 and hence the last two columns present the 
chinge bclwv" 1990 anJ 2005. 
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Table A5.3.8 Trends in Industrial Soot 
(Left: in tons; right: ton per 10 thousand people) 
Province 
Anhui 
Beijing 
Fujian 
Gansu 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Guizhou 
Hainan 
Ilebei 
Ileilongjiang 
Ilenan 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Inner Mongolia 
Jiangsu 
Jiangxi 
Jilin 
Liaoning 
Ningxia 
Qinghai 
Shaanxi 
Shandong 
Shanghai 
Shanxi 
Sichuan 
Tianjin 
Xinjiang 
Xizang 
Yunnan 
Zhejiang 
1985__ 1990 1995 2000 2005 Chanjze% 
550000 106.7 310000 54.8 260403 44.0 243493 40.0 253000 
400000 407.7 250000 230.2 124471 99.5 51842 38.0 18000 
110000 39.7 100000 32.9 89562 27.7 103539 30.4 118000 
170000 83.3 200000 88.7 178283 73.1 124768 48.8 124000 
270000 47.7 220000 35.2 208113 30.7 264453 35.3 271000 
270000 69.7 300000 70.7 299875 66.0 590999 124.4 538000 
250000 84.1 250000 76.5 248577 70.9 342453 91.2 205000 
10000 15.1 12036 16.6 18078 22.9 10000 
690000 124.4 760000 123.4 445646 69.2 672176 100.7 560000 
1300000 387.3 1280000 361.3 461015 124.6 409337 107.5 454000 
620000 79.0 590000 68.2 478576 52.6 690618 72.8 857000 
360000 72.3 470000 86.4 191518 33.2 321461 53.9 266000 
450000 80.0 380000 62.2 306610 48.0 381268 58.1 453000 
450000 223.2 660000 305.2 396668 173.6 303292 127.8 604000 
770000 123.9 620000 91.6 540930 76.6 374737 51.1 426000 
310000 88.3 300000 78.7 280303 69.0 234059 56.4 230000 
770000 335.1 860000 352.4 367209 144.0 283006 107.7 327000 
1060000 287.3 1050000 266.1 604840 147.8 547223 130.8 517000 
90000 217.1 110000 236.2 93881 183.2 125537 226.5 102000 
60000 147.4 70000 156.6 38549 80.1 63810 123.7 57000 
340000 113.3 490000 147.8 476598 135.7 371908 102.1 292000 
1200000 155.9 1210000 143.6 606252 69.7 543067 60.5 485000 
200000 164.4 190000 148.1 133343 102.5 83153 62.9 50000 
410000 153.4 810000 279.4 361509 117.5 791300 243.6 910000 
930000 91.3 800000 74.0 597262 53.5 920693 80.1 765000 
150000 186.4 180000 203.6 92899 98.6 112234 112.1 77000 
140000 102.9 190000 124.3 172195 103.6 84000 45.4 150000 
4866 20.7 1150 4.6 2000 
290000 84.8 290000 77.7 161039 40.4 232566 54.8 171000 
340000 84.4 280000 66.1 146682 33.4 247096 53.8 199000 
41.3 
-54.0 -61.2 
11.7 
-95.5 -97.1 
33.4 7.3 
-16.0 
47.8 
-27.1 -42.6 
29.5 0.4 
-38.3 
115.5 99.3 65.6 
55.0 
-18.0 -34.7 
12.1 0.0 
-20.0 
81.7 
-18.8 -34.3 
118.8 
-65.1 -69.3 
91.4 38.2 15.6 
46.6 
-26.1 -35.6 
71.6 0.7 
-10.5 
253.1 34.2 13.4 
57.0 
-44.7 -54.0 
53.4 
-25.8 -39.6 
120.4 
-57.5 -64.1 
122.5 
-51.2 -57.4 
171.1 13.3 
-21.2 
105.0 
-5.0 -28.8 
78.5 
-14.1 -30.7 
52.4 
-59.6 -66.4 
28.1 
-75.0 -82.9 
271.2 122.0 76.9 
69.5 
-17.7 -23.9 
73.8 
-48.7 -60.4 
74.6 7.1 
-27.4 
7.2 
-58.9 -65.0 
38.4 
-41.0 -54.7 
40.6 
-41.5 -51.8 
Note: for Hainan there is no industrial soot data prior to 1990 and hence the last two columns present the 
change between 1990 and 2005. Similarly, for Xizang, it is between 1995 and 2005. 
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Table A5.33.9 Trends in Industrial Solid Waste 
(Left: in 10 thousand tons; right: ton per capita) 
PrMirct ITIS ITTO 1lTS 2000 2005 Change"/. 
Aabw 1441 04 : 33.2 03 2749 03 ý «IM 0.5 4196 0.7 
Beipot 470 03 617 06 IM 0.9 1139 0.8 1238 0.8 
Irojian 40 02 630 02 r23 02 2191 0.6 3773 1.1 
Com* M 04 IM 03 1432 04 1704 0.7 2249 0.9 
Gutet4en 1377 03 167 1 03 1463 02 1694 02 2896 0.3 
Gegegit 791 02 1211 03 1303 03 2108 0.4 3489 0.7 
GlagIbm 936 0,3 t97 03 1309 OA 2272 0.6 4854 1.3 
glal"a 97 01 87 0.1 93 OA 127 0.2 
liebei 3793 07 3162 os 6196 1.0 7028 1.1 16279 2.4 
litslooa4et 636) 20 3482 10 UM 0,7 2694 0.7 3210 0.8 
lies&* 187) 02 2,039 02 2m 03 3625 0.4 6178 0.7 
llebd 1632 03 1799 0,3 'Da 0,4 2818 0.3 3692 0.6 
lleain U) 04 1974 0.3 1333 0.3 2335 0.4 3366 0.5 
la«fbi«bt*U4 1134 06 1912 09 22» 1,0 2376 1.0 7363 3.1 
JIA" 1733 03 z= 03 12143 0.4 3038 0.4 5757 0.8 
Jiasgij 2m 07 3199 08 3669 0.9 4796 12 7007 1.6 
j44 1336 06 1716 07 1672 0-7 1604 0.6 2457 0.9 
Ll"et 711) 19 7431 19 69: 0 1,7 7563 1.8 10242 2.4 
m 0$ 334 os 397 OS 479 0.9 719 12 
z31 06 236 06 Os 0,4 337 0.7 649 12 
ju) 04 IM 0,3 1870 03 2625 0.7 4388 12 
skanden Z? 47 04 3m 03 4484 0,3 5407 0.6 9173 1.0 
sbao%W 711 06 1107 09 1364 1ý1 1333 1.0 1964 1.1 
Skantl 2: 61 08 31% 11 44,04 14 7695 2.4 11183 33 
Mb«o 4972 03 40m 04 4m 0L4 6019 0.3 8198 0.7 
1148jia 376 03 419 03 344 06 470 0.3 1123 1.1 
Xiajiaag 121' 02 389 03 602 OA 718 0.4 1295 0.6 
x14,694 0- 17 0.1 8 0.0 
1,09496 NU 07 2030 03 2147 03 3187 0.8 4661 1.0 
zä411494 633 02 941 02 la» 02 1386 0.3 2314 0.5 
127.9 92.0 
163.4 68.0 
703.7 529.5 
189.3 127.6 
83.6 13.0 
341.0 266.5 
480.6 362.6 
30.9 4.8 
329.0 247.4 
-51.1 
-57.0 
229.9 176.0 
123.5 94.9 
61.6 43.6 
549.2 448.5 
231.2 175.3 
181.4 129.1 
81.2 53.3 
42.6 24.7 
254.2 146.4 
176.2 107.0 
275.1 202.7 
234.0 177.9 
172.0 86.1 
394.6 294.1 
64.9 52.6 
198.5 130.3 
298.1 169.6 
-57.3 
105.8 58.1 
297.2 226.8 
t ac fix i t, ~ tt+rn U no In. 1uºursl saot dis pttot to 1990 and hence the last two columns present the 
chsnir k1* vc» 191)0 end . WS. Similarly, ! ut XiLan& it is bctuccn 1995 and 2005. 
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Table A5.3.10 Average Growth % Gross Regional Output and Composition 
Province CRP Primary Secondary 
Anhui 8.91 4.79 
Beijing 11.21 2.61 
Fujian 11.35 5.74 
Gansu 9.35 6.69 
Guangdong 13.29 4.90 
Guangxi 9.15 5.78 
Guizhou 8.30 3.99 
Hainan 10.32 7.68 
llcbci 10.00 6.17 
Ileilongjiang 6.92 5.32 
Ilenan 9.42 5.01 
Hubei 8.70 4.58 
Hunan 8.36 4.29 
Inner Mongolia 9.58 5.22 
Jiangsu 11.45 4.45 
Jiangxi 8.68 4.49 
Jilin 8.94 6.71 
Liaoning 8.46 7.09 
Ningxia 9.63 5.09 
Qinghai 8.43 4.27 
Shaanxi 9.00 4.22 
Shandong 11.00 4.79 
Shanghai 9.60 2.19 
Shanxi 8.97 2.80 
Sichuan 8.11 4.18 
Tianjin 9.55 4.02 
Xinjiang 10.21 6.76 
Xizang 7.24 1.95 
Yunnan 8.67 4.87 
Zhejiang 11.62 3.32 
Average 9.48 4.80 
10.16 
7.11 
13.11 
9.41 
14.74 
11.12 
8.60 
12.46 
10.78 
6.64 
11.50 
8.81 
9.27 
11.69 
11.86 
10.64 
8.93 
7.65 
10.88 
9.88 
10.02 
12.58 
7.65 
9.47 
9.04 
8.99 
12.99 
11.38 
9.27 
12.47 
10.30 
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Industry 
8.66 
6.30 
11.15 
8.28 
13.04 
9.27 
7.88 
10.82 
9.45 
5.79 
10.18 
7.44 
8.16 
10.55 
10.26 
9.01 
7.71 
6.78 
9.95 
8.83 
8.95 
10.84 
6.78 
8.73 
8.04 
8.02 
10.15 
8.07 
8.33 
10.70 
8.94 
Tertiary 
11.87 
15.45 
12.83 
11.62 
15.24 
11.02 
12.45 
12.77 
12.08 
9.83 
10.57 
12.52 
11.47 
10.30 
15.49 
10.44 
11.55 
11.03 
11.01 
8.97 
10.64 
13.07 
13.20 
10.72 
10.59 
11.56 
12.04 
9.96 
12.18 
14.25 
11.89 
Table A5.3.11 Average Growth rate % Capital, employment, income and population 
Province 
Anhui 
Beijing 
Fujian 
Gansu 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Guizhou 
Ilainan 
Hebei 
I1eilongjiang 
Henan 
Ilubei 
Hunan 
Inner Mongolia 
Jiangsu 
Jiangxi 
Jilin 
Liaoning 
Ningxia 
Qinghai 
Shaanxi 
Shandong 
Shanghai 
Shanxi 
Sichuan 
Tianjin 
Xinjiang 
Xizang 
Yunnan 
Zhejiang 
Average 
Capital Capital Total EMP Urban Rural POP 
Stock Flow Income Income 
11.08 11.08 1.83 7.04 4.10 0. ý-8 
16.5 15.46 3.19 8.01 5.17 2.38 
13.9 15.33 2.55 6.68 4.88 1.18 
11.19 12.72 1.16 6.92 4.67 1.14 
1519 15.79 3.07 7.01 4.98 2.41 
13.33 18.45 1.89 5.51 3.27 0.96 
9.7 10.1 2.49 6.09 3.00 1.09 
12.34 11.62 2.02 5.94 4.08 1.59 
14 15.41 1.54 6.27 3.97 1.03 
8.49 8.56 1.18 4.75 3.20 0.59 
13.25 15.24 2.29 6.39 3.93 0.81 
13.88 15.3 1.24 6.25 3.79 0.63 
10.79 12.72 1.46 5.47 3.36 0.57 
15.99 18.46 1.08 5.59 2.80 0.81 
16.45 15.85 1.28 7.50 5.38 0.94 
12.92 14.83 1.52 6.56 3.96 1.00 
13.17 15.99 0.83 6.52 3.60 0.79 
11.94 13.45 0.74 6.80 4.24 0.70 
10.48 11.68 2.58 5.06 3.69 1.77 
11.05 12.29 1.99 4.84 1.98 1.40 
10.84 11.33 1.55 5.52 2.81 1.02 
14.84 15.2 1.89 6.81 4.88 0.90 
12.9 12.72 0.61 7.79 5.51 2.12 
13.55 15.39 1.36 6.79 3.99 1.09 
10.68 12.54 1.1 5.31 3.75 0.34 
11.74 12.43 
-0.12 6.70 4.67 1.50 
15.29 16.53 1.72 5.72 2.66 1.98 
12.11 12.24 1.61 2.92 2.02 1.63 
11.19 14.27 2.03 5.16 2.39 1.27 
16.94 16.32 2.06 7.42 5.71 1.04 
12.86 13.98 1.66 6.18 3.88 1.18 
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Table A5.3.12 Average Growth % Total Trade, Exports and Imports 
Protiece Total Trade Exports Imports 
Anhui 17.60 16.09 23.71 
Beijing 22.69 19.38 29.89 
Fujian 20.77 20.79 21.27 
Gansu 22.49 18.66 41.72 
Guangdong 27.42 26.18 30.71 
Guangxi 14.02 11.85 21.79 
Guizhou 17.75 19.95 20.73 
Hainan 20.01 15.61 26.00 
licbel 14.37 12.90 23.57 
Ilcilongjiang 16.75 15.55 16.99 
Ifenan 15.35 14.70 21.28 
Ilubel 14.65 13.47 22.53 
Ilunan 13.86 12.88 19.89 
Inner Mongolia 16.87 13.62 23.36 
Jiangsu 25.74 24.04 30.76 
Jiangxi 15.89 14.48 23.77 
Jilin 14.48 10.86 22.70 
Liaoning 11.82 9.35 22.12 
Ningxia 17.93 19.07 22.53 
Qinghai 17.55 15.24 51.23 
Shaanxi 18.59 19.17 20.16 
Shandong 16.88 16.40 30.65 
Shanghai 19.00 17.65 21.75 
Shanxi 19.32 20.56 22.14 
Sichuan 16.26 15.48 22.71 
Tianjin 18.69 16.01 27.26 
Xinjiang 19.78 22.60 22.14 
XWng 30.57 30.44 52.48 
Yunnan 15.87 15.38 17.54 
Zhejiang 25.06 24.15 29.63 
Average 18.60 17A2 26.1 
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Figure A5.3.1 Average Provincial Trade Intensity, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.2 A%erage Trade Volumes by province, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.3 Average Industrial Waste Water Discharge, 1985-2007 
Figure A5.3.4 Average Chemical Oxygen Demand Emissions, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.5 Average Industrial Waste Air Emissions, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.6 Average Industrial SO2 Emissions, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.7 Average Industrial Dust Emissions, 1985-2007 
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Figure A5.3.9 Average Industrial Solid Waste Emissions, 1985-2007 
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A5.5Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is aggravated by adding interaction terms in an econometric equation. A 
feasible solution without increasing sample size or dropping out interaction terms is 
centring the interaction terms at sample mean. Centring will sometimes increase the 
correlations and decrease the correlations at other times according to Jaccard and Turrisi 
(2003: 28). 
The following correlation table shows the correlation of variables for model A. The 
interaction terms are highly correlated with the individual terms. For example, the 
correlation between the interaction of openness and composition and the interaction of 
openness composition and income seems to be extremely high. After centring, 
multicollinearity is greatly reduced. For the variables in model B, centring reduces the 
correlation between the interaction terms and their individual terms; however, the 
correlation between the interaction terms seems to be strengthened after centring. 
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It is argued that correlation maybe not a good way to detect multicollinearity in a model. 
Some authors have suggested computing tolerance indices of multicollinearity. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is one of the indices which measure the severity of 
multicollincarity. Mathematically, VIF(?, )=1, which is a component part of the I Riz 
sampling variances of the OLS slope estimator for the ih independent variable. Ri 2 is the 
R-squared obtained by regressing the Vh independent variable on the other independent 
variables. A higher value of Rý increases the sampling variance and implies that the i th 
independent variable is more correlated with other independent variables. (Wooldridge, 
2003: 97). As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF is greater than 10 (some researchers 
suggest a lower value) indicate a possibility that it could be considered as a linear 
combination of other independent variables. For our datasets, it shows that the models 
with the original interaction terms suffer greatly from the violation of the condition. If we 
use ccntrcd interaction terms, the VIF values are much smaller. Also model B has a 
greatcr mean VIF (27.09) than model A (8-82). 
The correlation of economic variables is unavoidable. As long as the correlation is not too 
high, the regression results are viewed as credible. In fact, we do not see much of the 
multicollincarity problem addressed in current empirical research work. However, in some 
models, the issue of multicollinearity is so severe that it affects the validity of the 
cocffjcicnts for individual rcgressors. Since we are more interested in the mechanisms of 
how trade liberalization affects environment, caution should be taken whenever we 
interpret the coefficient results of the interaction terms. The introduction of the interaction 
terms in the model also aggravates the issue as we just have shown. There are a few ways 
to reduce multicollinearity. Based on the current panel, the feasible solutions are: 1. 
centring the interaction terms at sample means; 2. drop some of the interaction terms; 3. 
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Check if other proxies for composition effect exists (for example, energy intensity) and 
are better indicators. 
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A5.6 Robustness Check 
Table A5.6.1 Results for industrial waste water 
sptcirication 1 
S 
KL 
tio 
I 
0 
O*rtLKL 
O'rcLKV 
O*rcLl 
O*rcLI3 
O*reLKL*reLl 
POPDEN 
PROD 
. -; Ons 
F 
N 
0.789000 0.750*0* 0.726*** 
(-10.186) (-9.087) (-8.71) 
0.098 0.139 
(-1.208) (-1.445) 
-0.024 
(-1.148) 
7.358*0* 7.7304** 7.952*** 
(-17.966) (-15.373) (-14.658) 
328 323 344 
639 639 639 
45678 
0.764*** 0.764*** 0.829*** 0.829*** 1.015*** 
(-9.387) (-9.321) (-lO. 397) (-lO. 064) (-9.775) 
0.263** 0.263** 0.462* 0.462** 0.649*** 
(-2.658) (-2.683) (-2.551) (-2.641) (-3.67) 
-0.001 -0.007 -0.018 -0.018 0.011 
(-0.055) (-0.340) (-0.720) (-0.715) 
-0.376 
-0.620** -0.733*** -0.962** -0.962** -0.795* 
(-3.102) (-3.744) (-2.821) (-2.883) (-2.345) 
0.098* 0.112** 0.112* * 0.132** 
(-2.306) (-2.62) (-2.612) (-3.084) 
0.128 0.128 0.121 
-1.529 -1.528 -1.465 
(-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.003) 
(-0.171) (-0.171) (-0.074) 
-0.271 -0.271 -0.192 
(-1.840) (-t. 858) (-1.327) 
-0.713** -0.713** -0.546** 
(-3.205) (-3.203) (-2.639) 
-0.67 -0.67 -0.666* 
(-1.920) (-1.928) (-2.004) 
-0.001 -0.294 
(-0.00. ) (-0.72. )
-0.757** 
(-3.189) 
12.240*** 13.329*** 14.689*** 14.685*** 10.719*** 
(-S. 301) (-9.177) (-5.99) (-5.516) (-3.354) 
310 987 370 5689 318 
639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Ncwcy-West estimator, for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. *Os means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means 
significant at 10*/* 
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Table A5.61 Results for COD 
specification 137 
s 0.609*** 0.708*0* 0.567*** 0.652*** 0.662*** 0.712*** 0.678*** 0.930*** 
(-3.535) (-3.663) (-3.34) (-3.982) (4.191) (4.329) (4.117) (-5.327) 
KL 
-0.253 0.039 0.351 0.343 0.838* 0.918* 1.182** 
(-1.203) (-0.169) (-1.704) (-1.697) (-2.421) (-2.535) (-3.174) 
Kv 
-0.17*** -0.12** -0.129*** 
-0.152** -0.164*** -0.125* 
(-5.273) (-3.484) (-3.896) (-3.279) (-3.357) (-2.523) 
1 
-1.63** -1.873*** 
-3.12*** -3.203 *** -2.99*** 
(4.702) (-5.096) (-6.430) (-6.352) (-6.195) 
0 0.205* 0.213* 0.221 * 0.248** 
(-2.293) (-2.305) (-2.375) (-2.655) 
O*rcl. KL 0.29 0.303 0.302 
(-1.6) (-1.658) (-1.702) 
OlreLKI! 0.091 0.088 0.095 
(-1.002) (-0.978) (-1.072) 
O*reLl 
-0.89*** -0.93*** -0.84** 
(-3.978) (4.039) (-3.873) 
O*reLll 
-0.341 -0.343 . 0.12 
(-0.862) (-0.870) (-0.306) 
O'reLKL*reLl 0.013 0.042 0.038 
(4022) (-0.07) (-0.065) 
POPDEN 0.55 0.162 
(1.17) (0.34) 
PROD 
-1.037** 
(-2.740) 
-ýons 9.256 8.309 
9.699 21.224 23.497*** 32.533 35.224*** 30.012 
000 
-7.7 0 
-7.677 0 
F 1289.593 2183.69 1004.507 10631.56 93.458 46495.81 101.228 33549.56 
N 584 584 584 584 584 584 584 584 
Note: model A using Newey-West estimator; for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means 
significant at 10% 
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Table A5.63 Results for industrial waste air 
sptcirication 145678 
s 0.709*** 0.649*0* 0.626*** 0.632*** 0.632*** 0.642*** 0.632*** 0.807*** 
(-10.787) (-9.297) (-8.877) (-8.918) (-8.911) (-8.794) (-8.58) (40.006) 
KL 0.1510 0.190* 0.210** 0.210*0 0.328* 0.354* 0.528** 
(-2.139) (-2.403) (-2.589) (-2.589) (-1.994) (-2.054) (-3.012) 
-0.023 -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 -0.02 0.008 
(-1.700) (-1.318) (-1.221) (-0.676) (-0.822) (-0.338) 
-0.098 -0.082 -0.387 -0.414 -0.258 
(-0.647) (4523) (-1.785) (-1.862) (-1.167) 
0 
-0.013 -0.001 0.002 0.02 
(-0.283) (-0.018) (4035) (-0.394) 
O*rtLKL 0.053 0.058 0.051 
(-0.66) (-0.711) (465) 
O*rtLKO 
-0.021 -0.022 -0.018 
O"rel. l 
OlrcL12 
06rtLKL*reLl 
POPDEN 
PROD 
-ons 
(-0.593) (-0.618) (-0.543) 
-0.127 -0-137 -0.063 
(-1.167) (-1.245) (-0.587) 
0.122 0.122 0.279 
(-0.642) (-0.643) (-1.522) 
-0.173 -0.165 . 0.161 
(-0.595) (-0.565) (-0.584) 
0.181 
-0.093 
(0.57) (-0.29) 
A ýnorrr 
(-3.662) 
3.986*** 4.556*** 4.773$** 5.448*** 5.299*** 7.430*** 8.314*** 4.604* 
(. 11.633) (40.64) (-10.472) (4.822) (4.291) (4.414) (-3.806) (-2.011) 
F 291 288 290 283 5226 286 284 286 
N 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Ncwcy-West estimator, for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. 000 means significant at 1%; **rneans significant at 5%; *means 
significant at 10%, 
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Table A5.6.4 Results for S02 
Specification 1234568 
s 0.6210*0 0.615*40 0.519*** 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.560*** 0.527*** 0.714*** 
(-6.89) (-6.174) (-5.591) (-5.654) (-5.65) (-5.664) (-5.028) (-6.188) 
KL 0.016 0.177* 0.246** 0.246** 0.404* 0.488* 0.676** 
(-0.19) (-1.967) (-2.597) (-2.596) (-1.9920 (-2.401) (-3.294) 
KLI 
-0.094*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
-0.085*** -0.098*** -0.069** 
(-5.860) (-5.488) (-5.307) (-3.545) (-3.781) (-2.594) 
1 
-0.345 -0.348 
-0.793* -0.883* -0.715* 
(-1.926) (-1.860) (-2.264) (-2.578) (-2.121) 
0 0.003 0.014 0.023 0.043 
(-0.06) (-0.275) (-0.448) (-0.84) 
O*rtl. KL 0.087 0.102 0.095 
(-0.992) (-1.175) (-1.147) 
O"reLKt! 0.012 0.009 0.013 
(-0.294) (-0.222) (-0.341) 
Olrdl 
-0.245 -0.280* -0.2 
(-1.776) (-2.102) (-1.550) 
O*reLl' 0.075 0.077 0.245 
(-0.374) (-0.376) (-1.236) 
O*reLKL*reLl 
-0.148 -0.119 -0.115 
(-0.494) (-0.395) (-0.398) 
POPDEN 0.598* 0,305 
(1.76) (0.85) 
PROD 
-0.760*** 
(-3.537) 
-ýons 9.382*** 9.4420*0 10.323*** 12.709*** 
12.740*** 15.875*** 18.797*** 14.815*** 
(. 20.159) (-16.056) (-18.202) (-9.762) (-8.948) (-6.111) (-7.47) (-5.312) 
F 242 233 273 229 411 221 11967 239 
N 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Newey-West estimator. for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means 
significant at 101/9 
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Table A5.6.5 Results for industrial dust 
specification 1268 
s 0.4610** 0.4290* 0.203 0.191 0.191 0.319** 0.329** 0.615** 
(-3.704) (-3.218) (-1.727) (-1.657) (-1.661) (-2.751) (-2.749) (-4.409) 
KL 0.082 0.464*** 0.424** 0.424** 1.271*** 1.248*** 1.534** 
(-0.668) (-3.572) (-3.144) (-3.141) (-4.752) (-4.516) (-5.566) 
-0.222*** -0.229*** -0.232*** 
-0.240*** -0.236*** 
-0.19**9 
(-8.719) (-7.836) (-7.693) (-5.666) (-5.509) (-4.690) 
0.195 0.15 
-0.999* -0.974* -0.718 
0 
(-0.605) (-0.486) (-2.290) (-2.145) (-1.653) 
0.039 0.109 0.106 0.136 
O'reLKL 
(_O. 51) (-1.493) (-1.451) (-1.886) 
0.383** 0.378** 0.367** 
O*rtLKO 
(-2.712) (-2.656) (-2.867) 
-0.160** -0.159* * -0.152** 
O*reL1 
-0.784*** -0.774*** -0.653** 
O*rtLll 
(-3.411) (-3.318) (-2.982) 
-1.029* -1.029* -0.772* 
O*reLKL*rtL1 
(-2.491) (-2.492) (-2.007) 
-0.987* -0.995* -0.988* 
POPDEN 
(-2.055) (-2.076) (. 2.085) 
-0.166 -0.614 
PROD 
-1.16** 
(-3.627) 
-. 
ýons 10.6890** 10.9974** 13.087*** 11.737*** 12.169*** 19.937*** 19.127*** 13.051 * 
(-16.533) (-13.949) (-IS. 228) (-4.958) (-5.401) (-6.097) (-4.598) (-3.086) 
F 65.8 60.9 106 91.6 502 145 5768 120 
N 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Ncwcy-Wcst estimator, for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. $00 means significant at 1%; "means significant at 5%; *means 
sip i ficant at IM 
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Table A5.6.6 Results for industrial soot 
specification 123467 
S 0.530*** 0.599*** 0.445*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 0.499*** 0.486*** 0.732*** 
4.558 
-4.462 -3.983 -3.972 -3.963 -4.079 -3,681 -4.935 
KL 
-0.176 0.084 0.128 0.128 0.770*** 0.804*** 1.050*** 
(-1.384) 
-0.657 -0.91 -0.907 -3.389 -3.461 -4.331 
KL2 
. 
0.151*** 
-0.143*** -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.105** 
(-6.482) (-6.094) (-5.880) (-3.926) (4-015) (-3.054) 
1 
-0.221 -0.184 -1.484*** -1.520*** -1.300*** 
(-0.709) (-0.583) (-3.800) (4.034) (-3.479) 
0 
-0.032 0.022 0.026 0.052 
(-0.525) (-0.369) (-0.434) (-0.856) 
O*rel. KL 0.262* 0.268* 0.259* 
(-2.238) (-2.284) (-2.273) 
O*rel. KO 
-0.1 -0.101 -0.095 
(-1.585) (-1.604) (-1.591) 
O*rcLl 
-0.612*** -0.627*** -0,522** 
(-3.441) (-3.582) (-3.175) 
O*rcl. 12 0.361 0.362 0.583 
(-1.005) (-1.002) (4741) 
O*rel. KL*rel. 1 -0.123 -0.111 -0.106 
(-0.285) (-0.260) (-0.258) 
POPDEN 0.242 -0.144 
(0.55) (-0.31) 
PROD -0.998*** 
(-3.749) 
_ýons 
10.101*** 9.434*** 10.857*** 12.385*** 12.031*** 21.287*** 22.468*** 17.237** 
(-17.272) (-11.447) (-15.213) (-5.606) (-5.357) (-7.541) (-7.487) (-5.194) 
F 133 125 154 139 694 141 16242 142 
N 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Newey-West estimator; for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included; t-statistics are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 5%; *means 
significant at 10% 
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Table A5.6.7 Results for industrial solid waste 
Specification 123458 
s 0.376*0* 0.319** 0.288* 0.289* 0.288* 0.335** 0.314** 0.497*** 
(-3.319) (-2.817) (-2.45) (-2.47) (-2.489) (-3.195) (-2.943) (-4.511) 
KL 0.145 0.197* 0.199* 0.199* 0.781*** 0.833*** 1.015*** 
(-1.791) (-2.327) (-2.081) (-2.115) (-4.602) (-4.707) (-5.672) 
KL2 
-0.031* -0.03 -0.036* 
-0.021 -0.029 0 
(-2.222) (-1.824) (-1.988) (-0.844) (-1.110) (-0.007) 
-0.012 -0.125 -0.941*** -0.997*** -0.833** 
(-0.056) (-0.616) (-3.472) (-3.652) (-2.877) 
0 0.098 0.144** 0.149** 0.169*** 
(-1.889) (-2.759) (-2.843) (-3.312) 
O*reLKL 0.186* 0.196* 0.189* 
(-2.413) (-2.525) (-2.418) 
O*rtLKL' 
-0.164*** -0.166*** -0.162*** 
(-4.725) (-4.792) (-4.972) 
O*reL1 
-0.512*** -0.534*** -0.456** 
(-3.607) (-3.786) (-3.112) 
O*rtLll 
-0.383 -0.382 -0.217 
(-1.879) (-1.890) (-1.126) 
O*reLKL*reL1 0.344 0.362 0.366 
(-1.124) (-1.205) (-1.233) 
POPDEN 0.371 0.084 
(1.32) (0.30) 
PROD 
-0.742*** 
(-3.506) 
-ýOns 3.736000 6.302*** 6.590*** 6.671*** 7.762*** 13.502*** 15.314*** 11.426*** (. 9.524) (-9.772) (-9.542) (-3.986) (-4.607) (-6.297) (-6.216) (-3.991) 
F 354 365 354 344 335 300 27030 286 
N 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Newey-West estimator, for all the following tables, province and time dummies are 
included. I-statistics are in parentheses. $00 means significant at 1%; **rneans significant at 5%; *means 
significant at Me 
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Table A5.6.8 Random Effects estimation results for model A 
Waste COD Waste 
water air 
Sol Dust Soot Solid waste 
s 1.015*** 0.930*** 0.807*** 0.714*** 0,615*** 0.732*** 0.497*** 
(-12.021) (-6.526) (-12.288) (-7.58) (-4.886) (-5.796) (-5.551) 
KL 0.649*** 1.182*** 0.528*** 0.676*** 1.534*** 1.050*** 1.015*** 
(-4.475) (-3.761) (-3.707) (-3.878) (-6.272) (-5.178) (-6.492) 
KO 0.011 
-0.125*** 0.008 -0.069*** 
-0.192*** -0.105*** 0 
(-0.464) (-3.075) (-0.416) (-3.103) (-5.628) (-3.731) (-0.008) 
1 
-0.795$** -2.996*** -0.258 -0.715** 
-0.718* -1.300*** 
-0.833*** (-2.922) (-7.354) (-1.401) (-2.573) (-1.942) (4.219) (-3.493) 
0 0.132*** 0.248*** 0.02 0.043 0.136** 0.052 0.169*** 
(-3.766) (-3.009) (-0.488) (-0.94) (-2.117) (-1.012) (-3.567) 
O*rel. KL 0.121* 0.302** 0.051 0.095 0.367*** 0.259*** 0.189*** 
(-1.796) (-2.052) (-0.8) (-1.342) (-3.276) (-2.699) (-2.788) 
O*rel. KV 
-0.003 0.095 -0.018 0.013 -0.152*** 
-0.095* -0.162*** 
(4095) (-1.342) (-0.673) (-0.423) (-3.707) (-1.944) (-6.117) 
O*rel. 1 
-0.192 -0.837*** -0.063 -0.200* -0.653*** 
-0.522*** -0.456*** 
(-1.640) (4.528) (-0.696) (-1.779) (-3.568) (-3.652) 
-3.499) 
O*rel. ll 
-0.5460** -0.12 0.279* 0.245 -0.772** 0.583** 
-0.217 
(-3.256) (-0.358) (-1.824) (. 1.42) (-2.340) (-2.046) (-1.275) 
O*reLKL*reLl 
-0.666** 0.038 -0.161 -0.115 -0.988** 
-0.106 0.366 
(-2.481) (-0.077) (-0.705) (-0.467) (-2.496) (-0.299) (-1.415) 
POPDEN 
-0.294 0.162 -0.093 0.305 -0.614* 
-0.144 0.084 
(-0.912) (-0.395) (-0.367) (-1.066) (-1.802) (-0.378) (-0.355) 
PROD 
-0.757*** -1.037*** -0.708*** -0.760*** -1.159*** 
. 
0.998*** 
-0.742*** 
(-3.978) (-3.068) (4.374) (4.126) (4.123) (4-380) (4.139) 
_cons 
10.719*** 30.834*** 4.604** 14.815*** 13.051*** 17.237*** 11.426*** 
(4.14) (-7.89) (-2.425) (-6.384) (-3.584) (-6.092) (4.81) 
Ch12 27812.66 7037.699 25742.04 21367.9 10625.58 12853.19 26656.72 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
Note: model A using Random Effect estimator; for all the following tables, province and time dummies 
are included; robust z-statistics are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means significant at 
5%; *mcans signi ficant at 10% 
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Table A5.6.9 Random Effects estimation results for model B 
Waste COD 'Iyaste 
water air 
S02 Dust Soot Solid waste 
S 0.701 ***1.005 **00.733*** 0.682*** 0.342** 0.578*** 0,496*** 
(-8.073) (-5.779) (-9.74) (-6.676) (-2.108) (4.602) (4.855) 
KL0.31 1.541*** 0.438*** 0.701*** 2.105 *0*1.240*** 0.819*** 
(-1.514) (4.45) (-2.759) (-3.218) (-6.737) (4.956) (-3.56) 
K 0.037* 
-0.098*** 0.004 -0.067*** 
-0.160*** -0-097*** 0.001 
(-1.748) (-2.617) (-0.232) (-3.250) (-5.137) (-3,471) (-0.036) 
GDPPC 
-0.273 -2.704*** -0.460*** -0.878*** 
-1.819*** -1.289*** -0-887*** 
(-1.133) (-7.388) (-2.923) (-3.727) (4.765) (4.234) (-3.918) 
0 0.013 0.078 
-0.014 0.001 0.094 
-0.013 0.130*** 
(-0.362) (-1.032) (-0.357) (-0.019) (-1.589) (-0.238) (-2.576) 
O*rcl. KL 0.058 0.646*** 0.058 0.210** 0.684*** 0.476*** 0.167* 
(-0.656) (4.037) (-0.803) (-2.231) (4.844) (4.108) (-1.669) 
O*rel. KV 0.242*** 0.456*** 0.071* 0.049 
-0.133* -0.011 -0.105 ** 
(-5.775) (4.18) (. 1.668) (-1.077) (-1.768) (-0.150) (-2.128) 
O*rel. GDPPC 
-0.242** -0.925*** -0.098 -0.281*** -0.940*** -0.621*** -0.159 
(-2.417) (-5.741) (-1.446) (-2.848) (-6.670) (-5.245) (4516) 
O*reLGDPPC' 0.051 
-0.256 0.039 -0.196 -0.334* -0.268 -0.059 
(-0.427) (-1.187) (-0.341) (-1.626) (-1.677) (-1.304) (-0.467) 
O*rcl. KL*rc]. GDPPC 
-0.512*** -0.413 . 0.208* 0.06 0.166 0.027 
-0.082 
(4.044) (-1.584) (-1.784) (-0.473) (-0.862) (0.123) (-0.630) 
jons 10.457*** 27.602*** 7.677*** 16.246*** 26.928*** 20.295*** 12.431 
(-5.965) (-10.847) (-6.572) (-9.427) (-10.34) (-9.502) (-6.34) 
ChI2 28492.06 7106.704 28322.61 20789.82 10021.76 12953.35 27856.41 
N 639 584 639 639 639 639 639 
Notes only for model B using Random Effect estimator; for all the following tables, province and time 
dummies are included; robust z-statistics are in parentheses. *** means significant at 1%; **means 
significant at 50/*; *mcans significant at 10% 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examines the relationship between trade and the environment, both the 
trade pattern (competitiveness) consequences of environmental regulations and the 
environmental consequences of trade and trade liberalization. For four separate 
empirical studies, different datasets and methodologies are employed to give a broad 
picture of trade liberalization and the environment in China. In this last chapter, we 
provide a summary of main findings, contributions, limitations and policy implications. 
Finally, a few possible extensions for further research are briefly discussed. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In chapter two we examine whether "Dirty Industry Migration" phenomenon due to 
North-South environmental regulatory gap actually happens for China and five 
selected developed countries (i. e. the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and France) using 
trade data from 100 countries (as a representative of world trading bloc) between 1976 
and 2004. After a critical review of alternative measures of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA), we choose Balassa's original RCA and normalized RCA (the 
preferred one) indices developed by Yu et al. (2009). We define 'dirtiness' for 28 ISIC 
3-digit manufacturing industries using emissions information from IPPS dataset. Our 
results show that China has little revealed comparative advantage in dirty industries. 
The evolution of NRCA also shows that China's revealed comparative advantage in 
dirty industries have actually declined over the years. In the case of the industrial 
countries, little evidence is found that dirty industries in these countries have lost 
revealed comparative advantage. To sum up, our results show that 'Dirty Industry 
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Migration' may not be a decisive and systematic trend. Chapter two does not offer 
support for a strong-form of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). However, this 
does not rule out a weak-form of PHH that environmental stringency has negative 
impact on trade perfonnance/spccialization. 
Chapter three then carries on the task of examining and quantifying the role of 
environmental stringency in the determination of trade performance/specialization. 
Given a lack of internationally comparable data on environmental stringency, we 
confine our study to cross-industry regression analysis using Chinese data only. 
Environmental stringency is proxied by two cost-based measures: the ratio of 
pollution abatement operating costs to value added (ENVI) and the ratio of payroll to 
environmental protection staff to value added (ENV2). For trade 
performance/specialization, we select three measures: a Trade Specialization Index 
(TSI), the Michaely and Net Exports scaled by value added (Netva). Two samples are 
constructed according to data availability. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
we find a significant and negative impact from environmental stringency on trade 
special ization/performance. We also find some evidence that dirtier industries tend to 
be more affected by increasing environmental stringency. In terms of other control 
variables, we find less consistent results for the impact of human capital intensity and 
physical capital intensity across trade variables and samples. The absence of 
comprehensive environmental stringency information at the industry level constrains 
the robustness of the findings. 
The research focus turns to the environmental consequences of trade liberalization in 
chapters four and five. To address the weaknesses in the literature of pollution content 
in trade, chapter four adopts an Environmental Input-Output analysis to evaluate the 
overall effect of trade. Two contributions are made. First, we distinguish domestic 
intermediate inputs from imported intermediate inputs using an import proportionality 
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assumption and obtain consistent results. Second, we differentiate 'actual' from 
Gpotcntial' pollution content in trade using alternatively common technology and 
heterogeneous technology assumptions. The results show that trade allows China to 
Gsave' on air pollution (CO2, S02, NO. ) by exporting cleaner goods and importing 
dirtier goods that would be dirtier to produce at home. This is despite a huge trade 
surplus. This is a type of 'gain' from trade for China. However, China is actually 
exporting more air pollution and its exports structure is more pollution intensive than 
its imports given the more efficicrit technologies actually used abroad to produce these 
goods. 
Chapter five carries out an econometric analysis of the impact of trade liberalization 
on the environment. Following a few recent studies, we decompose the overall impact 
into distinctive channels: the scale, technique and trade-induced composition effects. 
We use a long time period panel of Chinese provincial data between 1985 and 2007. 
The results provide evidence in line with expectation from the related theory: an 
increase in economic activities will increase pollution levels, while an increase in 
income levels tends to generate stricter environmental regulations and reduce pollution 
levels. TIhe trade-induced composition effect depends on provincial characteristics and 
evidences for a PHH effect and a FEH effect are found. We also calculate the trade 
elastiticities for individual provinces and find that under current conditions (factor 
endowments and income levels) further trade openness tends to shift the composition 
of production to slightly more pollution intensive industries. Chapter five makes a few 
changes to the existing model specifications (and underlying assumptions), for 
example, using log-log type of specifications, including a variable of squared capital 
intensity measure, and using different income measures. The regression results are 
reasonably robust across different environmental indicators, across different model 
specifications and across different estimation methods. 
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The findings of this thesis also have important policy implications. Firstly, the 
evidence that China has a revealed comparative advantage in cleaner industries and 
the evidence that environmental stringency matters more for dirtier industries indicate 
that an overall strengthening in environmental stringency may cause less pain to China 
than to a country with a revealed comparative advantage in dirtier goods. However, 
whether international harmonization of environmental standards should be pursued or 
not needs to be carefully examined given the existence of technology gaps and 
regulatory differences between developed countries and China. 
Secondly, further trade tends to help clear China's air; however, the energy efficiency 
and technologies in China are lagging behind those of advance countries. China is 
richly endowed with coal which renders the price of coal (in energy content term) 
much lower than other energy types. The need to increase energy efficiency and adopt 
alternative energy seems crucial for China to clean up its environment and also to 
reduce global air emissions. 
Lastly, inland provinces would be made dirtier with capital inflows in the short run. 
The increases in economic activities and capital intensity are detrimental to the 
environment, without the long run and offsetting effect from income growth (which 
encourages the strengthening of environmental regulations). To develop inland 
provinces, more capital is being directed by the central governments to boost 
industries (especially the manufacturing). At least in the short run, the environment 
will be negatively affected in inland provinces. Whether and when this trend will be 
reversed depends on income growth and implementation of environmental regulations. 
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6.2 FUTUgE RESEARCH 
Future research on trade liberalization and the environment in China can be 
summarized into two directions: to extend content and research scope. We can extend 
the current analysis to incorporate more recent, accurate and disaggregate data which 
would allow the adoption of more sophisticated econometric techniques. For example, 
chapter two can be extended to include trade flows after 2004 to examine the changing 
pattcrris of trade specialization in more recent years. We can also investigate at finer 
industrial level (ISIC 4-digit) trade flows, which in turn would provide more detailed 
information on industry migration. 
A more recent, up-to-date 1-0 table for China is expected to be published soon, which 
could be employed to analyze the economy structure and the pollution content in trade 
and production. To investigate the impact of environmental policy on competitiveness 
(as we do in chapter three), we can employ firm-level data on economic response to 
environmental regulations (currently industrial level regulatory stringency is easier to 
obtain than that of firm-level). To tackle the problems of autocorrelation and 
cndogeneity in the regression analysis (as in chapters three and five), a dynamic panel 
approach using difference and system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) 
estimations is a possible alternative to current techniques, although data requirements 
will be much more demanding. 
There is scope for further and substantive research. For example, we only study 
pollution as if it stays 'local'; however pollutants are mobile via different media 
(water flows, wind ctc). One strand of research examines transboundary pollution. 
Transboundary pollution, especially air pollution, has been regarded as a grave 
environmental challenge in North-East Asia (especially between China and Japan). 
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Merrifield (1988) uses a general equilibrium model to analyze transnational pollution, 
particularly transnational pollution between the US and Canada. He concludes that 
only tight pollution abatement standards can reduce transnational pollution. Another 
related topic is waste (hazardous) trade. Although buying hazardous waste from 
abroad is illegal in China, quite a few small family enterprises in coastal provinces 
still carry out great deal of such trade. 
Further, the differences between urban and rural industries in environmental 
compliance are largely ignored in research. China's pollution levy system and 
environmental monitoring work relatively well in the urban areas, but faces a grave 
challenge in the rural areas because of intertwined interest between local governments 
and TVEs (Township and Village Enterprises). Rural industries are also relatively 
dispersed and there relatively little demand for cleaner environment in rural areas. 
During the 1990s, the environmental problems created by TVEs attracted the attention 
of Beijing (Ma and Ortonalo, 2000). However, the environmental impact of rural 
industrial development has not received sufficient examination, probably due to data 
limitations. 
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